

**A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF A REFLEXIVE DEMOCRATIC PRAXIS
RELATED TO HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

YUSEF WAGHID (B.A., D.Ed.)



Dissertation presented for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in Education Policy Studies

at the

University of Stellenbosch

Promotor: Prof J.C. Steyn

8 March 2001

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

YUSEF WAGHID

ABSTRACT

The central question of this thesis is whether education policy frameworks are sufficient to transform the higher education system in South Africa. I hold that higher education policy initiatives promulgated in statutory documents such as the White Paper 3 on Higher Education Transformation of 1997 and the Higher Education Act of 1997 are not sufficient to guide educational transformation in universities. My main claim is that as higher education role players we also need to pursue practices driven from “inside” (Gutman 1998: 34) whereby we can develop the “strength of will” to contribute towards initiating equal access and development and, enhancing accountability and quality at our universities.

I hold that in order to practice higher education transformation from “inside” (Gutman 1998: 34), one can justifiably pursue a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that it involves a form of “doing action” with some worthwhile, rational end in mind. It has to do with engaging in reflexive and democratic action attuned to social experience, more specifically higher education, where possibilities may be contemplated, reflected upon, transformed and deepened. To deepen our understanding of our actions involves asking questions about “what we have not thought to think” (Lather 1991: 156). I argue that philosophy of education, more specifically conceptual analysis, is an indispensable means by which we can develop such a deeper, clearer, more informed and better reasoned understanding about the current shifts in higher education transformation in post-

apartheid South Africa. Simultaneously, I use conceptual analysis to show *why* and *how* the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can become a “satisfying sense of personal meaning, purpose, and commitment” (Soltis 1998: 196) to guide our activities as educators in the higher education realm.

The general principle, which shapes a reflexive democratic praxis, is rationality. Rationality is shaped by logically necessary conditions such as “educational discourse”, “reflexive action” and “ethical activity to promote the moral good” in the forms of truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency and respect for evidence and people. My contention is that appealing to moral notions of rationality *is* where the strength of a reflexive democratic praxis lies. In this sense I further elucidate rationality which I argue can create spaces for achieving democratic education which, in turn, holds much promise for shaping teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service in the context of higher education transformation in South Africa.

I use “touchstones” which evolve out of rationality, namely access, relevance and dialogism, to show how the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards shaping higher education transformation in South Africa. I provide an overview of the South African higher education policy framework, in particular its concern with issues of equality, development, accountability and quality, which can be linked to and guided by “touchstones” of a reflexive democratic praxis.

A reflexive democratic praxis implies a shift towards socially distributed knowledge production which in turn shapes higher education transformation. By reflecting on instances related to the institution where I work, I argue that a more nuanced understanding of higher education has the potential to initiate equal access and development on the one hand, and to enhance accountability and quality on the other hand. I conclude with the idea that a reflexive democratic praxis can provide higher education practitioners with a conceptual frame to organise their discourses in such a way as to contribute towards transforming their activities and that of their institutions. In this way they might contribute towards addressing the demands of equality, development, accountability and quality in South African higher education.

KEYWORDS: Philosophy of education, conceptual analysis, reflexivity, democracy, praxis, higher education, transformation and South Africa.

ABSTRAK

Die sentrale kwessie wat hierdie proefskrif aanspreek, is die vraag of die raamwerke vir onderwysbeleid genoegsaam is vir die transformasie van hoër onderwys in Suid-Afrika. Ek is van mening dat die proklamasie van inisiatiewe ten opsigte van die beleid vir hoër onderwys in statutêre dokumente soos die Witskrif 3 oor die Transformasie van Hoër Onderwys (1997) en die Wet vir Hoër Onderwys (1997) nie genoegsaam is om transformasie aan universiteite te rig nie. My hoofstandpunt is dat ons, die rolspelers in hoër onderwys, ook aandag moet gee aan praktyke wat "van binne uit" gedryf word (Gutman 1998: 34). Op so 'n manier kan ons die "wilskrag" ontwikkel wat sal bydra tot die inisiering van gelyke toelating en ontwikkeling en die versterking van verantwoordelikheid en kwaliteit aan ons universiteite.

Ek is van mening dat dit geregverdig is om die transformasie van hoër onderwys "van binne uit" te bewerkstellig deur 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk omdat dit 'n soort aksie verg wat 'n betekenisvolle rasionele doel het. Dit gaan oor refleksiewe en demokratiese aksies wat afgestem is op sosiale ondervinding, veral op die hoër onderwys, waar verskillende moontlikhede oorweeg kan word, daaroor gereflekteer kan word en dit dan getransformeer en verdiep kan word. Ter wille van die verdieping van ons begrip van ons aksies moet vrae gevra word oor "what we have not thought to think" (Lather 1991: 156). My argument is dat die filosofie van die opvoeding, meer spesifiek 'n konseptuele analise, 'n onontbeerlike manier is om 'n dieper, duideliker, meer informatiewe en beter beredeneerde begrip te ontwikkel van die huidige klemverskuiwings in die transformasie

van die hoër onderwys in 'n post-apartheid Suid-Afrika. Daarmee saam gebruik ek konseptuele analise om aan te toon *waarom* en *hoe* die idee van 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk 'n "satisfying sense of personal meaning, purpose, and commitment" (Soltis 1998: 196) kan word om ons aktiwiteite as opvoedkundiges in die hoër onderwys te kan rig.

Die algemene beginsel wat aan 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk sy vorm gee is 'n rasionaliteit. Rasionaliteit word gevorm deur logies-noodsaaklike beginsels, bv "opvoedkundige diskoers", "refleksiewe aksie" en "etiese aktiwiteite wat goeie moraliteit bevorder" soos dit aangetref word in die praat van die waarheid, opregtheid, vryheid van denke, helderheid, nie-arbitrêrheid, onpartydigheid, 'n sin vir relevansie, konstantheid en respek vir bewysstukke en mense. My standpunt is dat die sterkte van 'n refleksiewe demokratiese beleid daarin geleë is dat dit aanspraak maak op morele kwessies van rasionaliteit. Ek verklaar rasionaliteit in hierdie sin verder deur te beweer dat dit die plek is om demokratiese onderwys te verwerklik, wat op sy beurt groot beloftes inhou vir onderrig en leer deur middel van afstandsonderwys, navorsing en gemeenskapsdiens in die konteks van die transformasie van hoër onderwys in Suid-Afrika.

Ek gebruik kwaliteitsaanduiders wat ontwikkel uit rasionaliteit, naamlik toeganklikheid, relevansie en samevatting om aan te toon hoe die idee van 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk kan bydra tot die vorming van die transformasie van hoër onderwys in Suid-Afrika. Ek verskaf 'n oorsig oor die raamwerk vir die Suid-Afrikaanse beleid oor hoër onderwys, in die besonder oor aspekte soos gelykheid, ontwikkeling en

verantwoordbaarheid, wat gekoppel kan word aan en gerig kan word deur die kwaliteitsaanduiders van 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk.

'n Refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk impliseer 'n klemverskuiwing in die rigting van sosiaal-verspreide kennisproduksie wat vorm gee aan die transformasie van hoër onderwys. Deur te reflekteer oor gebeure wat verband hou met die inrigting waar ek werk, argumenteer ek dat 'n fyner genuanseerde omskrywing van hoër onderwys die potensiaal het om aan die een kant gelyke toeganklikheid en ontwikkeling te inisieer en aan die ander kant om verantwoordbaarheid en kwaliteit te versterk. Ek sluit af met die gedagte dat 'n refleksiewe demokratiese praktyk die praktisyns van hoër onderwys van 'n konseptuele raamwerk kan voorsien wat hul diskussies op so 'n manier sal organiseer dat dit sal bydra tot die transformasie van hulle aktiwiteite en die van die inrigtings waarby hulle betrokke is. Op so 'n manier kan 'n bydrae gelewer word tot die aanspreek van die eise van gelykheid, ontwikkeling en verantwoordbaarheid en kwaliteit van hoër onderwys in Suid-Afrika.

SLEUTELBEGRIPE: Filosofie van die opvoeding, konseptuele analise, refleksiwiteit, demokrasie, praktyk, hoër onderwys, transformasie en Suid-Afrika.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- Prof J.C. Steyn for his unfailing co-operation, valuable comments, careful reading and expedient feedback on my drafts
- Prof T. Park (Dean) for his encouragement and value he attaches to academic research in the Faculty of Education
- Dr C.A. Puhl for her interest in my research and much appreciated language editing
- My wife Niedah and children Faiq, Zayd and Sihan for their understanding and support
- The reading group in the Faculty of Education for critical voices and rigorous insights during discussions
- The Almighty Creator for showing Wisdom, Compassion and Mercy

Yusef Waghid

STELLENBOSCH

1 September 2000

CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ABSTRAK	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
 CHAPTER 1	
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 RATIONALE OF STUDY	2
1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY	3
1.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURE	10
1.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION	13
1.6 GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE USE OF CONCEPTS	22
1.7 RELATIONAL CONCEPTS AND THEIR USE	32
1.8 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF CONCEPTS	34
1.9 SUMMARY	39
1.10 PROGRAMME OF STUDY	40
 CHAPTER 2	
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF PRAXIS	42
2.1 INTRODUCTION	42
2.2 EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE	45
2.2.1 POSITIVIST THEORY	45
2.2.2 INTERPRETIVE THEORY	50
2.2.3 CRITICAL THEORY	54
2.3 REFLEXIVE ACTION	59
2.4 ETHICAL ACTIVITY	63
2.5 PRAXIS AND RATIONALITY	64
2.5.1 TRUTH-TELLING AND SINCERITY	65

2.5.2 FREEDOM OF THOUGHT	68
2.5.3 CLARITY OF MEANING	70
2.5.4 NON-ARBITRARINESS	72
2.5.5 IMPARTIALITY	74
2.5.6 A SENSE OF RELEVANCE	78
2.5.7 CONSISTENCY	80
2.5.8 RESPECT FOR EVIDENCE AND PEOPLE	81
2.6 SUMMARY	82
 CHAPTER 3	 83
PRAXIS, RATIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION	83
3.1 INTRODUCTION	83
3.2 DEMOCRACY	83
3.3 RATIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE	89
3.3.1 SINCERITY, RESPECT, NON-ARBITRARINESS AND DIVERSITY	90
3.3.2 RELEVANCE, EQUALITY AND QUALITY	93
3.3.3 IMPARTIALITY AND DIALOGISM	99
3.3.4 CLARITY, CONSISTENCY, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SELF-DETERMINATION	102
3.4 SUMMARY	104
 CHAPTER 4	 106
HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION AND MODES OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION	106
4.1 INTRODUCTION	106
4.2 TRANSFORMING HIGHER EDUCATION	106
4.3 THE HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY FRAMEWORK AND CONDITIONS OF EQUALITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, DEVELOPMENT AND QUALITY	109
4.3.1 INITIATING TRANSFORMATION THROUGH EQUALITY	114
4.3.2 ACCENT ON DEVELOPMENT	117

4.3.3 ACCENT ON ACCOUNTABILITY	121
4.3.4 ENHANCING TRANSFORMATION THROUGH QUALITY	123
4.3.4.1 QUALITY AS EXCEPTIONAL	125
4.3.4.2 QUALITY AS PERFECTION	125
4.3.4.3 QUALITY AS FITNESS FOR PURPOSE	126
4.3.4.4 QUALITY AS VALUE FOR MONEY	127
4.3.4.5 QUALITY AS TRANSFORMATION	127
4.4 HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION	133
4.4.1 "MODES" OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND HIGHER EDUCATION	135
4.4.1.1 KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF APPLICATION	137
4.4.1.2 TRANSDISCIPLINARITY	137
4.4.1.3 HETEROGENEITY AND ORGANISATIONAL DIVERSITY	138
4.4.1.4 SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFLEXIVITY	139
4.4.1.5 QUALITY CONTROL	140
4.4.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT TOWARDS "MODE 2" FOR A REFLEXIVE DEMOCRATIC PRAXIS	142
4.5 SUMMARY	147
 CHAPTER 5	
TEACHING AND LEARNING THROUGH DISTANCE EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE	148
5.1 INTRODUCTION	148
5.2 TEACHING AND LEARNING THROUGH DISTANCE EDUCATION	152
5.2.1 EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN DISTANCE EDUCATION	156
5.2.2 DIALOGUE	160
5.2.3 LEARNER AUTONOMY	161
5.2.4 INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DESIGN	165
5.3 RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE	189

5.3.1 THE ROLE OF ACADEMICS	190
5.3.2 CHALLENGES TO HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS	195
5.3.3 THE SUPPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “MODE 1” AND “MODE 2”	197
5.3.4 A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF COMMUNITY SERVICE	202
5.4 SUMMARY	208
 CHAPTER 6	
INSTANCES OF HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION: SOME RESPONSES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH	210
6.1 INTRODUCTION	210
6.2 COMMUNITY SERVICE	210
6.3 DISTANCE EDUCATION	214
6.4 A MOMENT IN MY OWN PRAXIS: REFLEXIVE, DEMOCRATIC OR BOTH?	223
6.5 CONCLUSION: POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH	231
 REFERENCES	235

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

To be a university academic at the present time in post-apartheid South Africa should be both disturbing and challenging. Globally (including South Africa) there is a shift towards problem-solving or applied as opposed to disciplinary research (ways of experiencing and constructing knowledge) as a result of a growing demand for social relevance and accountability (Muller 1999: 10). In view of this emergent shift in knowledge production or formation (research), universities are increasingly being challenged in terms of their responsiveness and relevance to societal needs (Subotzky 1999: 17). Given the extent of world-wide moral, economic and social problems, there is increasing pressure on universities to bridge the gap between higher education and society and “to become active partners with parents, teachers, principals, community advocates, business leaders, community agencies, and general citizenry” (Braskamp & Wergin 1998: 62).

Moreover, international trends suggest that the merits of the research and teaching university relative to its considerable public costs is continuously under scrutiny in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and Canada. This is so primarily as a result of a decline in economic growth, which forces governments to reduce their subsidies to public universities. In the face of these disturbing crises, a need for a different conceptual model for higher education has emerged where

universities excel in community service (in the form of providing integrated teaching and research-based services grounded in knowledge production in the context of its application), rather than a model in which universities focus exclusively on conventional academic research and teaching (Cummings 1998: 1, 3). The challenge that universities need to supplement teaching and research with community service whereby academics through teaching and research can provide applied knowledge to assist communities in the solution of social problems is obvious enough. In this way, universities and communities become jointly responsible for social change (Braskamp & Wergin 1998: 87).

1.2 RATIONALE OF STUDY

My dissertation is an attempt to clarify what it *means* for higher education institutions, more specifically universities, to organise their practices in meeting the demands posed by changing local, national and global educational contexts. Several education policy documents have been promulgated over the past decade by the government, which require more clarity before implementation. This dissertation is an attempt to address this issue.

To say that my research investigation is an answer to the current waves of challenge, which characterise the higher education sector in South Africa, would be to underestimate the weightiness associated with educational transformation.

Instead, my contention is that higher educational policy frameworks are not sufficient to guide transformation in universities. We also need to pursue practices driven from

“inside” (Gutman 1998: 34) that would make us accountable towards seeing that our higher education system initiates equal access and development and enhances quality. I argue that one such practice is the notion of a reflexive democratic praxis. Why? Praxis involves more than just doing something. In the Aristotelian sense it is a form of “doing action” with some worthwhile, rational end in mind. It has to do with engaging in action attuned to social experience where possibilities may be contemplated, reflected upon, transformed and deepened. To deepen our understanding of our actions involves asking questions about “what we have not thought to think” (Lather 1991: 156). In this way our praxis is intertwined with the notion of reflexivity, which Lather (1998: 497) refers to “as a move towards an experience of the promise that is unforeseeable from the perspective of our present conceptual frameworks”. Likewise transforming our understanding and ways of experiencing action is shaped by our representation in participatory human practices; our social experiences are shaped by these adjuncts of democracy (Walker 1998: 22; Jarvis 1998: 95).

1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY

The Higher Education Act of 1997 emphasises the establishment of a single coordinated higher education system that responds to the needs of the South African society and communities served by institutions. In line with this, I contend that teaching and research universities in South Africa also need to expand their community service orientation in order to prepare and develop academics for the needs of effective provision in higher education.

The concept of community service that will be developed later on in this thesis is grounded in the emerging mode of knowledge production called “Mode 2”, that is, knowledge which is socially accountable, reflexive, transdisciplinary and problem-oriented. Knowledge produced in the context of its application gives rise to a concept of community service that does not undermine the merits of research and teaching. Rather, community service integrates with teaching and research through “the delivery, installation, and maintenance of knowledge-based applications to clients” within and outside the university (Cummings 1998: 1). In other words, the thesis holds the position that teaching and research universities should carefully “go service” and also become “Mode 2” knowledge producing agencies without harming their positions as teaching and research universities with sound “Mode 1” disciplinary bases (refer to section 4.4.1). Instead, I contend that community service should be viewed as a potential engine for the effective preparation and continuing development of academics for their various roles in higher education, unlike conventional notions which depict service as voluntary charitable work (Henning 1998: 44) and merely “part of good citizenship” (Gordon 1997: 75). In a different way, I shall argue that teaching and research universities in South Africa should “become more responsive to *social* problems and to function as a forum for the expression and negotiation of social discourse” (Subotzky 1999: 16-17).

It is one thing to find the current higher education situation challenging but quite another to have the equipment which is required to cope with it. It is my conviction that philosophy of education is an indispensable part of the equipment which university academics require to form a clearer, more informed and better reasoned opinion about the current shifts in higher education transformation in post-apartheid

South Africa. This presupposes a particular view of philosophy of education. Hence, I shall give a brief description of my understanding of philosophy of education.

Soltis (1998: 196) sketches contemporary philosophy of education in a compelling manner according to three dimensions: the personal, the public and the professional. To have a personal philosophy of education is to possess a set of personal beliefs about what can be considered good, right and worthwhile to do in education. The individual who practices philosophy of education achieves a “satisfying sense of personal meaning, purpose, and commitment to guide his or her activities as an educator” (1998: 196). Practising philosophy of education in a personal manner requires one to be thoughtful and self-directed. Different from an understanding of philosophy of education along the personal dimension of guiding individual practice, is philosophy of education in a public dimension. Philosophy of education in the public dimension aims to guide and direct the practice of “the many”, which may include educators, academics, intellectuals, politicians, journalists or philosophers. Soltis (1998: 197) explains philosophy of education according to the public dimension as follows:

Public philosophy of education is everybody’s business and ought to be. The point of being philosophical about education in the public dimension is to articulate public aspirations and educational values, give sense and purpose to the cooperative public enterprise of education, and provide the opportunity for thoughtful participation in the direction of education by all who care seriously about it.

Although such a public dimension of philosophy of education offers space for debates, critiques and thoughtful policy making, it is not substantive enough to examine contemporary philosophical perspectives on conceptions of teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher education transformation. This is so primarily because a public dimension of philosophy of education focuses more on proposing and articulating “public aspirations and educational values”. Why is such a view of philosophy of education insufficient to treat perspectives on higher education transformation?

I shall respond to this question by referring to the government’s proposals for the implementation of a new outcomes based education system (OBE). Outcomes based education (OBE) with its emphasis on specifying outcomes seems to objectify goals, learners and knowledge itself. OBE’s aim to produce measurable outcomes testifies its focus towards objectification which regards the world as an object detached from the self-understandings of people (Taylor 1985: 5). According to objectification, Gallagher (1992: 174) argues that people consider themselves as disengaged from ties to nature, society and history, preoccupied with exercising power and control over their environment, nature and others. In this way, specifying outcomes can be associated with control and the manipulation of learners.

But how can outcomes such as those related to empowering learners to think creatively, enabling learners to critically evaluate information, and facilitating learners to construct their own meanings of education, all be linked to control that is perceived to be pernicious for education? In a different way, why is control deemed so harmful for OBE? Jardine (in Pinar & Reynolds 1992: 118) posits that objectification, in this

instance specifying outcomes, exhibits “the desire for finality, the desire for control, the relentless lust to render the world as a harmless picture for our indifferent and disinterested perusal”. My emphasis is on the link Jardine (Pinar & Reynolds 1992: 118) establishes between the “desire for finality” and the “desire for control”. Specifying outcomes has the inherent objective to address the current crises in South African education, characterised by, among other things, “major inequalities, high drop-out and failure rates ... (and) examination orientedness with a major emphasis on learning by rote ...” (Steyn & Wilkinson 1998: 203). Following objectification, these difficulties currently encountered in education are perceived to be problems that can be fixed or at least ameliorated, hence, the “desire for finality” through the specification of outcomes. Of course, as an example, learners through the agency of educators can develop critical attitudes and abilities to construct meanings, which would contribute to improving the current system of education.

However, specifying outcomes will not necessarily help educators predict, control, manage, overcome, or eliminate educational problems. This is so for the reason that outcomes are value-laden and cannot be controlled completely in terms of objectification which draws on a “measurable”, dispassionate observation of facts as they are independent of metaphysical value-judgements. Demonstrating understanding, thinking critically about patterns of social development, constructing meaning: practices such as these could be learner experiences, not objects in a classroom educators observe and control. More significantly, the belief that education is something we can control through specifying outcomes is to disengage learners and educators from the social practice which makes education what it is.

Moreover, control can be multifold. Control is associated with one's urge to manage, regulate and order. It may also be rooted in fear of the unknown, that is, control is considered a shield as one encounters the strange (Gadamer 1992: 233). In this sense, specifying outcomes seems to be in line with controlling education in a post-Apartheid South Africa as educators strive to "coin a new vision of empowered citizens of the future" (Steyn & Wilkinson 1998). In contrast, control also stands for the capacity to remain open to the possibility that one's position may be misdirected:

It is truly a tremendous task which faces every human moment. His prejudices – his being saturated with wishes, drives, hopes, and interests – must be held under control to such an extent that the other is not made invisible or does not remain invisible. It is not easy to acknowledge that the other could be right, that oneself and one's own interests could be wrong (Gadamer 1992: 233).

Controlling education in an OBE frame through specified outcomes, and at the same time acknowledging that specifying outcomes should be open to critical examination and criticism, compels one to acknowledge that these outcomes cannot be final and fixed, and that possibilities for new and different outcomes do exist. If controlling an education system, in the sense referred to here, means that such a system should remain "open" to possibilities and challenges, then such an education system should make it possible or should establish conditions to explore alternatives. However, specifying outcomes that emphasise the development of say, critical, problem-solving and communicative learners, is precisely the condition that would curtail the establishment of such a form of control which would further prohibit learners to

become critical, interactive problem-solvers. Being open does not just happen; it represents

an ongoing choice, a conscious willed decision nourished by hope and desire ... being open both requires and sustains agency, realized in persons who intend, enjoin, judge, direct, and take responsibility for their actions. Each of us must choose to “open up” another or be *open* in her place. The decision to be open thus is a life-orientation, requiring a form of control we call self-discipline (Kerdeman 1988: 263).

Outcomes that are there are specifications which have already been decided or “opened up” for learners and educators who now have to sustain their implementation. In a different way, the choice has already been made for learners to be critical without their having developed the self-discipline to be critical. Kerdeman (1998: 264) claims “the primary purpose of education is to foster the self-discipline that is necessary for understanding how to be open and present”.

What I want to illustrate with such an analysis of OBE is that the concept cannot just be the domain of the public, that is, what the government proposes education to be. It has to be subjected to more analysing, reflecting and evaluating in seeking a clearer understanding of what OBE means. Consequently a public dimension of philosophy of education has its merits but it is not substantive enough in seeking a clearer understanding of educational matters. It is in this sense that I agree with Soltis (1998: 199) that personal and public dimensions of philosophy of education should be integrated with “professional space”. When engaged in professional philosophising,

philosophers of education are firstly concerned about the logical soundness of arguments, explaining the meaning of concepts, constructing reasonable arguments and providing ways to think about educational matters before devising “ways to do or solve them”. Soltis (1998: 199) explains that being professionally philosophical is to

... make the educational enterprise as rationally self-reflective as possible by providing philosophically rigorous examinations, critiques, justifications, analyses and syntheses of aspects of the educators’ conceptual and normative domain ... (Professional philosophers of education) are philosophical scholar-teachers who do technical philosophical work demanding rigour, precision, and adherence to their own professional canons of scholarship just as sociologists, historians, psychologists, and other academics do in their writing and teaching.

In essence, philosophy of education as an overlapping three-dimensional (personal, public and professional) approach to educational tasks and problems is more intent on “providing illumination, understanding, and perspective for educators *to think with*, than on providing programmes and policies (like OBE) for educators *to act on*” (1998: 199). This is not a denial of philosophy of education’s concern with action. But rather, before action can be taken one first requires clarity about educational thought and practice.

1.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURE

In this thesis my research methodology is grounded in philosophy of education as the

“three-dimensional personal, public and professional space” which draws on reflective activity and is concerned with questions about the analysis of concepts and grounds of knowledge, belief and practice (actions and activities). It is specifically interested in using conceptual analysis in gaining clarity about how educational matters are and *what should be done* in the realm of education (Hirst & Peters 1998a: 37). Such an understanding of philosophy of education is concerned with what is distinct about education and what ought to be done “to arrive at clearer answers to questions about what should be put on the curriculum, about teaching methods, and about how children should be treated” (1998a: 37). Of importance to this thesis is the point about conceptual analysis being an investigative tool of philosophy of education.

* In this chapter I intend to develop the conceptual framework in terms of which I shall, in later chapters, attempt to analyse what reflexive democratic praxis related to higher education transformation in South Africa means. Why? The South African government’s policies on higher education give clear signs of being consistent with international trends in favour of the market economy and the demand for greater social accountability from public institutions (Department of Education 1997a). These new orientations are reflected in signals to the universities to be prepared for a future leveling out of public support, and these have catalysed universities to submit their strategic institutional plans to the National Ministry of Education.

Most of the universities in South Africa have experienced challenges to their claims on government revenues. Subsidy cuts have created serious financial problems for higher education in South Africa (Jackson 1994: 7). Several teaching and research

universities, faced with “subsidy cuts, have avoided more drastic curtailment of their programmes by drawing more effectively on contractual research and teaching, and donor support” (Donaldson 1994: 5). This mounting financial crisis in higher education brings into question the role of the teaching and research university as the South African higher education system is being transformed. Change in the higher education sector occurs in many different ways to redress the legacies of the apartheid education system and to respond to various political, economic and social pressures of the new South Africa.

Unlike the traditional disciplinary teaching and research university, where the research problem originates with the problematics of the discipline, the problem for problem-solving research arises in a context of application. This means that knowledge is increasingly produced through addressing the political and social problems in South Africa directly. Such problem-oriented research is often financed by the private sector and less and less by traditional statutory councils (Muller 1999: 10). These fiscal limits encountered by universities invariably affect the role academics need to assume if they intend contributing effectively towards establishing a new higher education system that can also be socially accountable and relevant. Many external influences which impact the role academics should fulfill are:

- the newly proposed National Qualifications Framework (NQF) which emphasises competencies and closer links between education, training and the recognition of prior learning;
- the Higher Education Act's (1997) demand that new, flexible and appropriate curricula be developed which integrate knowledge with skills and that standards

be defined in terms of learning outcomes and appropriate assessment procedures;

- the Ministry of Education and the South African Qualifications Authority's (SAQA) priority to link one level of learning to another and enable successful learners to progress to higher levels without restriction from any starting point within the higher education system; and
- a new accreditation system for higher education to be promoted and developed by various role players in collaboration with prospective Education and Training Quality Assurers (ETQAs) (Lategan 1998: 62).

I contend that an increased demand on universities to change akin to external variables should have the effect whereby academics develop better skills to deal effectively with the teaching and research processes. I shall argue in this thesis that university academics ought to develop a reflexive democratic praxis. I contend that such a practice would contribute towards ensuring that the exclusivity of the traditional academic and disciplinary based teaching and research university does not remain isolated from the social problems of the broader South African society, irrespective of reduced state subsidies for universities. In addition, as I shall argue in the thesis, for academics to pursue a reflexive democratic praxis the achievement of equal access, development, accountability and quality in higher education may not necessarily be unattainable.

1.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Before I explore the characteristic features of conceptual analysis, I shall first offer a brief historical account of this philosophic activity concerned with educational

thought and practice. Throughout the history of Western philosophy (from Plato down to Dewey and Whitehead), philosophical consideration of the nature, content and processes of education has received attention. It was in the 20th century that philosophical issues in a sustained systematic tradition began to be seen as central to educational policy and practice (Hirst & White 1998: vi). The work of John Dewey in the United States directed philosophy of education to a study which involved the development of experimental schooling inspired by epistemological (from a point of view of knowledge), ethical and political philosophy. However for several diverse reasons, institutional, sociological and political, the serious study of education from a philosophical position failed to emerge (1998: ii). At the beginning of the 1960s in the United Kingdom, under the leadership of R.S. Peters, an already distinguished analytical philosopher, philosophy of education in the analytic tradition was launched. The analytic tradition of philosophy of education can best be understood with reference to its evolution within academic philosophy.

In the 1900s, reviving the empiricist tradition based on the work of Locke, Berkley and Hume, two Cambridge philosophers, Moore and Russell, asserted the importance of analysis as a philosophical method (1998: 2). By this they meant that concepts or ideas had to be explained by breaking them down into more basic concepts and showing their relationship with other concepts. Wittgenstein, who later joined Moore and Russell at Cambridge, in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) extended analysis to the notion that to know the meaning of a concept is to know a language that mirrors or pictures in propositional form the structure of the world. Wittgenstein's ideas had a profound influence on philosophers of the "Vienna Circle" (the logical positivists), several of who asserted that the meaning of any proposition is through

analysis and by way of technical verification. In the 1930s Wittgenstein himself rejected this view of meaning as a mirror of reality propounded in the *Tractatus* by replacing it with the idea that meanings, propositions and other forms of discourse are to be found in rules (general principles or constitutive meanings) which govern their use in public as opposed to private activities. Van der Merwe (1992: 27-28) aptly summarises this shift in Wittgensteinian thought as follows:

According to Wittgenstein's later analysis of the dialectic of "language games" and "forms of life", our linguistic endeavours to understand and communicate the content of our experiences of the world are not arbitrary interpretations of "realities" we construct and deconstruct by means of our discourse. Rather, what is implied, is that:

1. The representational or descriptive use of language is part of a specific "language game", for example the "language game" of a specific scientific practice;
2. The "objects" or "facts" of experience referred to by linguistic expressions in such a "language game" are experienced as part of a specific "form of life" which is mediated by, and therefore related solely, to that "language game";
3. The knowledge and truth claims made in such a "language game" cannot be *universalised*, but are relative to the "form of life" pertaining to that language game ... (my italics).

In 1953 Wittgenstein published his *Philosophical Investigations*, which, with the influence of his students at Oxford, caused a major revolution in philosophy whereby the impetus shifted to employ analytic methods in philosophy of education.

Philosophy of education began to take root as “a clearly demarcated area of work” in the early 1960s (Hirst & White 1998:vi). Influenced by the work of Hardie (1942), O’Conner (1957), Ryle’s *Concept of Mind* (1949) and Hare’s (1952) *The Language of Morals*, telling contributions in the field of analytic philosophy of education were made. These include the work by Scheffler (1960) in his book *The Language of Education* and Peters (1966) (Chair of Philosophy of Education at the University of London Institute of Education and who later collaborated with Popper, Mace, Oakeshott, Hamlyn and Phillips-Griffiths) in his influential major book *Ethics and Education*. Peters (1966) concerned himself with four areas of philosophical activity:

- the analysis of concepts specific to education, an area that can be seen as falling under philosophical psychology and social philosophy;
- the application of ethics and social philosophy to assumptions about desirable content and procedures of education;
- examination of the conceptual schemes and assumptions used by educational psychologists about educational processes; and
- examination of the philosophical character of the content and organisation of the curriculum and related questions about learning (in Hirst & White 1998: vi).

Peters (1966) saw conceptual analysis as a tool of philosophy of education concerned with making pronouncements on a wide range of educational issues, of which some major themes include the nature of education, teaching and learning, curriculum content, moral education, educational research and education policy. Before the rise of analytic philosophy of education in the late 1950s, it was fashionable for those involved in educational studies to deduce educational claims from philosophical premises (Evers 1998: 120). Brubacher (1955: 10) explains this phenomenon in terms of the association of educational positions with particular philosophical “isms” such as the following:

- Empiricism – the name for a family of theories of epistemology that generally accept the premise that knowledge begins with sense experience. Empiricists such as Hume (1711-1776), the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and contemporary empiricists like Quine are deeply concerned with the activity of how to construct concepts and theories (that is, explanations and predictions) out of brute data (Schwandt 1997: 37).

- Essentialism – a metaphysical doctrine that holds that objects have essences, that is, identifying or characterising properties that constitute their real, true nature (1997: 40).

- Realism - the doctrine that there are real objects that exist independently of our knowledge of their existence (1997: 133).

- Idealism – this philosophical doctrine stands in opposition to realism and holds that the world (reality and real objects) does not exist independently of human minds (1997: 67).
- Pragmatism – a philosophical outlook which comprises a set of ideas that are often appealed to in defending qualitative inquiry as a viable option in the social sciences. These ideas include: (1) anti-foundationalism, (2) a thorough going fallibilism in which one realises that although one should begin any inquiry with prejudgments and can never call everything into question at once, there is no belief that further interpretation should not happen, (3) the social character of the self and the need to cultivate a critical community of inquiry and, (4) the view that there can be no escape from the plurality of perspectives (1997: 123-124).

For example, education associated with empiricism might have pronounced an educational position: “All knowledge produced in good schools is to be universally applied”, from which various deductions were made. However, none of these approaches to philosophy of education, in the words of Hirst and White (1998: i):

... proved effective in delineating philosophy’s distinctive role in the determination of contemporary educational practice. They inevitably seemed too piecemeal, even idiosyncratic, too abstract and historical in emphasis to engage with important practical issues in a significant way.

After this approach to philosophy of education was vehemently criticised for its pronouncement of universal truth claims based on isolated “isms” it was replaced by a new philosophical tool which construed philosophy of education as an activity or practice. As has been mentioned earlier, this view of philosophy of education as analysis or analytical practice was developed by Peters and Hirst, and other philosophers of education in the 1960s and beyond at the University of London Institute of Education. Through the medium of the Philosophy of Education Society established at the London Institute of Education and the journals *Education Theory* and *Studies in Philosophy and Education* the analytic tradition took root in the United States, Australasia, and Canada (1998: ix).

Despite the criticism waged against conceptual analysis as the production of a comprehensive set of conceptual truths about education, such an approach to philosophy of education remains an important philosophical activity to understand the use of terms and clarifying what these terms stand for. Critics of analytic philosophy of education such as Evers (1998: 128) propose, for example, that critical theory needs to be used “to identify sources of social domination, oppression, and justice and to promote the kind of individual and collective reflective practices necessary for human emancipation”. I agree with Evers’ position that critical educational theory does provide educational practice a reflective and emancipatory (to transform to a more humane position) activity.

However, Evers and other post-analytic scholars seem to ignore what they refer to as post-analytic traditions, which first require clarity about their meanings. In this way, critics of conceptual analysis invariably draw on a necessary condition (although not

sufficient condition) of conceptual analysis; to understand the meaning of a concept or practice before using it to transform an educational issue. One first needs to know what critical educational theory means before one understands its use in practice. No wonder recent papers in the field of philosophy of education use an analysis of concepts to gain clarity about educational matters. Barrow (1991) analyses “critical thinking”, Gaden (1990) analyses “responsibility”, and McLaughlin (1990) analyses “belief”, to mention a few examples. Moreover, critics of conceptual analysis often seem to wage their criticism against what Moore (1903: 8-10) and Russell (1918: 193) refer to as identifying meanings which were themselves incapable of any further analysis, that is, the search for essences or absolutes of meaning. In this kind of “reductive analysis” the search is for units of meanings with less emphasis laid on clarity and on the nature of human beings’ understanding, what they do and think. This kind of reductive analysis already criticised by Popper (1945: 19) as a “source of vagueness, ambiguity and confusion”, is not what I shall use in this thesis. In fact, accepting atoms of meaning was itself rejected by Ayer (1933: 2) as “a sense metaphysical conception”.

My use of conceptual analysis grounded in the post-1960 ideas of philosophers of education at the University of London Institute of Education is adequately described by Broad (1958: 67) as an “area of philosophical study (searching for) the general principles, in accordance with which people do in fact think and behave in their every day life”. It is within such a tradition of conceptual analysis by understanding, in a Wittgensteinian sense (1953), how a term is used and by locating it within the social context that gives it meaning for a particular people, at a particular time and place, without looking for essences or atoms of meaning.

Furthermore, from 1960 analytic philosophy of education developed equally in the United States through the influence of the work Dewey and later Quine. By 1980 analytic philosophy of education

... had become a robust discipline with its own momentum, constantly drawing life and energy from developments in academic philosophy and from demands for ever more rationally constructed educational theory and practice. Its achievement over twenty years had been remarkable ... the very nature of education, its purposes and their justification had been analytically mapped and examined as never before ... Analytical work was leading to a new consideration of long-standing issues in the whole history of philosophy, as in the work of MacIntyre (1981) and Taylor (1985) (Hirst & White 1998: x).

Similarly the work of Rawls (1972) and Rorty (1980) significantly impacted the analytic tradition of philosophy of education. By the late 1990 work in the analytic tradition had strong links with other traditions, notably those of Marxism, critical theory, existentialism and postmodern thought. It is with this continuing analytic tradition in mind that I shall use conceptual analysis to distinguish and clarify the use of terms such as “reflexivity”, “democracy”, “praxis”, “rationality”, and several others related to education in general and higher education transformation in South Africa in particular.

The first part of this chapter sets out to explain why conceptual analysis can enable us (1) to reflect on and get a clearer understanding of concepts, as well as guiding our

practices as educators towards (2) looking for “logically necessary conditions” for the use of concepts. Secondly, I shall argue that concepts can only be understood in relation to other concepts. To conclude this chapter, I shall elucidate what it means to provide a justification for the use of concepts. In doing so, I shall argue that conceptual analysis can help us to pin-point more clearly what is implicit in our moral consciousness.

1.6 GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE USE OF CONCEPTS

In this section, using the work of Hirst and Peters (1998: 33) I shall explain that conceptual analysis is an appropriate philosophical activity to make sense of what it means to have an understanding of a reflexive democratic praxis. In addition, I shall draw on some of the propositions of Fay (1975) and Taylor (1985) with regard to the notion of constitutive meanings or rules and their link with practices.

To begin with, to have an understanding of a concept in the words of Hirst and Peters (1998: 30) “covers both the experience of grasping a principle *and* the ability to discriminate and use words correctly”. In the first instance, to grasp a principle means to have an understanding of what makes a concept what it is, that is, its constitutive meaning or rule (Taylor 1985: 137). Supposedly the word “dialogue” is constituted by some “general principle” that it must be a social activity which is engaged in by people and which is shaped by the material, intellectual and spiritual conditions in which they live. Such an understanding is different from one that explains dialogue in terms of a general empirical condition only such as when one observes people talk to

each other. People can talk to each other without even engaging rationally in conversation. In this sense, merely for people to be in each other's presence is not a sufficient condition for dialogue to take place. What constitutes dialogue is not simply that empirical conditions prevail whereby one sees people in conversation. Rather, what makes dialogue what it is, is the "general principle" or constitutive rule which guides and shapes rational social engagement on the part of human beings.

What are the premises in Hirst and Peters' (1998: 31) explanation of conceptual analysis to help us in our understanding of concepts? In response to this question, consider the following example: One can study "education" by describing CD-ROM curricula programmes, "on-line" computer communication networks for learners, video-conferencing rooms, multi-media learning programmes, and so on – observable, empirical conditions that can make the study of "education" happen. But before one can do so, one needs to know, in the first place, what "education" is, otherwise one might by mistake embark upon a study of "technology". And the "general principle" that distinguishes "education" from "technology" and other educational resources is what Hirst and Peters (1998: 31) describe as searching for "logically necessary conditions" for the use of a concept. According to them searching for logically necessary conditions depends on how human beings conceive activities:

A necessary condition of calling something a game is, surely, that it must be an activity which is indulged in non-seriously. Now 'non-seriously' does not mean that the player lacks involvement in it or that he (she) does not give his attention to it. Rather, it means that he can conceive it as not being part of the 'business of living' (1998: 31).

In terms of this view, to get a clearer understanding of the term “game” means not to base one’s understanding on an observable quality of the sort of what makes a thing a computer. Hence, to have a “general principle” of a concept game, firstly involves searching for logically necessary conditions for using the word “game”. Likewise, one cannot get clarity about the concept education without searching for logically necessary conditions that constitute its general principle. For example, the use of the word “education” is shaped by a logically necessary condition that human beings engage in a transaction. In this human transaction new comers (for example, learners) are initiated into an inherited tradition of human activities, aspirations, sentiments, images, opinions, beliefs, modes of understanding, customs and practices, that is, “states of mind” (Oakeshott 1998: 284-287). In this instance, a logically necessary condition which guides the use of the word “education” is that human beings are initiated into an inheritance of human achievements of understanding and belief. To be initiated into an inherited tradition of knowledge, what Oakeshott (1998: 287) refers to as “world of meanings and understandings”, is to engage with such knowledge. This implies that one not only does certain things but also understands and learns to understand what one is doing.

What I want to illustrate with this explanation of education is that the concept can be analysed in terms of searching for logically necessary conditions which guide its general principle. In the same way, in chapter two, I shall argue that in order to gain a clearer understanding of reflexive democratic praxis, one needs to search for logically necessary conditions which may constitute the general principle of such a practice. It

is in terms of the general principle that we select and organise our practices in a particular way. Different general principles would guide practices differently.

In addition the general principle of education challenges the very idea that inherited meanings and understandings are transmitted to “newcomers” who uncritically accept and apply such knowledge. For this reason Oakeshott (1998: 287) articulates the general principle which ought to shape an understanding of education as follows:

Education is not acquiring a stock of ready-made ideas, images, sentiments, beliefs etc.; it is learning to look, to listen, to think, to feel, to imagine, to believe, to understand, to choose and to wish.

This general principle of the concept education explains that human beings ought to engage not to do “this or that”, but to learn how to think, understand, imagine and enact themselves in relation to “wished-for outcomes”. To expound on this, I shall distinguish between two types of principles. Some principles regulate behaviour, for example, “Don’t play golf”. Human beings can still play golf whether or not this principle exists; but some principles (like the principle of the concept education) constitute forms of action which would not be possible without the existence of principles. The principle of golf constitutes the possibility of an action which can be called “scoring a birdie”. Without the principle, this action would not be available. The general principle (constitutive rule) opens up new possibilities; possibilities of understanding the actions of others (think of understanding roulette), including actions one has never seen before, and possibilities of actions never before performed (no one has ever hit a golf ball in exactly the same way as before).

Regarding the general principle of the concept education, human beings not only do certain things but also understand and learn to understand what they are doing. They are engaged in a transaction in a specific way. They can still refuse to challenge inherited meanings and understandings whether or not the regulatory principle exists. But without the general principle (constitutive rule) of education, an action such as to critically accept and apply knowledge, is not possible. Hence, it is the general principle or rule of education which constitutes the understanding of new forms of action for new comers to learn how to think, understand and imagine themselves. Now, implicit in the actions of human beings is the general principle of education. This principle does not regulate their actions, but rather, it is the general principle or constitutive rule which enables new actions and can be used to explain them.

Thus far, I have discussed the links between searching for logically necessary conditions which constitute the general principle of the concept education. I now need to expound on this notion of use. "Education" implies an action, but it is not an action caused by the use of the term "education", for that would imply that a regulatory principle is in operation. It is rather a kind of principle, which in the words of Fay (1975: 71), is "employed to describe behaviour which is done with a purpose ...". However, not all actions involve bodily movements and, following Fay (1975: 72), "no physical movement is ever a necessary condition for an action". He claims rather that actions are necessarily linked to the meaning of bodily movements being performed (1975: 72).

Thus, if one considers that human beings perform the act of education, it follows from this that the very act of education is constituted by its meaning (general principle), and not the bodily movements of human beings. In this regard, Fay (1975: 72) argues that one has to look at the reasons or logically necessary conditions why a particular act is performed. But then, offering reasons to explain actions requires a reference to a wider web of general principles which frame actions, what Fay (1975: 74) refers to as practices. In other words, an understanding of actions refers to reasons or logically necessary conditions, which in turn refer to general principles. It is in this way that he claims: "Constitutive meanings (general principles) underlie social practices in the same way that practices underlie actions" (1975: 74). Practices involve the possibility of giving reasons or searching for logically necessary conditions why certain actions are performed, that is, looking at the general principles which constitute certain actions.

What follows from the above is that there exists a link between the general principle of a concept and its practices. In a different way, searching for reasons or logically necessary conditions involves getting to know the use of the general principle in relation to its practices. A link between practices and general principles is articulated by Taylor (1989: 204), who interprets practices as follows:

By 'practice', I mean something extremely vague and general: more or less any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape is defined by a certain pattern of dos and don'ts (general principles) ...

Thus far, I pointed out the link between general principles and their practices. I now need to show the various ways in which general principles can interweave with their practices. A discussion of these ways is central to my thesis, for the reason that searching for logically necessary conditions of a reflexive democratic praxis in a particular context gives rise (as I shall show in later chapters) to a particular general principle which shapes practices in particular ways. Thus, the question is: How do general principles interweave with their practices? Drawing on the ideas of Taylor (1989: 205), I want to note various ways.

Firstly, “the dominant ideas (concepts might) distort the practice and that perhaps as a consequence the practice itself is corrupt ... which may demand rectification” (Taylor 1989: 205). To elucidate how the general principle of a concept might “distort” its practices, it is worthwhile considering the notion of critical understanding. This concept is driven by the emancipatory interest; that is, its purpose is to contribute to change in people's understanding of themselves and their practices and thus free them from constraints of society. In this way the general principle of critical understanding strives to engender self-reflective enquiry and learning (that is, practices) amongst individuals to bring about the clear articulation of arguments in an atmosphere of openness to overcome ideological distortions generated within social relations and institutions (Carr & Kemmis 1986: 162). The general principle of a critical approach to learning aims to generate critical action in others and gives rise to conditions to replace one distorted set of practices with another less distorted set of practices (1986: 197).

Secondly, “the whole practice and its rationale (might) come to seem repugnant, and there can be a demand for what is self-consciously seen as a transfer of allegiance to a new practice ...” (Taylor 1989: 205). For example educators, who find the belief that education involves the control of learner experiences in a classroom repugnant, might transfer their allegiance to the practice of understanding, thinking critically about patterns of social development and constructing meaning.

Thirdly, Taylor claims that “ideas and practices may come to be out of true with each other, because one or the other fails to reproduce itself properly ... (and that) some of the original rationale may be lost ... just through drift or through the challenge of new insight; or the practice may alter as it is adequately handed down” (1989: 205). Taylor’s view regarding the “original rationale” which may become “lost” through “drift or through the challenge of some new insight” can be explained with reference to the relationship between the concepts intersubjectivity and education. Literally intersubjectivity “means occurring between or among (or accessible to) two or more separate subjects or conscious minds” (Schwandt 1997: 29). Intersubjectivity implies that education is not a one-way process in which knowledge is transferred from educator to learner. Instead, education according to intersubjectivity is considered a “co-constructive process” (Taylor 1985: 137) in which both learners and educators play an active role and in which meaning is not transferred but produced. Education in an intersubjective frame requires by necessity a personal relationship in terms of which learners and educators engage in purposeful social cooperation. Following intersubjectivity, education cannot be a uni-directional process of transferring ready-made outcomes or knowledge constructs to learners. Intersubjectivity, in a Taylorian

sense is a “new insight” that challenges the rationale or general principle that education can be uni-directional.

Intersubjectivity as a “new insight” has the effect whereby learners and educators are actively engaged in producing outcomes through purposeful social co-operation in the classroom. The crucial issue for intersubjectivity is that meaning is the outcome of social co-operation. For education this means that the collective activities of learners and educators constitute the meaning of what is learned. It is not the case that educators offer meaning through specifying outcomes and learners receive it. Learners and educators are co-partners in the making of the outcome. In this way, intersubjectivity alters the practice of education from being uni-directional to that of social co-operation.

Fourthly, “there can be a perfectly stable arrangement of mutual reinforcement, where the idea (concept) seems to articulate the underlying rationale (general principle) of the dos and don’ts in an adequate and undistorted fashion; and then the idea can strengthen the pattern (practice) and keep it alive, while the experience of the pattern can constantly regenerate the idea” (Taylor 1989: 205). One may find that the general principle which guides the concept of constructivism is that knowledge of the world is the result of our constructing, and not as a result of our discovery of how the world really is (Von Glaserfeld in Held 1990: 180). A logically necessary condition which constitutes such a general principle is that “knowledge is viewed beginning from the learner’s activity and is mentally constructed and closely related to the action and experience of a learner” (Jegedi 1991: 6).

In a different way, constructivism links strongly with the idea of learner autonomy referred to by Jegedi as “the action and experience of a learner”. Another logically necessary condition which constitutes the general principle of constructivism lays claim to a social dimension in the sense that meaning is constructed in a social context and is communicated dialogically through “socially negotiated understandings” (Ernest in Steffe & Gale 1995: 480). The general principle of constructivism constituted by logically necessary conditions such as dialogue and learner autonomy, strengthens and articulates constructivist practices that reinforce the idea of learner-centredness. I consider this particular way in which the general principle of a concept reinforces its practices as central to my thesis. In later chapters it is shown that the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis can articulate and strengthen practices such as teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service in the context of higher education transformation. But now, I need to look in further detail at practices, in particular whether practices can be seen as independent of the historical context in which they occur.

Earlier I have argued that the general principle of a concept makes the concept what it is. It is the general principle which manifests itself in practices. But practices (using Taylor’s idea of diachronic causation) occur in particular social and historical contexts. Of course, one does not have to know the history of a practice in order to enact it. So, every time educators practised constructivism correctly, they used a general principle regardless of whether they knew the historical context in which constructivism arose. But does this necessarily mean that educators practised constructivism in exactly the same way? The answer is no, for the reason that the use of the general principle of constructivism for educators in the 1970s is related to

subjective, individual constructions of knowledge, whereas in the 1990s constructivist meanings were considered as socially negotiated and determined (Jegedi 1991: 7). In other words, the general principle of constructivism played a different role; it explained the practices of human beings differently in different historical contexts. This makes sense, for the very meaning of a general principle is not to constrain action (that is, only certain actions constitute “constructivism”) and to be able to understand new actions (by seeing them as instances of a particular general principle). So, clarifying why “constructivism” was practised in a particular way requires an understanding of the historical context which shaped that practice. It is with such an understanding in mind of the historical context in which practices develop that it is explained in later chapters how a reflexive democratic praxis relates to higher education transformation in South Africa.

To sum up, I have shown that a concept can be analysed in terms of searching for logically necessary conditions which guide its general principle or constitutive rule. The general principle (that which makes a concept what it is) does not regulate human actions, but rather, enables new actions which can be used to explain and reconstitute practices. In addition, to understand why a concept is used as it is used, one has to know the historical context which has shaped the general principle of a concept and its relational practices. Next, the second aspect of conceptual analysis is explored, which makes the claim that concepts can only be understood in relation to other concepts.

1.7 RELATIONAL CONCEPTS AND THEIR USE

Understanding a concept only with relevance to its general principle might be concerned with a distinct characteristic of a concept in a “loose sense” (Hirst & Peters 1998: 33). To search for logically necessary conditions that constitute concepts also involves reflecting on “their relation to other words and their use in different types of sentences” (1998: 33). In a different way, concepts can only be understood in relation to other concepts and the manner in which these different concepts are used. We would probably say that a person understands the concept education if she could relate the word education appropriately to the use of concepts such as teaching, learning and society. “Education” has to be understood in relation to a whole set of concepts subsumed under “education”.

Thus if one attempts to analyse a concept by searching for logically necessary conditions or characteristics of a concept, one usually proceeds “by taking cases within their denotation and trying out suggestions about defining characteristics” (1998: 32). In order to get clearer about “distance education” one considers different cases such as “distance education is a family of instructional methods in which communication between the educator and learner must be facilitated by print, electronic, mechanical or other devices” (Moore 1973: 664), “distance education covers various forms of study at all levels which are not under the continuous, immediate supervision of tutors present with their students in lecture rooms” (Holmberg 1977: 9), “distance education is a method of imparting knowledge, skills and attitudes by the extensive use of technical media” (Peters 1993: 206), and so on. In this way one gradually makes explicit the links between concepts. One would for instance, only understand what “distance education” means if one has an

understanding of other concepts related to “distance education”. In is in this sense that Hirst and Peters (1998: 33) claim the following:

If, therefore, we are trying to analyse a concept it is important to realise that this cannot be done adequately by just examining the use of words in a self-contained way. We have to study carefully their relation to other words (concepts) and their use in different types of sentences (contexts). An understanding of their use in sentences does not come just by the study of grammar; it is also necessary to understand the different sorts of purposes (general principles) that lie behind the use of sentences. And this requires reflection on different purposes, both linguistic and non-linguistic, that human beings share in social life.

In essence, getting to know the meaning of a concept, that is, seeing through it requires an examination of the use of a concept in relation to other concepts that govern its use. In the succeeding chapters I shall examine concepts such as reflexivity, democratic education and praxis in relation to other concepts which govern their use. This brings me to a discussion of conceptual analysis as a philosophical inquiry concerned with reflecting on the justification of the use of concepts.

1.8 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF CONCEPTS

Reflecting on the justification of the use of a concept is more than just making explicit logically necessary conditions which constitute its general principle. It seems difficult to conceive how educators could be interested in philosophical questions such as

“How do we know that we ought to educate learners?” unless they are also interested in the moral question of whether or not they ought to educate learners. This implies that reflecting on the justification for using a concept such as education, for instance, is to search for justification, that is, to question and query the point of education. Peters (1998a: 226) summarises this “non-instrumentalist” justification for the use of the word “education” as follows:

To search for justification ... (for the use of the word “education” involves asking the question): ‘What is the point of it all? (This) is to ask for features internal to it, which constitute reasons for pursuing it (education).

To ask the Socratic question “What is the point of it all?” implies that those who engage in philosophical inquiry are not satisfied with “unexamined” issues. Driven by the passions such as curiosity and imagination educators wonder about what is “out there” in relation to the worth and relevance of education. But asking questions about the “worthwhileness” of education is closely tied to the notion of the “good life” as Peters and Hirst would wish education to be. For Hirst, (1998a: 393) the practices of education connected to the individual’s wants, capacities and achievements for the future development of the “good life” are likely to involve the following:

- Varied basic practices necessary for any individual to be rationally viable in their everyday physical, personal and social contexts.
- Practices from that much wider range of optional practices available for the construction of each individual’s rational life such as the rational pursuit of theoretical and academic knowledge.

- Practices involving critical reflection on theoretical knowledge to produce persons who are “practically wise”.

What can be deduced from the above depiction of the “good life” is that virtue is not strictly used in the moral sense, but rather “as an enduring excellence of character with respect to any given human activity” (Evers 1998: 108). For Evers, the notion of virtue

... is likewise to be explicated by reference to whatever capacities and dispositions are required as means to the achievement of a good life or are partly constitutive of it (1998: 108).

Hirst’s argument for attaining the “good life” is premised on the idea that people have to engage in and pursue practices. In this sense, the criticism of some post-analytic scholars that philosophy of education has been conducted in isolation from human beings is unjustified.

Like post-analytic philosophy of education, conceptual analysis of the concept education cannot be done without “a *Human Person* and *Human Virtues*” (Evers 1998: 108). Put differently, reflecting on the justification for using the concept education cannot be done without any understanding of practices. The link between practices and the “good life” is also accentuated by MacIntyre (1981: 175) for whom practices aimed at achieving the “successful” or “good life” comprise internal, shared goods:

By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Brick-laying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting and music. In the ancient and medieval worlds the creation and sustaining of human communities – of households, cities, nations – is generally taken to be a practice in the sense in which I have defined it.

The question arises: How can MacIntyre's theory of the "good life" and its connection with practices shape our understanding and justification for using the concept education? According to MacIntyre (1981: 175) human practices contain internal, shared goods which make humans produce "excellence" appropriate to their "socially established" cooperative activities such as building cities, nations, communities, civilisations, and so on. For human practices to sustain the excellence of what is produced they need goods internal to their practices, that is, virtues. These virtues or internal goods include the courage, honesty, wisdom, judgement, integrity, constancy and patience to sustain the excellence and "cooperativeness necessary for working on a common task" (White & White 1998: 352-353). Moreover, using MacIntyre's

(1981: 175) account of internal, shared goods, White and White (1998: 353) argue that the “good life” is inextricably linked to the concept of tradition:

In seeking the good and exercising the virtues one does not do so as a solitary individual but as a bearer of a particular social identity, as someone’s daughter or father, as a member of such and such a work-group, as a citizen of such and such a city or nation. It is as a role-holder that I engage in practices; and what helps to hold my life together in a unity is my progression into and out of succession of such roles. These roles and practices, institutions and communities in which they appear have a historical dimension: behind them lie traditions of thought and action which must be sustained and cherished ... Since it is a lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage and lack of the relevant intellectual virtues which corrupt traditions and the practices, institutions and communities which currently embody them, we see, finally a third way in which virtues enter into the good life – not only as a feature of practices and of the unity of individual lives, but also as that which sustains the tradition within which alone these things can exist.

If I relate the above account of the “good life” to education, then one of the central goods intrinsic to the practices of education is to engage as “a bearer of a social identity” in the virtues and traditions of thought and action which embody education. It is not sufficient to “know about” the extrinsic goods of education which include promotion and tenure of teaching staff, curriculum development, learners and examinations if we are to acquire the moral virtues of courage, honesty, wisdom, judgement, integrity, constancy and patience which engaging in education promotes.

We have to engage in educative activities through participation, observation and imagination, that is, to become immersed in the practices of education.

What follows from the above is that justifying the use of a concept, in this instance education, is to search for logically necessary conditions which not only concern the extrinsic ends of education but also concern characteristics connected to its intrinsic good. In a different way, to justify the use of a concept involves searching for logically necessary conditions that can ensure the “good life”. Goods intrinsic to the practices of education and which organise logically necessary conditions that constitute the general principle of the concept are linked to human practices aimed at achieving the “good life”. In the next chapter I shall argue that the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis is linked closely to achieving the “good life”.

1.9 SUMMARY

I have shown that philosophy of education through conceptual analysis can assist one to get a clearer, more informed and better reasoned opinion about concepts, a practice necessary to gain clarity about the current shifts in higher education transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. I have developed the argument that conceptual analysis involves searching for logically necessary conditions or characteristics, which constitute the general principle of a concept. In other words, the applicability of a concept must be based on the satisfaction of certain logically necessary conditions (Richman 1965: 66; Hacker 1972: 258). To know the general principle of a concept is to understand its meaning in order to gain clarity as to how its practices are organised. Clarity is used in a Popperian (1963: 28) sense whereby “there can be no point in

trying to be more precise than what our problems demands". In a different way, to gain clarity is not to search for a set of universal context-free presuppositions, but rather for the general principle which is context-dependent.

Also, different general principles in particular social and historical contexts guide practices differently. In addition, to understand why a concept is used as it is practised requires an examination of the use of a concept in relation to other concepts that govern its use. Likewise, justifying the use of a concept involves searching for logically necessary conditions that can ensure the "good life" – those internal, shared goods which make humans produce "excellence" appropriate to their practices. I acknowledge the claims of critics that evidence for the decline of analytic philosophy of education "continues to pile up" (Evers 1979: 1). However, my contention is that these critics reject a mix of reductive and conceptual analysis which would, for example, attempt to analyse a concept like education on its own and not in relation to the practices of people (Peters 1973; Haack 1976; Golding 1981).

1.10 PROGRAMME OF STUDY

In terms of conceptual analysis acknowledging the importance of the social context developed thus far, I shall now attempt to uncover the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis, which as will be argued later on, can create possibilities for rational discourse related to higher education transformation in South Africa.

As with this chapter, throughout the thesis I use conceptual analysis to clarify the meanings of concepts. In **Chapter Two** I identify and clarify meanings of praxis by

searching for logically necessary conditions which constitute its general principle. In doing so, I elucidate on logically necessary conditions such as “educational discourse”, “reflexive action” and “ethical activity to promote the moral good” which constitute rationality, the general principle of praxis. Thereafter, I argue that rationality effects truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency and respect for evidence and people. My contention is that appealing to meanings of rationality *is* where the strength of praxis lies.

In **Chapter Three** I argue that forms of rationality can create spaces for achieving democratic education which, in turn, holds much promise for shaping teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service in the context of higher education transformation in South Africa.

In **Chapter Four** I use “touchstones” of rationality to show how the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can be used to make sense of and to shape higher education transformation in South Africa. An overview of the South African higher education policy framework is provided, in particular its concern with issues of equality, development, accountability and quality which can be linked to “touchstones” of a reflexive democratic praxis. Then, I attempt to show how notions of equal access, relevance and dialogism (as “touchstones” of a reflexive democratic praxis) can contribute towards **initiating** equality and development and **enhancing** accountability and quality in higher education transformation in South Africa.

In **Chapter Five** I address the question as to how a reflexive democratic praxis in terms of the shift towards “Mode 2” knowledge production can shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher education transformation. It is my contention that a more nuanced understanding of higher education has the potential to **initiate** equal access and development on the one hand, and to **enhance** accountability and quality on the other hand.

In **Chapter Six** I identify instances related to community service and distance education with particular emphasis on the University of Stellenbosch Faculty of Education. This is intended to give further clarity to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis which hold much promise for initiating equal access and development and enhancing accountability and quality as far as university community service and distance education initiatives are concerned. I conclude with the idea that a reflexive democratic praxis can provide higher education practitioners with a conceptual frame to organise their discourses in such a way as to contribute towards transforming their activities and that of their institutions. In this way they might achieve more toward this worthwhile end: to contribute towards addressing the demands of equality, development, accountability and quality in South African higher education.

CHAPTER 2

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF PRAXIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I wish to identify and spell out meanings of praxis by searching for logically necessary conditions which constitute its general principle. Firstly, I shall elucidate on logically necessary conditions such as “educational discourse”, “reflexive action” and “ethical activity to promote the moral good” which constitute rationality, the general principle of praxis. Secondly, I shall argue that rationality effects truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency and respect for evidence and people. Appealing to meanings of rationality is where the strength of praxis lies.

The first issue is what constitutes praxis. In *Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary of Terms*, Schwandt (1997: 124) explains “praxis” as a term used for a particular form of human activity that means something different from our common usage of the word “practice”. He claims that this particular form of human activity is not instrumental, in the sense that it does not bring about specific products that requires a kind of technical know-how or expertise (1997: 124). To understand this difference between praxis and practice, one needs to consider praxis in its historical context. In my reading of Aristotle’s (1955: 4) *Nichomachean Ethics*, the history of the concept clearly reveals that it is a practice of “doing something”, that is, engaging in morally committed actions such as education and other ethical, political and social discourses. In an

Aristotelian sense praxis is a discourse concerned with the “*bios praktikos*” – a practice committed to right living through the pursuit of the human good (Aristotle 1955: 4). More specifically praxis is an educational discourse (a logically necessary condition) concerned with how to promote “intrinsically worthwhile ends” (Peters 1966: 54). Praxis is different from “*poiesis*” or “making action”, that is, action by which the end is to bring some specific product or object into existence such as a ship or a brick wall. Carr (1998: 175), drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of epistemological presuppositions of praxis, explains the concept as follows:

Although ‘practice’ (*praxis*) is also action directed towards the achievement of some end, it differs from *poiesis* in several crucial respects. In the first place the end of a practice is not to produce an object or artefact but to realise some morally worthwhile ‘good’. But, secondly, practice is not a neutral instrument by means of which this ‘good’ can be produced. The ‘good’ for the sake of which a practice is pursued cannot be ‘made’, it can only be done. ‘Practice’ (*praxis*) is a form of ‘doing action’ precisely because its end can only be realised ‘through’ action and can only exist in the action (discourse) itself.

It is with the above historical understanding of praxis as a form of “doing action” in mind that I shall now explore logically necessary conditions which may constitute its general principle. Logically necessary conditions of praxis may include (1) “educational discourse”, in particular how it relates to the theoretical frameworks of thinking which guide the activities of those involved in the discourse, (2) “reflexive action” that can change the theory that guides it and (3) ethical activity which can

promote the moral good. I shall now discuss these “characteristics” of praxis in order to uncover its general principle.

2.2 EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE

Educational discourse (practice) is a logically necessary condition of praxis. Human beings doing praxis change not only the world of objects but also themselves and their social relations from a lower level of “educatedness” to a higher level of “educatedness” (Gould 1988: 10; Hernandez 1997: 19; Cooper 1998: 180). In this sense, praxis implies that human beings engage in educational discourse and “attempt to describe, explain, and change (improve) human behaviour in educational contexts” (Kelchtermans & Schratz, 1994: 245). I already explained that thoughts or ways of understanding and seeing the world constitute educational discourse (practice) (Fay 1975: 76). Therefore, to construe educational discourse as an activity according to different meanings or methodological concerns (Greene 1987; Small 1987) is to know the “grammar of thinking”, “shapes of consciousness” or “forms of rationality” (Morrow 1995), which can guide praxis. In this chapter I distinguish between positivist theory, interpretive theory and critical theory as distinctive patterns of understanding or methodological concerns of knowing. Each of these patterns of thinking gives different meanings to educational discourse and, hence, praxis.

2.2.1 Positivist theory

Positivism claims that all events we want to explain are “facts in the world”, that is, of the same logical type. For positivist theory there can be no rational argument about

values – values are subjective like feelings or attitudes. Positivist theory insists that there is only one proper form of explanation, that is, the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation: whenever (1) C happens then E occurs, (2) C happened, (3) therefore E occurred. The nomological statement indicated by (1), that is, C happens then E occurs, specifies a causal relationship between variables. C is called the “independent” variable because in the context of this explanation the occurrence of C is independent of the occurrence of E, and E the “dependent” variable because its occurrence depends on the occurrence of C. For example, “Whenever a teacher gives information to a child, the child learns” is a nomological or synthetic statement (it specifies a relationship between two facts – a teacher giving information to a child and the child learning) (Morrow 1995).

For positivist theory the object of educational discourse is to try to find nomological or “scientific” statements, that is hypotheses, and then to set out to try to “falsify” them (educational discourse proceeds by formulating an hypothesis (“conjecture”), and then setting out to “test” it to try to refute it). Positivist theory claims that educational discourse should enable one to gain better control over educational processes; it refers to “the formal, systematic application of the scientific method to the study of educational problems ... namely to explain, predict / or control educational phenomena” (Gay 1987: 4). It is in this positivist, “scientific” frame that, according to Marcinkowski (1993: 41), educational discourse can be couched as “quantitative”, characterised by a:

- need to establish clear linkages between variables rooted in hypotheses;
- frequent preoccupation with the establishment of causal relationships;

- desire to establish that the results of a particular investigation can be generalised beyond a particular research setting; and
- belief in the importance of the ability to replicate studies and their findings to avoid potential research bias.

Within a positivist theory, educational discourse in quantitative terms implies that it must be possible to find nomological statements (with possible key variables) whereby one can find out how to control education with scientific precision. It is in this regard that MacMillan and Schumacher (1989: 10) point out that the intentions of quantitative educational discourse may be generally organised into four interrelated categories: to describe, to predict, to control, and to explain. The link between explanation and prediction, and thus explanation and control, provides a haunting and powerful motive for quantitative educational discourse.

Moreover, in keeping with the positivists' explanation of educational discourse, "scientific method" within the arena of quantitative educational discourse, following Marcinkowski (1993: 52), can be associated with different types of methodologies:

- description – surveys, longitudinal and cross-sectional developmental studies, correlational studies;
- prediction – correlational and multi-correlational statistical analyses; and
- explanation and control - experimental type designs.

However, the main problem in finding hypotheses or nomological statements in educational discourse is to know what the variables are. Say we wanted to explain

why a learner learns successfully (E). Perhaps it is her intelligence, perhaps the climate in the school, perhaps the quality of her home and community, perhaps her hard work, perhaps the governance of the schooling system, etc. (here we are searching for C). But these possibilities are, in a sense, at different levels; they themselves might be causally linked in various ways, as often experienced by researchers using experimental methodologies. For this reason, most of the explanations on offer in educational discourse within a positivist frame do not conform to the D-N model of explanation. In educational discourse we do not (yet) know what the possible key variables are; and we cannot generate fruitful nomological statements or hypotheses unless we know that. Nomological statements specify a relation between variables. Many theorists have tried and the diversity, and range, of proposed “theories” of education can be read as so many attempts to suggest key variables.

Moreover, many explanations in educational discourse are probabilistic or statistical (showing correlations between various factors) and have such form of reasoning as:

1. In 80% of cases where a learner is in the classroom with educators she learns.
2. A learner is in the classroom with an educator.
3. Therefore there is 80% chance that the learner will learn.

Positivists would argue that such explanations are not real explanations because we cannot yet explain why a learner is amongst the 80% who learns or amongst the 20% who do not, in spite of the fact that they all had classroom contact with an educator.

For positivism the problem is that (1) is not a proper nomological statement (hypothesis), it is not universal, and it cannot be falsified by one contrary instance. In the words of Marcinkowski (1993: 60):

as with experimental research (educational discourse), there are some limitations to correlation and prediction studies. While some may think of relationships in causal terms, these types of studies do not lead to causal claims. Rather they portray apparent relationships at one or more particular points in time. We may treat relationship claims as working hypotheses with respect to causality, though can rarely, if ever, test them using these methods. A second limitation has to do with the complex rules governing the various statistical analyses employed in correlational and prediction studies. Whether out of practicality or for some other reason, it is a fairly common occurrence that these rules are violated (e.g., a test requiring interval data is used on ordinal sets).

In the main, educational discourse based on positivist theory uses a methodology which sees meanings as separate from people's subjective interpretations, consciousness and intentions. For this reason, positivist theory does not seem to be a plausible pattern of thinking to guide educational discourse which involves the human element. In a different way, it sees no scope for value judgements of people, thus alienating itself from the realms of ethical and political commitment. Educational discourse in the positivist tradition draws on a neutral, objective, or statistical language and, occurs independent of human beings' self-understandings (Kelchtermans & Schratz 1994: 244). Bearing in mind that praxis involves the

practices of human beings, to assume that a neutral kind of educational discourse can exist, is itself an untenable idea.

2.2.2 Interpretive theory

Interpretive theory insists on two central issues: the self-understanding of the individual forms the basis of all social interpretation (phenomenological or hermeneutical) and human consciousness is transparent (or that human explanations and interpretations, as they appear, do not conceal any deeper understanding of events). On the one hand, Vandenberg (1995: 188-189) explains social interpretation on a phenomenological level according to three phases: (1) understanding or gaining insight into the phenomenon; (2) describing phenomena in the realm of transcending, in conscious existence, that is, “by imagining a conversation with others to give one’s findings an intersubjective testing”; and (3) recontextualising the well-defined phenomenon by locating it “within the whole educational domain and evaluating its significance for the development of an integral human life”. On the other hand, Danner (1995: 223) explains social interpretation as “hermeneutic understanding” which aims to make meaning explicit, to explain, to understand “sense” and to interpret meaning. In his words,

we can say that when we deal with *human beings* and *human products* we are involved in a hermeneutic process. In the educational field it is especially important to recognise this wide range of hermeneutic potentiality and reality ... (which) must be “understood”. Hermeneutics cannot be reduced to interpretation of texts without misrepresenting its real and full content;

interpretation of texts is a special, and important, case of hermeneutics. Hermeneutic understanding happens every time a person encounters another human being or human artefact (1995: 223).

Both these explanations of social interpretation accord with interpretive theory. Interpretive theory believes that analysis involves more than observation (as some positivists believe). The crucial point of analysis is to reach the self-understanding of the person acting in the situation, analysing and understanding his or her reasons for their actions (Fay 1975: 74). For example, one person at a distance from another person waves her hand. How does one interpret her action? Perhaps she is calling the other person; or even making a gesture with her hand to show her anger; maybe she is just stretching her arm. In other words, her actions cannot just be observed and taken for granted that she is waving at the other person. Her actions have to be explained. We need to know her reasons for performing such an action; we need to know her self-understanding.

Interpretive theory rejects the claim that all events we want to explain are of the same logical type in terms of the view that human actions belong to a different logical category from all other events in the world. For interpretive theory an understanding of human beings and society is logically different from an understanding of the natural world. For this reason, according to interpretive theory we cannot give a D-N explanation (causal explanation) of human action since the dependent variables (what is trying to be explained) cannot be identified (Fay 1975: 74).

Accordingly, in an interpretive theory, educational discourse can be described as “qualitative”, characterised by the use of “archival knowledge, narrative knowledge or observational knowledge”. According to Bennett de Marrais (1998: 10), the qualitative methodologies used according to the interpretive theory of educational discourse are given in the three statements below.

- Observational knowing tends to privilege ethnography and action research through participant observation, and the writing of detailed field notes to capture the words and behaviour of people.
- Archival knowing provides the framework for historical research, reliant primarily on archival data (journals, diaries, letters, newspapers, photographs, films, etc.) and may also include interviews and oral histories.
- Narrative knowing usually takes the form of in-depth interviews, oral histories, autobiography, narratology and phenomenology, but extends top privilege to participant observations.

Educational discourse involves human practices, which are so difficult to quantify, difficult to pin down with "prediction"; findings are presented in narrative and rich hermeneutic or qualitative form. In opposition to positivist theory, interpretive theory “view(s) the human being as a subject of knowledge principally capable of reflection, (potential) rationality, discursive communication, and social interaction (Kelchtermans & Schratz 1994: 244).

Moreover, the interpretive theory differs distinctly from positivist theory. A human action such as “acquiring knowledge” cannot simply be identified by mere observation or discovery. For instance, you open a text with some information about alligators. What are you doing? Perhaps you are reading the text to explain how alligators are similar to or different from crocodiles, or consulting the text in order to write an essay, or moving your eyes over the page without reading it. To know which of these actions is actually taking place I might need to know something about your purposes, or the context in which the action takes place. If I determined that what you are doing is “looking at the pages of the text”, I have explained the action by describing it - a view positivist theory rejects. I have explained your action in terms of your reason for doing it. In this way, different types of explanations exist for different actions theorists want to interpret or explain. On the one hand, positivist theory, in contrast, insists that there is one absolute or objective form of explanation. For interpretive theory on the other hand, to know the meaning of a word is to know how the word is used, and not just to get the “correct image” or “true picture”. In other words, meaning grows out of human experiences. For instance, for analytical philosophers in education to get to know the meaning of education is to know how the concept is used and not just what we think it is or what we think it ought to be. I contend that interpretive theory’s concern with explanation, interpretation and analysis provide educational discourse and, hence, praxis with some tools that break with discourse as a positivist “science”. These tools of analysis and interpretation are necessary but not sufficient for educational discourse to change or transform the self-understandings of people.

2.2.3 Critical theory

By far the most important dimension of critical theory is the fact that it is driven by the emancipatory interest; that is, its purpose is to contribute to change in people's understanding of themselves and their practices and thus free them from constraints of society (Carr 1983, Giroux 1983, Aronowitz & Giroux 1992). A critical educational theory strives to engender self-reflective enquiry amongst individuals to bring about the clear articulation of arguments in an atmosphere of openness to overcome ideological distortions generated within social relations and institutions (Carr & Kemmis 1986: 162). A critical approach to educational discourse aims to generate critical action in others and gives rise to conditions to replace one distorted set of practices with another, hopefully less distorted set of practices (1986: 197).

Critical theory alleges that positivist and interpretive theories, at best, only describe or explain the social world, and that critical educational theory provides resources both to criticise and change the social world. For critical theory "... the truth or falsity of (its) theories will be partially determined by whether they are in fact translated into action" (Fay 1975: 95). Critical theory does not produce a "theory"; it develops theories specific to the particular historical situations with which it is concerned – theories that have a practical purpose: to help people to change an unsatisfactory situation (Habermas 1972: 308). In order to explain the type of educational discourse that can be shaped by critical theory, I draw on two case studies:

- MacIntyre (1998: 176) describes, for example, how educational discourse in literacy instruction in whole language classrooms can change the way students learn. According to MacIntyre (1998: 176) the procedure will be thus:

Teachers can teach skills meaningfully in whole language classrooms, and I wanted to explore how they do it and what children learn from them (i.e. how their practices changed). It involved a qualitative description of literacy instruction employing ethnographic data collection techniques and (quantitative) pre- and post-measures of literacy skills of students receiving that instruction. I viewed the qualitative and quantitative data as complementary because both could contribute vital information to the study problem.

- Velazquez (1998: 65), reporting on her interpretive ethnographic educational discourse investigating a Mexican-American migrant community, states that it is unethical and irresponsible "to try to uncover and interpret the realities of participants' lives without also supporting the reflective process that leads to change from oppression and promotes self-determination ... improvement in the quality of life of the recipient ... the type of research (educational discourse) that transforms and empowers".

In both cases, educational discourse began with a problem-posing phase characterised by a process of critical reflection about, and assessment of, the problem in order to clearly define it. The problem generally derives from experience and the goal is to initiate change, rather than to create or test theory. The data were quantitatively

acquired, such as the numerical scores written down to assess students' writing progress, and qualitatively analysed such as to how the social context of migrancy shaped the experiences of participant adults as learners. However, the research process did not end after the findings were reported. This type of critical educational discourse shaped by critical theory uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to effect change and to support the kind of reflection that leads to change (emancipation) during and after the discourse, and thus blurring the familiar quantitative / qualitative distinction (Walker & Evers 1988; Evers 1991; Lakomski 1991). In the words of Velazquez (1998: 66) "transformative ... (that is, critical educational discourse) stimulates critical awareness of power relationships and empowers researcher and participants with the knowledge to change power relationships".

Educational discourse guided by critical theory suggests that the methodologies to be used depend on an understanding of the basis of the problem. These methodologies can be both quantitative and qualitative. In this regard, Marcinkowski (1993: 60) argues that educational discourse can employ lengthy, open-ended interviews for data collection purposes, and use content analysis procedures for data analysis purposes as is common in qualitative educational discourse. In addition, both procedures present findings in the form of quantitative frequency distributions. In this way, critical theory transcends the quantitative-qualitative educational discourse dichotomy. Yates (1997: 491) argues that quantitative questions "helped frame new qualitative agendas for (educational) researchers".

Bryman (1988: 123) argues the quantitative-qualitative educational discourse dichotomy should be transcended. His view appears reasonably representative of the views currently held by many within the educational community. Smith and Heshusius (1986:4) posit that over the last 25-30 years the quantitative-qualitative debate moved from conflict to détente to cooperation:

A recent trend in the literature concerning quantitative versus qualitative approaches to (educational discourse) research indicates two things about the nature of this debate. First, many educational inquirers now accept the idea that there are two different, equally legitimate approaches to inquiry. Second, many inquirers also feel that whatever differences may exist between the two perspectives, they do not, in the final analysis, really matter very much ... (Many) educational inquirers now seem to think that the profession has reached a stage of, if not synthesis, then certainly compatibility and cooperation between the approaches.

Like Bryman (1988), Firestone (1987), Smith and Heshusius (1986), Evers (1991) and Lakomski (1991) my position is that the use of critical theory in educational discourse transcends the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy. In this regard it is also worth quoting Mouton (1996), McLaren and Giarelli (1995), and Sherman and Webb (1990) on the complementary relationship between quantitative and qualitative educational discourse framed within critical theory. Mouton (1996: 31) holds the following view:

As far as epistemology is concerned, critical social scientists accept some of the basic assumptions of both positivism and phenomenology. They accept the

need for both causal theories based on objective (quantitative) observation and interpretive (qualitative) descriptions based on intersubjective understanding.

McLaren and Giarelli (1995: 2) have this to say about critical theory:

(It) is, at its center (sic), an effort to join empirical investigation (quantitative educational discourse), the task of interpretation (qualitative), and a critique of this reality ... (in order) to improve human existence by viewing knowledge for its emancipatory or repressive potential.

Sherman and Webb (1990: 11) comment on the complementary relationship between quantitative and qualitative educational discourse as follows:

(Educational discourse) ... today requires a more comprehensive perspective in which the considerations that qualitative researchers raise, and the questions about worth and intent posed by philosophy, are as much a part of the discussion as are measurement and analysis.

Of what good then, is critical theory for educational discourse, more specifically praxis? The notion of critical educational discourse, as has been alluded to earlier, is underscored by the recognition that our actions will change others, and an understanding that we too must be open to change. Tierney (1994: 101) posits that educational discourse "... is meant to be transformative (critical); we do not merely analyse or study an object to gain greater understanding, but instead struggle to investigate how individuals and groups might be better able to change their

situations". Inherent in the process of investigating how our actions will change others, we are engaged with constructions of knowledge for ourselves and communicate what we have experienced to others. In this way, we are rational, that is, we are crafting meaning and understandings of critical, active inquiry within our educational discourse; we conceptualise what we are doing and write about our knowing. This view of rationality builds on Taylor's (1985: 139 & 150) view of rationality as engaging in clear articulation of issues and attuning oneself to the social world where possibilities may be contemplated, reflected upon, transformed and deepened. What this explanation of educational discourse amounts to is, that discourse framed in a critical frame can be considered a logically necessary condition for rationality to occur. In a different way, educational discourse in a critical sense constitutes rationality. And, for the reason that critical educational discourse is a logically necessary condition of praxis, and such a discourse constitutes rationality, the latter can be considered the general principle of praxis.

Before moving on to a detailed discussion of rationality, I shall first expand on the notions of reflexive action and ethical educational activity as logically necessary conditions which constitute praxis. In addition to critical educational discourse, both reflexive action and ethical educational activity have strong links with rationality.

2.3 REFLEXIVE ACTION

Schwandt (1997: 135) refers to reflexivity or reflectivity as two different ideas informing qualitative inquiry: (1) the process of critical self-reflection on one's biases, theoretical predispositions, preferences, and so on; and (2) critical examination of *how*

one's personal and theoretical commitments serve as resources for generating particular constructions of meaning in particular contexts, meanings one would probably not have thought about. It is in this sense that I make sense of reflexive action as a logically necessary condition of praxis which "can itself transform the 'theory' which guides it" (Carr 1998: 180), in this instance, critical educational discourse. In a different way, reflexive action involves critically examining one's personal and theoretical dispositions and, at the same time, investigating how one's personal and theoretical commitments can transform patterns of critical educational discourse.

But what does it mean for reflexive action to change or transform critical educational discourse? Reflexive action subjects critical educational discourse to an "infinite" analysis through which the human experience occurs or is trying to occur without ever coming to an end. In a different way, reflexive action deconstructs critical educational discourse in the sense that it aims "to perform the critique of the critique ... but to think its possibility (for occurring or trying to occur) from another point" (Derrida in Salusinsky 1987: 20). For Derrida (in Egèa-Kuehne 1995: 296) only when critical educational discourse is "willing to rigorously critique and analyse its own heritage can it move forth and grow richer". In this sense, reflexive action rethinks or deconstructs critical educational discourse. In the words of Lather (1991: 156), reflexive action as deconstruction

... helps us to ask questions about what we have not thought to think, about what is most densely invested in our discourses / practices, about what has been muted, repressed, unheard in our liberatory efforts. It helps us to both

define the politics in our critical practices and move toward understanding the shortcomings of theories of political transformation.

Deconstruction is a kind of hermeneutics practiced in postpositivism, also referred to as radical hermeneutics or the hermeneutics of suspicion (Schwandt 1997: 28-29). The term “destrucktion” was originally explained by Heidegger (1889-1976), although Derrida’s term “deconstruction” is the most often cited source. Deconstruction examines “what is left out of a text, what is unnamed, what is excluded, and what is concealed” (1997: 29).

But how can deconstructive reflexive action help us to recover a vision of critical educational discourse that might become “muted” or “repressed” if we are not reflexive of critical educational discourse? My interest is in what Lather (1998: 497) refers to as a “move towards an experience of the promise that is unforeseeable from the perspective of our present conceptual frameworks”. I contend that critical educational discourse is not enough and that praxis should be the result of our own personal perspective that came into play with the data and “imaginative reconstructions of our world” (Lather 1991: 156). Having an imaginary reconstruction of something is more than just having a virtue, a state of mind, talent or capacity. Following Wilson (1998: 143), to have an “imaginary reconstruction” of something is not like being “excitable or benevolent or open-minded ... (but) it is (to have) a *disposition to address and act on the world by the use of reason* ... a certain sense of being serious”. In this sense, to develop an imaginary educational discourse means to intensify the use of reason on the part of educators to a level of seriousness. I want to

develop this notion of seriousness in the use of reason by drawing on the ideas of Nuyen (1996). For Nueyn (1996: 97)

Reason (as seriousness) ... encourages the imagination to come up with images, symbols, and metaphors to support ideas through which the unrepresentable can be thought.

On the one hand, seriousness through the use of reason implies that the educator comes up with “ideas that are ever more challenging to the imagination”, “to exceed everything that can be presented” (1996: 100-101). On the other hand, educators need “to cultivate (in them) the power of the imagination”, that is, to encourage themselves “to ever more challenging ideas, taking the imagination with it in the process” (1996: 101). This does not mean that imagination should be uncontrolled and “unbounded”. Kant (in Nuyen 1996: 97) insists “that the imagination must be kept in check even though there is a sense in which it should be unbounded”. Of course it can be argued that critical educational discourse can assist us with the basics of what we more or less have to know to effect change within our society and ourselves. But my argument for allowing space for seriousness through the use of reason (rationality) on the part of educators is what Lyotard (in Nuyen 1996: 102) refers to as “progressing toward the better” or what Rorty (in Nuyen 1996: 102) calls a “sense of wonder”.

Wilson asserts that no kind of serious educational discourse is possible without a basis for seriousness (1998: 153). This implies that educators have to encourage themselves “to soar to ever more challenging ideas, taking the imagination with it in the process” (Nuyen 1996: 101). To foster imagination within them, educators have to expand their

self-awareness in order to engender new ways of thinking and acting such as developing greater empathy and sensitivity to the “unpredictable encounters” that can be achieved through their use of their faculties of imagination. Hence, developing an “imaginary” educational discourse lies in the implementation of seriousness or the need for it through the use of reason which can “exceed” the boundaries of critical educational discourse to that of imaginary, deconstructive reflexive educational discourse “that can never end” (Orner, Miller & Ellsworth 1996: 80). In this way, reflexive deconstructive educational discourse further enacts the power of rationality (reason) to encourage the imagination of human beings through which the “unrepresentable can be thought”.

2.4 ETHICAL ACTIVITY

In addition to critical and reflexive educational discourse, another logically necessary condition of praxis, as has been alluded to in chapter one, is to promote “intrinsically worthwhile ends” or the moral good (Peters 1966: 54). To say that praxis has “intrinsically worthwhile ends” is to talk about educational discourse as an ethical activity where, in the words of Peters (1998a: 217):

... truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, and for people as a source of it ... must be accepted as virtues by anyone who is seriously concerned with answering questions by the use of reason (rationality).

In a different way, what makes praxis ethical is its concern with achieving the “good life” described as engaging in educational discourse in the pursuit of moral consciousness (Hirst 1998a: 393), in this sense, as an enduring excellence of character with respect to any given human activity (Evers 1998: 108). An explanation of ethical discourse has as its basis the notion of rationality which can be related to practices such as those “worthwhile ends” noted above by Peters (1998a: 217).

We can now justifiably refer to discourses grounded in critical, reflexive and ethical activities as logically necessary conditions which constitute an understanding of praxis. And, for the reason that engaging in critical, reflexive and ethical discourses constitute the meaning of rational practice, one can justifiably consider the general principle of praxis to be rationality. This leads to a discussion of rationality as the general principle of praxis. In the next section I elucidate the notions of “truth-telling and sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a sense of relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, and for people as a source of it” as forms of rational educational discourse grounded in critical, reflexive and moral spheres of meaning making.

2.5 PRAXIS AND RATIONALITY

In terms of conceptual analysis, using the understanding that the general principle of a concept can be expounded upon through clarifying other relational concepts, I shall now attempt to explain rationality in this way.

As has been argued for already, it is through rationality that we consider how our educational discourses shape both ourselves and the communities that we are striving to participate in and serve; often renewing possibilities for changing others, and understanding that we too must be open to change. Tierney (1994: 98) argues that rationality “constructs our beings and roles in relation to others over and over again through engagement with others in meaning-making”. Implicit in this notion of rationality is an understanding that it is our obligation to clarify our reasons and rationales for choosing to pursue educational discourse. Also, rationality demands that we question our intentions for interacting with others in certain ways, methodological choices, and reasons for focusing on certain topics. I shall now explain rationality as the general principle of praxis in relation to (1) truth-telling and sincerity, (2) freedom of thought or liberty, (3) clarity, (4) non-arbitrariness, (5) impartiality, (6) a sense of relevance, (7) consistency and, (8) respect for evidence and people.

2.5.1 Truth-telling and sincerity

Rationality implies that praxis (critical, reflexive and ethical discourse) has to be practised in a sincere and truthful way. Sincerity and truthfulness are based on an understanding that one has to be honest, conscious and willing in one's actions - more specifically in praxis. Human beings engage in praxis, which makes the latter a form of public as opposed to a private discourse. This means that people engaging in praxis have to be sincere, prepared and willing to listen to each other's, at times, conflicting views and differences. By implication, they should be patient and tolerant towards one another even if they express diverse views. Even in the wake of conflict and severe differences of opinion between participants in praxis, the probability of confrontation

would be ruled out by the willingness of both partners in the educational discourse to engage with each other. In this regard, it is worth noting Olivier (1990: 104) who claims the following:

What makes of our discoursing (praxis) together a conversation (form of engagement) as opposed to a confrontation, is the fact that even the most resolute defence of each participant's view is regulated by the courtesy-principle of give and take, of allowing the other his or her rejoinder.

In addition, regarding the notions of willingness and consciousness, participants must enter the public discourse (praxis) with an attitude of openness. By this I mean that either should not enter praxis whereby agreement is a prerequisite. One person should not coerce another into accepting his or her views before embarking upon public discourse with someone else. Olivier (1990: 103) drawing on Rorty (1980) makes the point that this would be "a conversation (public discourse) which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost as long as the conversation lasts". This he sees as a kind of rational discourse. Hence, agreement in praxis should be a desired goal, rather than a prerequisite. In other words, the agreement that can be attained through openness ought to grow out of the general principle of rationality.

This notion of praxis draws upon the moral virtues of patience and constancy that can cultivate in people the capacity for tolerance and mutual respect for "reasonable" differences of opinion. In this way, through engaging in praxis to achieve the "good life" the idea of rationality is not impeded. In defence of achieving praxis, that is,

critical, reflexive and ethical discourse, Gutman (1998: 31) claims the following:

A necessary (but of course not sufficient) condition of living well in a society where people differ in their moral convictions is effective teaching of the liberal virtue of toleration. A more distinctly democratic virtue that a good society must also teach effectively is mutual respect for reasonable differences of moral opinion. Mutual respect demands more than the attitude of live and let live; it requires willingness and ability to accord due intellectual and moral regard to reasonable points of view that we cannot deem ourselves as correct. In the political realm, toleration is a precondition for peaceful competition and pragmatic compromise; mutual respect is a precondition for democratic deliberation (praxis) and moral compromise.

Also, sincerity and truth constitute virtues of rationality which, in turn, allows moral space for intuition, what Taylor (1985: 139) refers to as “love and happiness”:

Our research efforts (discourse) ought to enable our readers to reflect on their own lives and to help us to envision lives for ourselves and our students that exist within communities of difference and hope.

The phrase “envision lives for ourselves and our students” suggests that human beings have a responsibility to make educational discourse intuitively positive for participants, which includes human relationships as well. Dewey posits (1984: 249): “Intuition in short, signifies the realisation of a pervasive quality such that it regulates the determination of relevant distinctions or of whatever, whether in the way of

relations, becomes the accepted object of thought (and praxis)". In another way, Dewey's concern for intuition in praxis implies that we need to develop a sense of care in our relations with each other at an individual level and at the same time relate that intuitive care to societal issues. Dewey and Bentley (1989: 247) felt that the notion of intuitive care in praxis

ranges from solicitude, through caring for in the sense of fondness, and through being deeply stirred, over to caring for in the sense of taking care, looking after, paying attention systematically, or minding.

If we do not care, then we do not engage in praxis; thorough educational discourse must be care-full. Tierney (1994: 99) framed his use of rationality by linking intuitive care with a reflexive educational discourse: "Caring, then, is a way to work on an individual level and at the same time relate that care to the broader questions about the structure of society".

2.5.2 Freedom of thought

In pursuit of achieving rationality is an understanding that people ought to have choices to exercise control over their lives (Jarvis 1998: 95); that is, they practise a particular kind of liberty (freedom) accepted and supported by all those involved in the educational discourse (praxis). But what kind of liberty seems to be the most desirable to make sense of praxis? Berlin's (1969: 131) view of positive liberty seems to be the most appropriate kind of liberty, one which can ensure the validity of a critical, reflexive and ethical discourse.

Central to positive liberty is the notion that human beings are rational, that is, self-directing and self-determining beings. They are in control of their lives. Reason, purpose and potential shape their own choices and decisions in life. In a different way, achieving self-direction through reason is, according to positive liberty, a way of attaining liberation. When the individual rationally analyses, understands and then takes appropriate action, such an individual has acquired self-mastery and is liberated. Berlin (1969:131) explains it as follows:

I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's (women's) acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not causes which affect me, as it were from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed ... This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that my reason distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world.

But taking appropriate action based on rationality (reason and understanding) does not mean that one can do only what one wants to do because this could seriously curb the freedom of others. Here positive liberty undermines the notion of individual freedom unhampered by the interference of other human beings, that is, negative liberty. Whereas negative liberty limits the control of others to infringe on the individual person's freedom, positive liberty is concerned with "what" or "who" should interfere with the individual's activities. Positive liberty is concerned with the individual's "higher self" as the source of control, that is, it aims to increase the individual's

conscious and willing enactment of one's own decisions and actions in life otherwise a person is not free. It is in the context of Berlin's notion of positive liberty that I understand the argument by Bowles and Gintis (1987: 4) that "liberty entails freedom of (individual) thought and association, freedom of political, cultural and religious expression, and the right to control one's body and express one's preferred spiritual, aesthetic, and sexual style of life". Hence, praxis appeals to the notion of positive liberty identified with the idea that human beings are by nature rationally self-controlling and self-directing. Berlin (1969: 136) emphasises this as follows: "... the essence of men (women) is that they are autonomous beings – authors of values, of ends in themselves, the ultimate authority of which consists precisely in the fact that they are willed freely – then nothing is worse than to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural objects ...".

2.5.3 Clarity of meaning

The idea of praxis as a process concerned directly with the pursuit of rationality, following Taylor (1985: 139), implies that one has to communicate clear meanings to others through educational discourse. In other words, rationality ensures that our interpretations and knowledge are articulated to others who may be interested in our perceptions and perspectives in a clear, logically consistent (Taylor 1985: 139) and unambiguous manner. Consequently, the transforming of our experiences into a rational form of language heightens the importance of our interpretations and constructed meanings as we seek to improve our situations and contexts. Hassard (1993: 5) argues that when we enter rational discourses, we involve ourselves in dynamic meaning-making within which we are agents of change who suggest

possibilities for renewal and development. Rationality in the sense that one attunes oneself contemplatively, critically and reflexively to the social world has shifted educational discourse from merely “free enquiry” or “curiosity-driven” to problem solving priorities (Gibbons 1998: 16-17), an issue I shall address in detail in chapter four.

Moreover, the question needs to be answered: what exactly constitutes a rational or clear meaning-making style? Clarity in writing style as to how human beings communicate their findings implies a transparent language written in plain rather than flowery language. This transparency in Lanham's (1974: 17) words is not just “any single verbal configuration (such as ‘Be clear’, ‘Avoid jargon’, ‘Be sincere’, and so on) but a relationship between a reader and a writer”. In this way, clarity in communicating one's findings means that one has to be “attuned to the relationships *between* listener and storyteller, *between* writer and reader, *between* knowledge and language” (Zeller & Farmer 1999: 14). Often, “confusing and impenetrable prose” defeat the meaning-making style characteristic of clear, transparent and narrative rationality. In addition, in the name of clarity and articulation, a praxiological language is constituted by a “narrative rationality”, which, unlike anecdote and genre (discourse contrasted with argumentation), builds on the assumption that “all forms of human communication can be seen fundamentally as stories, as interpretations of aspects of the world occurring in time and shaped by history, culture and character” (Fisher 1989: 56-57).

2.5.4 Non-arbitrariness

Through rationality human beings individually and collectively build their praxis which rejects arbitrariness. When one engages in praxis one does not do so as a solitary individual but as a bearer of a particular social identity through shared experiences which cause one to rationally reject arbitrariness such as bias, one-sidedness, prejudice, discrimination, intolerance, dogmatism, sexism, racism, injustice, and so on. In this way, engaging rationally in praxis offers space for diversity whereby “subordinate groups can develop their voices and articulate their needs if they have their own spaces rather than if they are absorbed in a consensual overarching public sphere” (Hernandez 1997: 57). This idea of diversity of identities through rational educational discourse opens up the possibility for different social groups to tolerate each other and to work together in the same territory or public sphere (Torres 1998: 425). In a different way, praxis is an arena of the conflicting interest groups in a society, rather than of the overarching representation of the choices of individuals who pursue their separate interests (Gould 1988: 10).

Diversity through rational educational discourse also repudiates the idea that the hegemonic power of the dominant culture can be imposed on different peoples in the name of integration (Fletcher 1999: 150). In fact, diversity provides the conditions for subordinate groups to articulate their needs, and deepens the emancipatory possibilities of different social groups (including subordinate ones) to free (liberate) themselves through praxis. In this way, they maintain, promote and develop their own culture and identity in a process of collective empowerment that allows them to reflect about their experience and situation within the wider society (Fraser 1990: 57). In

essence, rational engagement in praxis, in the words of Hernandez (1997: 58), “constitutes a space in which (different) people come to consciousness, deliberately transforming not only knowledge about themselves and their reality, but also transforming their own subjectivities”.

Fine (1994: 31) has this to say about rationality and the practice of diversity:

When we listen closely, to each other and our informants, we are surprised, and our intellectual work is transformed. We keep each other honest to forces of difference, divergence, and contradiction.

Rationality is strongly linked to critical arguments that emphasise differences among viewpoints and explanations of social events rather than those types of explanations that assume the value of only one right, arbitrary (absolute) interpretation. In other words, rationality in praxis implies that one has to search for other voices, other interpretations, and other stories. This view of diversity in praxis is vindicated by McLaren (1991: 10) for whom “all knowledge is relational and can only be understood within the context of production, its distributions, and the way it is taken up by different individuals and groups”. Put differently, praxis does not comprise a universal, value-free body of facts, independent of the understandings of people. Rather, it is produced, located and understood within existing social and cultural formations (Giroux 1999: 7). According to praxis, “scientific knowledge” and school / academic knowledge do not just represent an immutable body of unquestioning facts, unrelated to the diverse and every day life experiences of learners. Any form of knowledge is context-specific, relevant and “emerge(s) ... out of social conventions

and sometimes in opposition to them” (McLaren 1991: 10). Giroux (1992:17) cogently claims that praxis

... not only negotiates difference, but takes seriously the imperative to make knowledge meaningful in order that it might become critical and transformative (reflexive) – it is crucial that educators expand curricula to include those elements of popular culture that play a powerful role in shaping the desires, needs, and identities of students (learners).

The above shows that praxis grounded in rationality creates unconfined spaces for a plurality of voices.

2.5.5 Impartiality

A discussion of rational discourse invariably invokes some reference to being impartial, that is, being unbiased or unprejudiced. In philosophy of education impartial rational activity usually brings into focus a discussion of objectivity identified with what Elliot (1998: 126) calls private, public and metaphysical objectivity. Before moving on to a discussion of Elliot’s explanation of objectivity, it is worth referring to some common uses of this concept. Schwandt (1997: 104-105) identifies several interrelated senses of this concept:

- (1) In traditional social scientific parlance objectivity is often taken to be synonymous with “methodological”, “scientific”, “rational”, and regarded as a quality that comes from being procedural, rule following and algorithmic.

Objectivity in this sense avoids human judgment which is regarded as subjective.

(2) Objectivity has also been defined in terms of conditions of accurate representation of reality, that is, something is objective if it mirrors, reflects, or represents social reality.

(3) Objectivity is also associated with a metaphysical and epistemological separation of subject and object, that is, what is “out there” is independent of human beings.

(4) It is also used as the quality of being unbiased or unprejudiced.

(5) An “objective” statement or fact is also commonly used as a statement that all reasonable people would assent to or agree with.

These explanations of objectivity (perhaps with the partial exception of point 5) are not compatible with the way I intend using the concept in this thesis. This brings me to a discussion of Elliot’s (1998: 126) explanation of objectivity. Private objectivity stresses the importance of attaining certainty and universal validity, that is, “truth”. A person who is unwilling to accept that reality is not in the minds of people but “out there” independent of the value judgements of people, is said not to be objective and, hence, not rational. Elliot (1998: 126) notes that

'Private' objectivity is predicable primarily of persons, secondarily of judgements: a person is objective if his state of mind in making a judgement is disinterested, i.e. if his judgement is not influenced by irrelevant factors of a subjective mind, especially the passions and the will.

This kind of private objectivity in relation to rational human activity seems untenable for the reason that human beings do not exist independent of their subjective "forms of experience".

Public objectivity breaks with private objectivity in the sense that "truth" is not universally valid and the source of "truth" lies not with the individual, but with each particular community or society, referred to by Elliot (1998: 126) as "collective subjectivity". But does this mean that we would necessarily avoid bias and a situation where everything goes? Subjectivists believe that there are no universal truths. For them, all truths would be allowed expression and full consideration. Bernstein (1983: 11-12) sums up the position of public subjectivity with reference to human beings, by claiming that for subjectivists

... there is a nonreducible plurality of such schemes, paradigms (cognitive frameworks), and practices; there is no substantive overarching framework in which radically different and alternative schemes are commensurable – no universal standards that somehow stand outside of and above these competing alternatives.

What this means is that concepts must be understood relative to a specific conceptual scheme or practice. Subjectivists claim that there are no universal truths; for them all “standards” are relative to the particular context. Both these claims contain within them universal terms like “no” and “all”, reflecting a universal truth. So the subjectivist argument is paradoxical since subjectivists state that there is no universal truth. They appeal to the same “standards” they so wish to refute. For this reason collective subjectivity seemingly does not engender an impartial form of rational activity.

I shall now give attention to the notion of metaphysical objectivity as opposed to private and subjective “truth” claims. For Elliot (1998: 139) if we want our discourses to be objective, we should consider fostering rationality “free from all arbitrary constraints” through the social, intersubjective construction of meaning. He claims that

All the participants (in rational discourse) would have the same right, and in practice an equal chance, to begin a discussion and to keep it going, so that no opinion or point of view would be denied expression and full consideration. Each participant would be free to initiate a movement from the existing level of discourse to a more fundamental level, and to call into question the conceptual framework originally accepted or presupposed. Each would be free also to initiate enquiry into the genesis of existing knowledge, and even to question the existing concept of knowledge (1998: 139-140).

In a different way, developing objective meanings is a practice of social relation or intersubjective action whereby individuals in a society or community do not just have a given set of ideas or goals to which they subscribe. Intersubjective ideas and norms are not the property of individuals in a society, but are “constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act” (Taylor 1985: 36). Thus, intersubjectivity implies that human beings in society have a common discourse shaped by the right and equal chance to initiate and to question their shared social practices. This does not mean that human beings in rational discourse have to reach agreement with one another. To have intersubjective constructions of knowledge implies that human beings have to nurture and develop those constructions of meaning which are constituted in the social practices of a community; constructions of meaning are not conjured up on the basis of what is arbitrarily decided, but meanings which have developed out of the practices of a community, that is, meanings which are constituted in a community’s social practices, and which, in turn strengthen that community. In essence, intersubjective practices through metaphysical objectivity are ways of experiencing rational action through praxis in a society expressed in the common meanings constitutive of human activities (1985: 36).

2.5.6 A sense of relevance

Rationality through praxis demands that human beings pay close attention to unique and specific aspects of every context. By implication, rationality means that no single educational discourse will be useful in the same ways in all situations. In this regard, Hermes (1998: 158) posits that educational discourse’s emphasis should shift from discourse for discourse’s sake to educational discourse “that serves a specific purpose

or need of the community within which it is situated". In a different way, rationality implies that praxis has to be relevant and socially accountable "primarily by supporting the economy and promoting the quality of life of its citizens" (Gibbons et al 1998: 1). Moreover, rationality also guides praxis by using reflexive and continually changing procedures of educational discourse that act as a "situated response" (Hermes 1998: 157). Rationality engenders praxis as a "recursive process", that is reflexive activity specific to the culture, the problems, and the dynamics of a particular context. Capper (1993: 10) reminds us that reflexive, that is, different, divergent and contextual educational discourse is useful in praxis.

Moreover, Taylor (1985: 37) links rationality to being attuned with society and to socially constructed meanings. In this way, rationality implies that educational discourse is no longer a self-contained activity carried out in "relative institutional isolation", but involves "interaction with a variety of other knowledge producers" (Gibbons 1998: 1). For Gibbons (1998: 37):

the research agenda (educational discourse) and its funding are increasingly the outcome of a dialogue (praxis) between researchers and users, regulators, interest groups, etc. Unless that dialogue produces a consensus no research will be done. Leading edge research (educational discourse) has become a more participatory exercise involving many actors and experts who move less according to the dynamics of their original disciplines and more according to problem interest ... (which) means that academics will be away from the university, working in teams with experts from a wide range of intellectual backgrounds, in a variety of organisational settings.

From the above, rationality in educational discourse means that institutions like universities need to develop structures that “promote and reward group creativity” and produce knowledge under “continuous negotiation” (Gibbons 1998: ii & 6), a discussion which I pick up again in chapter four.

2.5.7 Consistency

Rationality through praxis is linked to clearly expressed articulations free from inconsistency. Taylor (1985: 137) accentuates this notion of rationality through praxis as follows:

We have a rational grasp of something when we can articulate it, that means, distinguish and lay out the different features of the matter in perspicuous order (that is, clearly expressed articulations devoid of inconsistencies).

My emphasis is on Taylor’s notion of “perspicuous order”. He uses this notion as referring to clearly expressed articulations devoid of inconsistencies. And, when people engage in praxis they articulate their views and opinions about educational problems in a consistent and coherent way, their articulations make practices transparent and illuminating. Hence, when their articulations clarify practices in such a perspicuous way, they are rational. In a different way, rationality constitutes the capacity in human beings to articulate expressions in a consistent spirit, where consistency refers to the articulation of points of views in a non-contradictory manner.

2.5.8 Respect for evidence and people

The idea of practising rationality through praxis provides an important constraint: the necessity for praxis to proceed in relation to impartiality, non-arbitrariness and consistency, even if a person or group introduces a "new vocabulary" which is incommensurable with another person's view. This shows the necessity of respect for people and for praxis to proceed, even if one person (or group) justifiably introduces a viewpoint incommensurable with the prevailing ideas. In this regard, it is worth noting Olivier (1990: 105), who draws on Rorty's "ethical-pragmatic" approach to praxis. Olivier claims that praxis should not be one, whereby "any power or institution (or its agents) ... arbitrarily and irrationally silences, terrorises, eliminates or excludes certain justifiably interested parties from dialogue (praxis) merely because the latter introduces a new vocabulary into the discourse - one which is incommensurate with the prevailing dogma". To exclude people from praxis or by denying them participation is to show disrespect for them and to "stifle rational deliberation of competing conceptions of good lives and good societies" (Gutman 1998: 34). Gutman argues that the idea of respect for people is an important virtue of rationality for the reason that it

... prevents the state, and all groups within it, from denying anyone an educational good on grounds irrelevant to the legitimate social purpose of that good (in this instance the good of praxis) (1998: 34).

Moreover, being impartial, non-arbitrary and consistent in praxis do not necessarily result in agreement. It is one thing to be sincere, open and willing to participate in

praxis, but what makes it irrelevant is precisely the lack of courage and commitment on the part of one person to accept the point the other person makes. In another way, praxis is necessarily grounded in commonly accepted rational principles such as the commitment to follow through on the best judgement, that is, showing respect for evidence.

2.6 SUMMARY

There are no *a priori* limits as to how rationality should be lived out in praxis. Praxis constitutes the use of rationality, cultivated by notions of truth-telling and sincerity, non-arbitrariness, freedom of thought, clarity, a sense of relevance, impartiality, consistency, respect for evidence and people. In other words, human beings' acceptance of the forms of rationality is a prerequisite for praxis which, in turn, is shaped by logically necessary conditions such as critical educational discourse, reflexive action and ethical human activity. In the next chapter I shall show how the general principle (that is, rationality) of praxis can be connected logically to the idea of democratic education. This is necessary for the reason that an understanding of democratic education holds much promise for reflexive praxis in the forms of teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher education transformation in South Africa.

CHAPTER 3

PRAXIS, RATIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The general principle of praxis developed thus far engenders an understanding that educational discourse grounded in critical, reflexive and ethical practices can effect forms of rationality. Rationality through praxis is linked to sincerity, freedom of thought, clarity of meaning, impartiality, non-arbitrariness, consistency, a sense of relevance and respect for evidence and people. The argument in this thesis is that these forms of rationality can create spaces for achieving democratic education which, in turn, holds much promise for shaping teaching and learning at a distance, research and community service in the context of higher education transformation in South Africa. Any discussion of democratic education presupposes an understanding of the concept democracy.

3.2 DEMOCRACY

Democracy is a messy system, but it has survived because there is a sphere for debates and a set of rules (general principles) that people follow even if they do not benefit from them (Torres 1998: 425). This definition of democracy accentuates three interrelated aspects central to an understanding of democracy: democracy as a system, democracy as a sphere for debates and democracy as a set of general principles. The

first two descriptions of democracy, that is, democracy as a system and democracy as a sphere for debates can be linked to two broad conceptions of democracy. Firstly, democracy as a **representative system** of political decision-making and, secondly, democracy as a sphere for social and political life in which people enjoy equal opportunities and are engaged in self-development, self-fulfillment and self-determination (Carr & Hartnett 1996: 40). Representative democracy basically means that collective deliberations that concern the whole of the community are taken not directly by its members, but by people elected for this purpose (Bobbio 1987: 40). Schumpeter (1940: 269) defines democracy as a representative form of government whereby decision-making is restricted to elected representatives, electors having voted without participating any further. Democracy as a **sphere for social and political life** is constituted by values of positive liberty (freedom of self-development) and political equality (Carr & Hartnett 1996: 41).

On the one hand, democracy is seen as a representative system of government. In this regard Macpherson (1966: 36) identifies three models of a democratic representative system of political decision-making:

1. Western liberal democracy which was brought into being to serve the need of the competitive market society – a product of successfully developing capitalist market societies. Liberal representative democracy created by capitalism (with its capacity to appropriate wealth) relocates power and domination from the state to civil society, to private property and the compulsions of the market (Wood 1994: 5). It is a kind of liberal democracy that accentuates the predominance of individual rights over collective rights, power of the people over any other

regulatory institution and equal rights for all citizens. Individual (negative) liberty or the right to private property is to be secured by the state against interference (Pateman 1979: 24). Steyn, De Klerk and Du Plessis (1999: 5-7) are correct when they consider equality as not being a “distinctive feature” of a liberal representative democracy.

2. Non-liberal Communist democracy, whereby a class state was created by the proletarian revolution. It had the job of holding down the old ruling class while transforming the whole society in such a way that there would be no more basis for exploitative classes and no more need for a class state, thus paving the way for a fully human society.
3. Non-liberal, non-Communist democracy in Third World States, which rejects the competitive ethos of the market society and sees no need for the competitive system of political parties. It sees the possibility of a classless society and state (Macpherson 1966: 35-36).

On the other hand, democracy is described as a sphere of social relationships; social democracy undermines class distinctions and advocates equality of opportunity for all citizens (Birch 1993: 46). This notion of social democracy can be extended to that which postulates radical equality in class, racial, ethnic and gender interactions. Social democracy is primarily aimed at welfare-oriented reforms within a market-related capitalist society (Gould 1988: 10). For Pateman (1979: 27) social democracy emphasises **participation** on the grounds of equality and liberty; that is, people have the right to control their own lives, and to become competent at self-management and

self-governance. She articulates this kind of democracy as a direct or participatory form of democracy whereby people directly participate in economic, political and social life.

My emphasis is on democracy as a concept that is constituted by a general principle. Considering the history of democracy along the lines of both representation and participation, its general principle needs to be justified in terms of combining representation and participation. In other words, democracy cannot work through representation alone; it also requires participation. Burnheim (1985: 5) eliminates the representation / participation dualism whereby representation is turned into a participatory process in which all legitimately interested parties have an equal chance to participate and where people can learn to make informed choices. He claims that such a general principle of democracy establishes conditions whereby people are **reasonably** democratic, tolerant in their social attitudes, and willing to participate in relevant matters (1985: 157). Such a general principle of democracy rejects authoritarian, centralised state control which undermines diversity and sets a high value on rationally co-ordinated and democratically controlled social change (Walker 1998: 22). Whereas centralisation in this instance refers to a unitary governmental system where the central government makes all decisions “in the nation’s capital” (Buckland & Hofmeyer 1993: 7), rational co-ordination implies a form of *functional decentralisation* whereby each individual in society performs one specific function which is co-ordinated by negotiation among the group, representative of all people with a legitimate interest in running the group (Walker 1998: 22).

My emphasis is on the general principle of democracy being tied to the idea of

rational co-ordination amongst people in order to maximise their participation. Such an understanding of democracy seems incompatible with what Steyn *et al.* (1999: 5) refer to as “a true and sound democracy”. For them “a true and sound democracy” can be obtained if freedom (liberty) and equality as cornerstones of such a democracy are “finely balanced”. It seems plausible to argue for liberty and equality to be “finely balanced” as this would imply that liberty and equality cannot exist independently of each other in “a true and sound democracy”. In this sense, I agree with Steyn *et al.* (1999) for the reason that such a “balance” would contribute towards turning representation into a participatory process in which all legitimately interested parties have an equal chance to participate and where people can learn to make liberal and rational choices. However, my concern is with their emphasis on achieving “a true and sound democracy”. Implicit in this view is an assumption that democracy needs to be “true” or product-based which might not always be congruent with the idea that democracy should be a *process* of establishing conditions whereby people are **reasonably** democratic, tolerant in their social attitudes, and willing to participate **rationally** in relevant matters, as opposed to achieving some universal truth. However, this criticism of Steyn *et al.* (1999) is not oblivious of an implicit assumption in their view that rationality can be linked to the general principle of democracy (an idea which I refer to again in section 3.3).

What the above explanation illustrates is that general principles of concepts are constitutive of the social practices in which people find them and make meaning. For Taylor (1985: 36) discourse (in this instance democracy) and its general principle constitutes forms of action or modes of social interaction which would not be possible without the existence of the general principle. The general principle of the discourse

of democracy opens up new possibilities; possibilities of understanding the actions of others, including actions one has never seen before, and possibilities of actions never before performed. In this sense, democracy as discourse “begins where certainty ends”, that is, democracy is reflexive; it liberates thought and practices to that which offers more choice, freedom and possibilities for emancipatory politics.

Democracy as a reflexive discourse aims to negate and resist privileged representations and dominant discourses that marginalise minority groups, oppress women (and men) and non-white peoples, disfigure the environment, and degrade knowledge and knowledge structures to instruments of social control and legitimisation (Jarvis 1998: 97). Moreover, democracy as a discourse, which embraces reflexivity (Barber 1994), recognises subversion – a notion that celebrates plurality (diversity) and dialogism (Jarvis 1998: 98).

Democracy enjoins constant, permanent motion (reflexivity) – a gentle kind of permanent revolution, a movable feast that affords each generation room for new appetites and new tastes, and thus allows political and spiritual migration to new territory ... (with) reflexivity the chief mode of (discourse) (Barber 1994: 45-48).

The above understanding of democratic discourse is shaped by a particular general principle. Hernandez (1997: 28) asserts that the general principle of democratic discourse organises people into collective social action, creating the conditions for transformation (which will be dealt with in more detail in sections 3.3.2 and 4.2). Her conceptualisation of democracy as discourse is worth quoting at length:

It seems to me that this conceptualisation (of democracy) is the basis for an empowering theory of action: individuals both get constituted and constitute themselves and through it (the general principle) they can come together to build a dynamic unity for social change and transformation ... Also it aims to critically open up the possibility of transforming experience while creating a more liberating public (educational) discourse (1997: 28).

I shall now tease out the general principle that constitutes a democratic discourse that can open up possibilities for transforming social experiences and liberating educational discourse. As has been explained earlier, the general principle of a democratic educational discourse, which holds the most radical possibilities for praxis, can be linked to the notion of rationality, for the reason that praxis (a reflexive educational discourse) is guided by rationality. I shall show how rationality can organise a democratic educational discourse and hence, praxis, by focussing on how it recognises self-determination, equality and diversity and, at the same time, engenders dialogism and a dynamic unity for transformation in educational discourse. In this way I hope to show how aspects of democratic educational discourse link conceptually with the notion of reflexive praxis.

3.3 RATIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE

Logically necessary conditions of praxis constitute critical educational discourse, reflexive action and ethical human activity. These conditions shape the guiding principle of praxis giving rise to clusters of rationality such as (1) sincerity, respect

and non-arbitrariness, (2) relevance, (3) impartiality and (4) clarity, consistency and freedom of thought. Based on the various forms of rationality discussed in section 2.5, I have clustered logically necessary conditions of praxis as mentioned for the purpose of using these clusters of rationality to chart out the idea of a democratic educational discourse and hence, praxis. In conclusion the notion of a **reflexive democratic praxis** will be discussed.

3.3.1 SINCERITY, RESPECT, NON-ARBITRARINESS AND DIVERSITY

I have argued that rationality allows space for sincerity, respect for non-arbitrariness and diversity. I shall now explore how these forms of rationality can further guide the notion of a democratic educational discourse. A democratic educational discourse does not restrict the rational consideration of diverse ways of public life, including educational discourse. Gutman (1998: 33) argues that for a democratic society to reproduce itself consciously

... (i)t must not restrict rational consideration of different ways of life. Instead it must cultivate the kind of character and the kind of intellect that enables people to choose rationally (some would say 'autonomously') among different ways of life.

But to promote the rational consideration of diversity or plurality through a democratic educational praxis requires in the first place a respect for diversity, meaning the rights of individuals or groups to transmit their ways of life. Callan (1998: 56, 61) argues that an arbitrary "closed-mindedness" or a contempt for

diversity will “tend to bring us into sharp conflict with citizens whose fidelity to opposing values is equally serious and tenacious”. For example, one might find two different religious groups each considering their conceptions of the good life as better than the other group’s. This difference might erupt into stark confrontation and conflict.

The question arises: How can sincerity, respect and an attitude of non-arbitrariness rule out confrontation and conflict and hold a diverse society together? One answer to this question is found in Rawls’ (1971) celebrated theory of justice and fairness. Some of Rawls’ ideas (1971: 10-18) on justice and fairness in relation to a liberal democratic society can be explained as follows:

1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties.
2. Fair co-operation has to occur between free and equal citizens who need to respect each other.

The success of Rawls’ ideas on justice and fairness as a response to the problem of working together in a diverse society hinges on the respect people have to show to each other. Showing respect is to disclose a sincere (conscious and willing) way of securing “mutually respectful social co-operation” (Callan 1998: 62). Mutual social co-operation implies that people have to respect each other and be sincere to meet each other half way, to compromise. When people in a democratic society compromise they do not merely advance the position of their individual or group interests but rather, develop a shared willingness to make minimal use of controversial

empirical premises. For example, people in a diverse society do little to push toward controversial understandings of “good education” so long as such a society lacks a substantial body of uncontroversial understandings of “good education”. To avoid conflict which may bring us nowhere, we need to develop what Callan (1998: 76) refers to as “a shared group-interest in compromise”, a kind of shared loyalty that can push hard in the direction of fair co-operation between free and equal citizens who need to respect each other. Callan states the following:

Patriotism (shared loyalty) can empower us to resist this kind of failure (individual and group egoism) to the extent that it gives us a shared group-interest in compromise. We no longer broach the prospect of compromise with wholly separate identities so that any gain for you is a loss for me and *vice versa*. The achievement of compromise is itself of value to us because it affirms the unity and continuity of a political (educational) community we both cherish (1998: 76).

In the context of pursuing respectfully and non-arbitrarily the idea of a democratic educational discourse in a diverse society we have to develop “a shared group-interest in compromise” which can prevent us pushing toward convergent interpretations of education and its concomitant link with knowledge production. Rather, we need to develop compromising understandings of education and knowledge production that can advance our shared interests in a diverse society.

3.3.2 RELEVANCE, EQUALITY AND QUALITY

I have tried to clarify the position that rationality cannot be blind to the notion of relevance. My concern in this section is with rationality as a sense of relevance that can give content to the notion of a democratic educational discourse. A democratic educational discourse “leaves maximum room for citizens deliberately to shape their society, not in their own image but in an image that they can legitimately identify with their informed, moral choices” (Gutman 1998: 33). My argument about how to engender a democratic educational discourse is conducive to the idea that educational discourse has to be identified with the “informed, moral choices” of people in a democratic society. I interpret the idea of engendering democratic educational discourse in relation to the “informed, moral choices” of people as making educational discourse relevant to the practices to which a democratic society has consciously agreed. To talk about relevance in a democratic educational discourse is to bring into play the notions of quality and equality of an education. Do explanations of equality, if connected with those of quality in terms of treating people according to “relevant” criteria, result in an understanding that a high quality educational discourse must logically be one of equality? To address this question of relevance in a democratic educational discourse, I shall refer to Cooper’s (1998: 180) explanation of the relationship between quality and equality.

I want to examine Cooper’s (1998: 180) view that although quality and equality are mutually related, their relation is one of incompatibility. Quality in education is not solely product-based but rather, produced through processes. A university may be very good despite the fact that some of its graduates might not meet the standard

required by the country's educational expectations. Nor is it sufficient for high-quality education that graduates leaving the university are well-educated. They might be well-educated before going to the university. This means that talking of a high quality university cannot be made solely on the grounds of its products, in this instance, graduates. My understanding of quality education is linked to the notion of processes, defined here as what Cooper (1998: 181) refers to as educational transformation, that is, "the change in a person's level of educatedness resulting from a certain education". One graduate's level of educatedness may have increased more by a certain university education than another graduate's, despite the latter being better educated at a different university in the first place. In this way, the graduate whose level of educatedness has been transformed more than that of a better educated graduate, has attained the higher quality university education. Cooper (1998: 181) claims the following:

Now I shall say that one education is of higher quality than another if the former, through its processes, produces greater educational transformation in the latter. The more an education of certain duration increases the level of educatedness, whatever the initial level, the higher quality it is.

Does equality in education mean that people are not excluded from education on the grounds that they are poor? Such a view of equality is untenable for the reason that some students who passed a matriculation examination, for example, might be unable to exercise their right to go to a university, which they are entitled to do in terms of equality. But due to lack of funds they are unable to receive the treatment of attending

a university. I want to examine Cooper's (1998: 180) explanation of equality which differs substantially from the above seemingly untenable principle of equality:

The principle is this: only those inequalities are permissible from which everyone, in particular the worst off, benefits more than he (she) would in their absence. For example, only those income differentials are justified which result in even the poorest doing better than they would without such differentials. Since we are concerned with educational equality, and with intrinsic educational benefits, the formula would read: only those inequalities in an educational system are justified which result in even the worst off getting a better education than they would be otherwise. Put in terms of educational transformation only those inequalities in rates of educational transformation are justified which result in even the least transformed being more transformed than in the absence of the inequalities.

To come back to the example mentioned earlier about the level of educatedness of a particular graduate which has been transformed more than that of a better educated graduate and, hence attained the higher quality university education, I want to interpret the same situation in relation to equality in education. Let us consider the following situations to find out (following Cooper's explanation) whether equality and quality in education co-exist:

1. Say the graduate whose educatedness has been transformed better, attended a university where she is not amongst the least transformed being more transformed.

In the presence of certain inequalities, according to the above explanation of

equality, this graduate has not achieved equality despite having received a higher quality of education.

2. Assume the same graduate is amongst the least transformed being more transformed in the presence of a lack of educational resources. However, her level of educatedness has been transformed less than what it was when she attended a different university. She is said to have achieved equality in education but not a higher quality education.
3. Two different universities justify the presence of inequalities in terms of educational transformation. At the first university the least educationally transformed becomes more transformed. At the second university students receive a higher quality education than those at the first university due the presence of more educational resources. Comparatively students at the first university achieved equality in education but not a higher quality education. Their level of educatedness has not been transformed to a better level than those of students at the second university.

In short, in terms of Cooper's argument, the demands for equality cannot be satisfied with demands for quality. In a different way, "egalitarian demands are appropriate only where they conflict with quality" (Cooper 1998: 186). But it is here that I want to depart from Cooper's incompatibility thesis for the reason that such an antithetical position on equality and quality might not necessarily advance democratic transformation in South African higher education.

Historically in developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, tension between equality and quality seems to have been present almost from the beginning (Berdahl, Moodie & Spitzberg 1991: 66). Several periods can be identified in which either concern for equality or quality has been predominant. From the mid-19th century to World War II the major thrust of higher education started in the direction of equal access to institutions for students who were not previously considered "college material" with the curriculum being opened to include the natural sciences and modern languages, the mechanical arts and culture. By the end of 19th century renewed emphasis was placed on quality in contrast to equal access whereby quality was defined in terms of those institutions whose programmes and graduates measured up to the "best" institutions (determined by success rates of students) (1991: 59). The post-war decade (1947-1958) in the United States was concerned with equal access for returning veterans who enrolled mostly for programmes of relevance to resolving national problems. The period from 1958 to 1968 became the period of the most rapid expansion with a primary emphasis on quality such as strengthening research in the natural sciences to meet the challenges of the cold war and the beginning of the space age. Yet, equal access was provided to a far wider range of students than ever before (1991: 61).

Between 1968 and 1980 attention in higher education was focussed on consolidating and extending equality gains with an emphasis on diversity and non-traditional modes of educational delivery which, in turn, raised questions of quality control. Between 1981 and 1988 a re-emphasis was placed on quality identified with programme or institutional effectiveness, effective utilisation of resources, governance structures and a concern with preserving an exclusive (elitist) limited range of academic traditions.

(1991: 67). What is significant about the concern with equality and quality in the history of higher education in the United States, is the complementary way in which the two notions unfolded. In other words, while concern for equality should persist, concern with quality should not be decreased.

Moreover, in South Africa, Steyn (1998: 108) has argued that

... quality and equality in education should be part of the process of transforming South African society into a ... democracy, but overemphasising one or the other may have devastating results. A delicate balancing of the two seems to me of the utmost importance.

It is this argument for a complementary view between equality and quality that I want to extend. It is my contention that in order to achieve a democratic educational discourse one invariably has to identify relevant conditions of equality at the expense of an elitist conception of quality (to be discussed in section 4.3.4) as to **initiate** transformation in people's level of educatedness in the South African higher education system. In other words, unlike Cooper's incompatibility thesis of equality and quality, extending the argument of Steyn (1998: 108), I want to talk of "balancing" equality and quality in higher education. By this I mean that equality and quality although seemingly incompatible need not to be understood as antithetical, but rather as periods in higher education transformation during which a concern with equality needs to be predominant and others in which a concern with quality needs to be predominant. It is my contention that higher education transformation in South Africa is at a time where equality has to be in the ascendancy from the beginning at

the expense of a purely elitist conception of quality. However, this does not mean that a concern for quality should be lost (this discussion will again be raised in section 4.3.4).

3.3.3 IMPARTIALITY AND DIALOGISM

If we want our educational discourses to be impartial or unprejudiced, we need to accept the universality of prejudice whenever we are talking about issues involving the good life, that is, practising rationality. Jones (1998: 151) argues, “in a pluralist context respecting people of other cultures involves seeing oneself and those others as prejudiced members of different forms of life”. But recognising the prejudices of others through rational consideration is to achieve a democratic educational discourse whereby people in a diverse society consciously agree to act “collectively” (Gutman 1998: 34). In a different way they agree to intersubjectively hold a sort of dialogism. Dialogism in this sense creates the possibility whereby, in the words of Jones (1998: 150),

Citizens of different ethnic, national and cultural backgrounds can participate in an investigation of one another’s acknowledged prejudices (in particular their feelings about the sort of life they want to lead) with the aim of arriving at compromise to which all participants can acquiesce without resentment and which aims at the optimal satisfaction of the conflicting prejudices of all participants.

Dialogism for the sake of compromise opens up the possibility for individuals or different groups to interrelate among themselves aimed at revealing their preferred perspectives. Talking together in different voices, aimed at addressing the differences of opinion which emerge through dialogism, participants have an opportunity to acquire a better understanding of each other. They also develop a greater self-understanding whereby they bring their prejudices to the fore and express them to others (Hernandez 1997: 19; Jones 1998: 150). This dialogism seems to be grounded in a notion of positive liberty, which rests on the principle that freedom entails a sense of belonging together in a particular society with which the individual shares "permanent characteristics". Berlin (1969:158) regards this "solidarity" with the group or community as a desire "for union, closer understanding, integration of interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice". This view is corroborated by Apple (1979: 10) for whom solidarity and common interest come into being only through communicative (dialogic) organisational practices.

What makes dialogism a rational discourse through which people can achieve compromise? Dialogism allows individuals and groups to live their differences (pluriculturalism) and at the same time creates the opportunity to exchange and share new forms of living and new cultural hybrids with others (interculturalism) (Fletcher 1999: 150). In other words, dialogism extends and radicalises democratic discourse whereby it is possible for different human beings to share and live together in solidarity, in the sense that individuals want their actions to be directed by the community of which they are members. Jones (1998: 150) adequately summarises this sort of dialogism:

This is not the usual debate about truth and who is right or wrong. It is an attempt to understand others and ourselves as people from different backgrounds and is the basis for a compromise aimed at allowing us to live together as a functioning and unified social unit rather than as a collection of warring factions living in geographical proximity.

Of course, the alternative to working towards solidarity by way of educational discourse for dialogism in the sense outlined would be to accept a move towards "fragmentation of society in groups" which is neither desirable nor defensible. A pessimist who argues that dialogism in our educational discourse would not work is not rationally considering how conflict can be avoided and how tolerance and compromise towards different prejudices can be encouraged. Maintaining an unjustifiable partiality for one's own prejudices without encouraging dialogism is itself a violation of the notion of impartiality. Jones (1998: 152) states the following:

A violation of the principle of impartiality is simply the first step towards the gross violations of the principle of respect for persons which racist practices constitute, because they involve imposing the views of a dominant group on another without acknowledging the members of the subordinate group as potential or actual autonomous agents, beings of praxis or centres of practical reason.

For an educational discourse to be worthwhile, dialogism and its recognition for the universality of prejudices should constantly be asserted. We cannot hope to succeed in

achieving a democratic educational discourse if we do not rationally consider dialogism as a commitment to collective action.

3.3.4 CLARITY, CONSISTENCY, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Democratic educational discourse obligates people to cultivate in themselves the capacity for critical reflection (rationality) by securing freedom of thought through clearly expressed and unambiguous articulations of “differing ways of life” (Gutman 1998: 33). The desire for freedom of thought that Callan (1998) refers to as “a desire for self-rule within a life” brings into focus a tendency to conceive the self-determination or autonomy of human beings in ways that can shape a democratic educational discourse. What is it about rational self-determination (autonomy) that can commit people to a democratic educational discourse? Peters (1998b: 5-6) identifies three conditions of autonomy on which I shall draw to answer this question:

1. Autonomy suggests that people accept or make rules for themselves.
2. Autonomy is associated with rationality whereby people subject rules to reflection and criticism in the light of principles such as impartiality and respect for persons.
3. Autonomy as “strength of will” inclines people to adhere in determination to the implementation of rules in the face of counter-inclinations.

The first two conditions, those of rational articulation and critical investigation of rules, have been alluded to on several occasions thus far, and will be partially ignored. Reflection and criticism in a democratic educational discourse can be used “to foster in future citizens the ability to defend their personal and political commitments, and revise those that are indefensible” (Gutman 1998: 35). However, the close connection between autonomy and “strength of will” is by far a necessary condition to exist in order to give application to a democratic educational discourse. For example, in South Africa many formal changes have occurred in line with the new Constitution, Bill of Rights and several policy instruments including the Higher Education Act of 1997, South African Schools Act, the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), Curriculum 2005 and the Norms and Standards for Teacher Education. These policy instruments confirm the removal of inequalities of access to a better education irrespective of race, gender, language, religion or culture. Sedibe (1998) argues that “substantial ground on policy transformation has been covered and the process is rapidly moving towards implementation”. However, the changing impact these new policies and laws will have on universities and schools should be viewed in conjunction with the “strength of will” of educators to ensure South Africa’s democratic education system. In other words, policy will have to take account of both the contexts and the “strength of will” of educators and other role players to ensure its implementation and hence, will be enabling a democratic educational discourse. Put differently, the implementation of educational policy in universities depends on the “strength of will” of educators in holding steadfast in conduct against counter-inclinations and to stick to principles in the face of ridicule, ostracism, punishment and bribes (Peters 1998b: 6).

In essence, people in a society must be determined to chart out the democratic educational discourse. To use Gutman's (1998: 34) words, a democratic educational discourse needs to be lived from the "inside". People must show the commitment to make praxis work.

3.4 SUMMARY

I have argued that a democratic educational discourse can be achieved if guided by interrelated clusters, referred to by Walker (1998: 22) as "touchstones" of rationality. These "touchstones" of rationality that can shape a democratic educational discourse can be summarised as follows:

1. developing "a shared group-interest in compromise" which can assist people in a diverse society to develop compromising understandings of education and knowledge production that can advance shared interests;
2. identifying relevant conditions of equality to initiate and of quality to **enhance** transformation in people's level of educatedness;
3. asserting dialogism and recognising the universality of prejudices as a commitment to collective action; and
4. implementing educational discourse through "strength of will" whereby people show determination to chart out their praxis.

“Touchstones” of rationality constitute the notion of a democratic educational discourse. Rationality has been identified as the general principle of praxis. Since rationality is guided by logically necessary conditions such as critical educational discourse, reflexive action and ethical human activity, one can justifiably link these conditions of rationality to the notion of democratic educational discourse. This is so for the reason that democratic educational discourse engenders “touchstones” of rationality grounded in critical, reflexive and ethical human action. In essence, the notions of critical practice, reflexive activity, ethical behaviour and democratic education can be couched under the idea of praxis, more specifically a reflexive (including critical and ethical activity) democratic praxis. In the next chapter I shall attempt to show how rationality as the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards shaping higher education transformation in South Africa.

CHAPTER 4

HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION AND MODES OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I shall use “touchstones” of rationality to show how the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can be used to make sense of and to shape higher education transformation in South Africa. First, I shall give an overview of the South African higher education policy framework, in particular its concern with issues of equality, development, accountability and quality which can be linked to “touchstones” of a reflexive democratic praxis. Thereafter, I shall attempt to show how notions of equal access, relevance and dialogism (as “touchstones” of a reflexive democratic praxis) can contribute towards **initiating** equality and development and **enhancing** accountability and quality in higher education transformation in South Africa. Before I address these issues, I shall briefly expound on the notion of transformation in higher education

4.2 TRANSFORMING HIGHER EDUCATION

Transformation is a form of change of one form into another (Harvey & Knight 1996: 10). It is with such an understanding of transformation in mind that I agree with Van Niekerk (1998: 65) when he states that “transformation is not its own goal; the goal is an improved, more just and more equitable society”. When one *transforms* society

from, say, the inequities of the present to a “more just and equitable society”, one responds to a future one wishes to achieve through an ongoing process of rethinking – a process of change from one form to another. In support of this view of transformation, Carrim (1998: 301) states the following in relation to South African education:

The system of apartheid seriously affected the nature of educational provision and order in South Africa. It ensured that South Africans were schooled in segregated environments. This meant that every level of schooling was cast in a racial mould; educational budget provisions, the structure of educational bureaucracies, the composition of staff and pupils in schools (and universities), the kind of curriculum followed, and the ethos prevalent in schools. Transforming education in South Africa, therefore, entails *erecting changes on all of these levels. This requires no less than an overhaul of the past educational order*, a redefinition of the culture prevalent in schools throughout the country and a shift in mentality, from being racist, undemocratic and authoritarian to being non-racial, democratic and enabling (my emphasis).

In the realm of higher education, change can be understood as a shift in the level of knowledge acquired, produced, implemented and questioned on the part of educators and learners – processes of coming to know, understand, implement, reflect. This makes transforming higher education more than just a process of producing “skilled acolytes” but also about

... producing people who can lead, who can produce new knowledge, who can see new problems and imagine new ways of approaching old problems. Higher education has a role to prepare people to go beyond the present and be able to respond to a future which cannot be imagined (Harvey & Knight 1996: 10).

Transformation in higher education involves a process of new knowledge production, reflexive action, which means seeing new problems and imagining new ways of approaching old problems and, deconstruction and reconstruction or constant exploring beneath surface appearances "to respond to a future that cannot be imagined". In this regard, Esterhuyse (1996: 79) is correct when he refers to transformation as a process where no "correct" projection can be made into the future in the light of present and past socio-political developments.

So transformation in higher education is not merely adding to students' knowledge base, skills and potential. At its core transformation refers to the *ongoing change* in the way educators and students approach the acquisition of knowledge and skills and relate them to a broader context (Harvey & Knight 1996: 12). By implication, transformation is about empowering those involved in the higher education process, to develop the critical ability of students and educators to the extent that they become self-determined (rational) and reflexive.

However, just as reflexivity involves being rational, so too higher education can be shaped by transformative conditions which effect changes in the experiences of educators and students. Makgoba (1996: 183-184) states that transformative conditions which impact mostly on the experiences of educators and students at

higher education institutions embrace notions of equal access, development, accountability and quality.

In order to further justify the relationship between transformative conditions and notions of equal access, development, accountability and quality, it is worth referring to Bitzer's (1998: 8-12) analysis of international and national contextual trends that can facilitate transformation in higher education. He identifies massification and greater heterogeneity in the student population, increased emphasis on learning rather than teaching, multi-disciplinarity and modularisation of learning programmes, changing demands on leadership skills as well as efficient control of public funds and quality assurance as some of the conditions which facilitate transformation in the higher education sector. It is my contention that such trends or conditions of transformation embody notions of equal access, development, accountability and quality. It is with such an understanding of transformation in mind that I shall address issues related to higher education policy changes, in particular how these changes link up with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.

4.3 THE HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY FRAMEWORK AND CONDITIONS OF EQUALITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, DEVELOPMENT AND QUALITY

The legacy of unjustifiable inequalities generated by the apartheid system which characterised the higher education system in South Africa, in response to which the African National Congress published its discussion document on education and

training in January 1994, is broadly summarised by Bunting (1994: 224-227) through the following characteristics:

1. Uneven *access* to higher education institutions which offered White South Africans a greater chance than Black South Africans of gaining admission to universities and technikons.
2. Inequitable *success rates* of students (outputs) of previously administered House of Assembly (White) universities have been significantly better than those of other groupings of universities under the management of House of Delegates (Indians), House of Representatives (Coloureds) and the Department of Education and Training (Blacks).
3. Unequal *employment opportunities* for those who are not White. In 1994 Whites held nearly 90% of permanent academic posts in all South African universities and technikons.
4. Under-representation of *women* in certain professional programmes and in senior academic and administrative ranks of higher education institutions.
5. Unequal *staffing resources* in terms of student-lecturer ratio and better qualifications which favoured historically White universities (HWUs), and inequitable *financing* which had a bias towards HWUs.

6. Lack of *responsiveness* (relevance) and “democratic accountability” of higher education institutions to the needs of the majority of South Africans.

A major challenge emerged for the government of national unity in 1994 to put educational policies into place that would help unwind the legacy of apartheid, and which would result in the establishment of a higher education system that would address the imperatives of transformative conditions such as equal access, development, accountability and quality. Morrow (1998: 387) makes the point that higher education institutions should not be exonerated from having perpetuated “patterns of injustice” propounded by the apartheid state. In his words,

... the Apartheid state can be seen as having made explicit what was merely implicit in colonialism. It imposed on society its own racially inspired definition of the groups which make up society and systematically consolidated those definitions in ramifying legislation. As part of that project the unequal dignity, status and privileges of the officially defined groups were reinforced in such a way that their advantages and disadvantages would be carried forward into the future. The gross and blatantly unjustifiable inequalities which this ideological regime spawned became more and more difficult either to ignore or to hide and the edifice, with all its rationalizations, collapsed. One way of putting this point is to say that Apartheid over-rode major and significant interest groups in society; many voices were excluded from collective decision making by being marginalized, ignored, silenced or “eliminated”. But this political strategy could not last for ever. Eventually the mounting pressures of excluded interest groups destroyed the whole

oppressive regime ... In a way educational institutions, and particularly higher education institutions, can be seen as the *epitome of this pattern of injustice*. Such institutions are major distributors of benefits in society, especially those benefits which stretch forward into the future. Universities, in particular, are bastions of privilege and as soon as one presses the questions of who is paying for them and who their beneficiaries are, then their key role in the maintenance and perpetuation of an unjust society becomes clear (1998: 387, my emphasis).

After the demise of the dominance of the apartheid education model for several decades, the higher education system in South Africa has undergone major restructuring. The current higher education policy framework is guided by the 1996 report of the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) which provided the framework for its reconstruction and laid the foundation for the 1997 Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education and the subsequent Higher Education Act (1997). This framework is heavily informed by international financing, quality assurance, governance and national qualifications models from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Subotzky 1999: 15).

The preamble of the Higher Education Act of 1997 is mainly concerned with issues of equality, development, accountability and quality. It states that the purposes of the Act are to:

1. Establish a single co-ordinated higher education system which promotes co-operative governance and provides for programme-based higher education.

2. Restructure and transform programmes and institutions to respond better to the human resource, economic and *development* needs of the Republic.
3. Redress past discrimination and ensure representation and *equal access*.
4. Provide optimal opportunities for learning and the creation of knowledge.
5. Promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, *equality* and freedom.
6. Respect freedom of religion, belief and opinion.
7. Respect and encourage democracy, academic freedom, freedom of speech and expression, creativity, scholarship and research.
8. Pursue excellence, promote the full realisation of the potential of every student and employee, tolerance of ideas and appreciation of diversity.
9. Respond to the needs of the Republic and of the communities served by the institutions.
10. Contribute to the advancement of all forms of knowledge and scholarship, in keeping with international standards of academic *quality*.

11. Enjoy freedom and autonomy in relation with the State within the context of public *accountability* and the national need for advanced skills and scientific knowledge.

4.3.1 Initiating transformation through equality

Some of the features listed in the preamble of the Higher Education Act (1997) which can be subsumed under equality arose as a result of the unequal racial and ethnic division of the higher education system due to apartheid discrimination and because of the inequalities in access which characterised it. Optimal educational opportunity (No. 3) and the full realisation of the potential for all (No. 4) are indications of the emphasis on equality that would be facilitated through establishing a single co-ordinated higher education system (No. 1). Wolpe (1993: 6-7) puts forward the following arguments for an emphasis on equality to be achieved in the South African higher education system:

1. The goal of equality motivated the struggle against apartheid and continues to be an extremely persistent and pervasive demand.
2. There is no guarantee, given the circumstances under which the transition is occurring in South Africa, that economic development will also entail redistribution and a secular trend towards 'general' equality.

Given the influence Wolpe had on higher education policy debates in South Africa, the Higher Education Act (1997) provides a policy framework for equal access as

crucial to redressing past discrimination and ensuring representation and participation. But it might be argued that ensuring equal access construes a violation of the principle of equality since not *all* citizens can gain access into the higher education system. For example, one might find that students who were exposed to scarce resources at school level did not obtain a matriculation exemption that would give them access to graduate studies. Equality in such a context of scarce resources does not imply equal access. In such a context the university may decide to “lower” its entry requirements to allow students who obtained a school leaving certificate without exemption an equal opportunity to “compete fairly” for a university qualification. In this regard Bunting (1994: 2442) claims that ‘the rules of access’ have to be made fairer in order to take account of the schooling problems faced by Black matriculants. He refers to such a situation of equality in the context of scarce resources as “a function of equality of opportunity”. In his words,

... (i)f a resource is scarce, then equity (equality) can exist in a society provided that all citizens have been able to *compete fairly* for a share of the resource. The guarantors of a ‘fair competition’ would in most circumstances be transparent competition rules and ‘level playing fields’ – i.e. rules which are accessible and open to all, and ‘life chances’ which are equal. If the playing fields in a society were not level, then on such a liberal view of equality of opportunity, redress or affirmative action steps would be justified (1994: 243).

The Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997) contains several references which suggest that the policy framework is committed to equality as promoting equal

opportunities as far as access to higher education is concerned. Some of these references include the statements below.

1. The Ministry of Education's commitment to changing the composition of the student body will be effected through the targeted redistribution of the public subsidy to higher education. The relative proportion of public funding used to support academically able but disadvantaged students must be increased.
2. Ensuring equal access must be complemented by a concern for equity goals and plans for achieving them, using indicative targets for distributing publicly subsidised places rather than firm quotas.
3. Ensuring equal access must be complemented by a concern for equality of outcomes. Increased access must not lead to a 'revolving door' syndrome for students, with high failure and drop-out rates. In this respect, the Ministry is committed to ensuring that public funds earmarked for achieving redress and equity must be linked to measurable progress toward improving quality and reducing the high drop-out and repetition rates.

What the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education alludes to is that opportunities are not equal and "measures" will have to be taken to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in the higher education sector. In essence, the above points raised regarding the initiation of equality in higher education seems to be consistent with equal access, resulting in the least transformed becoming more transformed (at times at the expense of quality), articulated as constituting a

touchstone of a reflexive democratic praxis. This means that for a higher education system to be equitable it needs to be committed to initiating equal opportunities as far as access to higher education is concerned. In this way, the idea of equality in higher education transformation can be connected logically to a reflexive democratic praxis.

Moreover, initiating equality in terms of equal access is itself to be concerned with what Howe (1998: 214) refers to as an “enabling good” whereby individuals acquire the knowledge and skill associated with educational transformation; the least transformed becoming more transformed. Such an understanding of equality is not necessarily one that involves justifying taking away certain individuals’ resources in order to promote the welfare of others, in this instance, removing resources from advantaged students to promote the welfare of the disadvantaged. Equal access is used as an enabling function to ensure “that individuals ... are free to pursue any form of (higher) education they freely choose” (1998: 203). Equality as an “enabling good” functions according to what Frankel (1971: 203) refers to as a context in which “the primary desideratum is developmental, educational, the evoking of potentialities” in disadvantaged students. And, bearing in mind that a reflexive democratic praxis aims to initiate equal access aimed at “the evoking of potentialities” in disadvantaged students, its connection with equality as an “enabling good” seems justifiable.

4.3.2 Accent on development

The Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 12) stresses the importance of development as creating conditions to facilitate transformation of the higher education system

... to enable it to contribute to the common good of society through the production, acquisition and application of knowledge, the building of human capacity, and the provision of lifelong learning opportunities.

Thus one finds the preamble of the Higher Education Act (1997) accentuates restructuring and transforming programmes at higher education institutions as imperative to respond to the human resource, economic and development needs of the South African society. What is significant to note is that the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 21) also gives an equal priority to equality and development despite Bunting's (1994) claim that a tension exists between the two concepts. On the one hand, equality is clearly linked to an equal opportunities model which emphasises the issue of ensuring that the composition of the student body at higher education institutions reflects the democratic realities of the broader society, "even if this is at the cost of removing members of the advantaged group from that sector of society" (Bunting 1994: 243). On the other hand, Bunting (1994) argues that the focus of development on, in this sense, "production, acquisition and application of knowledge, the building of human capacity, and the provision of lifelong learning opportunities" seems inconsistent with an equal opportunities model since not *all* citizens would have access to, for example, lifelong learning opportunities. His argument is that unlimited rights of access to knowledge production, capacity enhancement and lifelong learning opportunities would be denied in an equal opportunities model (1994: 244). My contention is that Bunting's view on the apparent inconsistency between equal opportunities and development does not hold water. This is so for the reason that Bunting assumes that advantaged students in the

higher education sector would not gain access to development as if the latter is exclusively earmarked for disadvantaged students in higher education. In any case the production, application and acquisition of knowledge, capacity enhancement and lifelong learning opportunities cannot be reserved only for disadvantaged students as this would not be compatible with achieving "the common good" of the whole South African society. However, correcting the inequalities of the past (and perhaps present) concerning access to and development of disadvantaged students in higher education, equality and development should at least be "progressively" tilted towards increased participation on the part of the disadvantaged. Development in this sense is subject to the condition that disadvantaged students in the first place have to gain access to higher education institutions. In other words, development of disadvantaged students to contribute to the "common good of society" contains already in some sense the possibilities of its subsequent development through knowledge use, capacity enhancement and opportunities for lifelong learning if the condition of access is satisfied. Hamlyn (1998: 144) supports this view by claiming that development is constituted by "conditions that merely make possible the actualisation of the potentiality that was already there; they are not so much independent and direct causes of what happens".

In this regard the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 21) accentuates that the "twin goals" of equal (educational) opportunity and development can be achieved through:

- ensuring that the composition of the student body progressively reflects the demographic realities of the broader society. A major focus of any expansion and

equality strategy must be on increasing the participation and success rates of black students in general, and of African, Coloured and women students in particular, especially in programmes and levels in which they are underrepresented;

- expanding career-oriented programmes at all levels, but in particular, in shorter cycle (one and two year) programmes at certificate and diploma levels, and in science, engineering and technology programmes;
- expanding enrolments in postgraduate programmes at the masters and doctoral levels, to address the high level skills necessary for social and economic development and to provide for the needs of the academic labour market; and
- expanding the range of programmes and increasing enrolments based on open learning and distance education, especially for young and older adults, with particular emphasis on women.

What all the above amounts to is that development, being subject to the condition that disadvantaged students in the first place have to gain equal access to higher education institutions, can be linked to the idea of a reflexive democratic discourse. This is so for the reason that development presupposes the notion of gaining equal access, the latter regarded as a touchstone of a reflexive democratic discourse.

4.3.3 Accent on accountability

To be accountable is to be under an obligation to provide a justification for what is being done (Morrow 1989: 5). Of course the notion of accountability has several nuances (Vroeijenstijn 1995), but a central characteristic of accountability is that of providing a justification of “rendering an account” as expressed by Middlehurst and Woodhouse (1995: 260):

(Accountability involves) that of ‘rendering an account’ of what one is doing in relation to goals that have been set or legitimate expectations that others may have of one’s products, services or processes, in terms that can be understood by those who have a need or right to understand the ‘account’. For this reason, accountability is usually, if not always, linked to public information and to judgements about the fitness, soundness, or level of satisfaction achieved.

What the above explanation of accountability implores is that a higher education system must be able to justify its policies in terms of defensible standards of higher education policy, what Middlehurst and Woodhouse (1995) refer to as “judgements about the fitness, soundness, or level of satisfaction achieved”. The idea of public accountability (No. 11) prioritised in the preamble of the Higher Education Act (1997) is expressed in the Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education (1997: 13) compatible with the notion of accountability as justification:

The principle of public accountability implies that institutions are answerable for their actions and decisions not only to their own governing bodies and the institutional community but also to the broader society. Firstly it requires that institutions receiving public funds should be able to report how, and how well, money has been spent. Secondly it requires that institutions should demonstrate the results they achieve with the resources at their disposal. Thirdly, it requires that institutions should demonstrate how they have met national policy goals and priorities.

The Education White Paper 3 on Higher Education prioritises the relationship between accountability, institutional efficiency and output or performance indicators related to student learning and the relevance of learning programmes to “national policy goals and priorities”. On the one hand, accountability as efficiency is based on the ability of a higher education institution to work to clear objectives and to achieve value for money such as to develop rolling academic and institutional plans, improvements in institutional management, the introduction of arrangements for staff development, appraisal and providing high quality teaching and learning. On the other hand, accountability is based upon the ability of the institution to deliver what it promised through its mission statement, programme objectives in relation to improving student learning experience and developing flexibility to be able to respond to future change (Harvey & Knight 1996: 73). This idea of accountability in higher education seems consistent with a touchstone of a reflexive democratic praxis, that is, relevance. This means that higher education policy has been developed according to compromising understandings which are responsive to the interests of society. For higher education policy to be publicly accountable, educationists need “to be

answerable for their actions and decisions not only to their own governing bodies and the institutional community but also to the broader society” and of relevance to “national policy goals and priorities”. In this way, the idea of public accountability seems to be logically connected to a reflexive democratic praxis.

4.3.4 Enhancing transformation through quality

The transformation of the higher education system in South Africa from its apartheid legacy has been facilitated by the National Commission on Higher Education report of 1996, as well as several policy documents in particular the Education White Paper 3 and the Higher Education Act of 1997, the latter currently informing the main thrust of higher education policy analysis in this chapter. In the first chapter it has been mentioned that important mechanisms in the formation of higher education transformation have been established which include a National Qualifications Framework (NQF), a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), a Council on Higher Education (CHE) and, in the course of 1999 under the CHEs Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC), a Quality Assurance (QA) system which suggests that the South African government prioritises the achievement of quality in the transformation of higher education. The Education White Paper 3 (1997: 28) stresses that

... the Higher Education Act will provide for the co-ordination of quality assurance in higher education The functions of HEQC will include programme accreditation, institutional auditing and quality promotion. It should operate within an agreed framework underpinned by:

- the formulation of criteria and procedures in consultation with higher education institutions;
- a formative notion of quality assurance, focussed on improvement and development rather than punitive sanction; and
- a mix of institutional self-evaluation and external independent assessment.

My emphasis is on the notion of “quality assurance focussed on improvement and development” rather than an elitist concept of quality as the obverse or reverse side of equality. As has been argued for thus far, the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis favours egalitarian issues of improvement and development at the expense of an elitist notion of quality. To consider demands for quality in terms of “improvement and development” is to be concerned with the predominance of egalitarian demands where they conflict with an elitist concept of quality. In other words, achieving the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis depends on a complementary understanding of equality and quality whereby the former needs to be in the ascendancy to **kick-start** the transformation process. However, to show how quality in terms of improvement and development can **enhance** the transformation process in higher education, I shall refer once again to the Education White Paper 3 of 1997, in particular to the challenges it poses for higher education transformation in South Africa.

Quality in terms of higher education transformation has been defined as an increase in the level of educatedness of people whatever the initial level of their educatedness.

However, as has been alluded to earlier, an increase in the level of educatedness of people whatever their initial level of educatedness is not a sufficient explanation of what quality means, particularly in terms of higher education transformation. Harvey and Green (1993) explain quality in terms of higher education according to five distinct and interrelated ways of thinking: quality as exceptional, as perfection (consistency), as fitness for purpose, as value for money and as transformation.

4.3.4.1 Quality as exceptional

Quality as exceptional can be associated with three variations: with the notion of exclusivity or high class (Pfeffer & Coote 1991), excellence or elitism attainable in limited circumstances (Ball 1985) and a product which has passed a set of quality checks or standards (Walsh 1991). In the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 12) the Ministry of Education considers “ideals of excellence” and the maintenance, application and evaluation of services and products against set academic and educational standards, with “a view to improvement, renewal or progress”. Such a view of quality in higher education can enhance transformation, particularly with “a view to improvement”.

4.3.4.2 Quality as perfection

Quality as consistency is aimed at both zero defects whereby faults do not occur (Harrington 1988: 10) and the fact that things are “done right first time” (Crosby 1984: 13). Such a view of quality does not favour transformation in higher education

for the reason that people are not fallible and invariably make mistakes as they formulate their institutions' aims, mission and programmes of study.

4.3.4.3 Quality as fitness for purpose

Quality as fitness for purpose can be related to meeting customer requirements, which pose a problem for higher education in the sense that the customer, the student for example, is not necessarily in a position to specify his or her requirements (Harvey & Knight 1996). But, fitness for purpose as a means of higher education institutions' responsiveness to the needs of students, employers, government and society fits well with the transformation process. In this regard, the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 10) links transformation in higher education to "responsiveness to societal interests and needs", an idea which is also grounded in the notion of accountability:

Successful policy must restructure the higher education system and its institutions to meet the needs of an increasingly technologically oriented economy. It must also deliver the requisite research, the highly trained people and the knowledge to equip a developing society with the capacity to address national needs and to participate in a rapidly changing and competitive global context.

4.3.4.4 Quality as value for money

Quality as value for money (“return on investment”) in the higher education transformation process seems to be compatible with principles of effectiveness and efficiency as articulated in the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 10):

An effective system or institution functions in such a way that it leads to desired outcomes or achieves desired objectives. An efficient system or institution is one which works well, without unnecessary duplication or waste, and within the bounds of affordability and sustainability. It does things correctly in terms of optimal use of available means.

4.3.4.5 Quality as transformation

In contrast to equality which is aimed at initiating transformation, quality as transformation is inextricably linked to improvement and development of processes of change at higher education institutions, that is, enhancing the transformation processes in the higher education sector. This makes quality as transformation complementary to equality, in particular equal access. On the basis of the complementary relationship between equality and quality, quality as transformation must clearly focus on enhancing the transformation processes at institutions. Harvey and Knight (1996: 109) identify four ways in which quality as transformation can enhance change in the higher education sector. I shall relate these four ways to the quality assurance framework proposed by the HEQC, below.

1. Continuous quality improvement (CQI) reflects a considered view of academic management compatible with “new collegialism” or dialogism (a touchstone of a reflexive democratic praxis) that emphasises the importance of sincerity and trust, ownership (autonomy), personal commitment (strength of will) and independence in the management of change (Middlehurst & Gordon 1995). Management of change according to Harvey and Knight (1996: 110) comprises seven strategic functions in respect of continuous quality improvement which in my view embrace several touchstones of a reflexive democratic praxis:

- Setting the parameters within which the quality improvement process takes place.
- Establishing a non-exploitative, suspicion-free context in which a culture of quality improvement can flourish.
- Establishing and ensuring a process of internal quality monitoring referred to by the Education White Paper 3 as institutional self-evaluation.
- Enabling the consistent gathering of relevant evidence to inform analysis and reflection.
- Disseminating good practice through an effective and open system of communication, which is emphasised by the Education White Paper 3 as consultation.
- Encouraging and facilitating *team working* amongst academic and academic-related colleagues.

- Delegating responsibility for quality improvement to the units that are going to deliver continuous improvement at the staff-student interface.
2. Bottom-up empowerment is an approach to quality improvement which requires identifiable teams of academics taking responsibility in working together to identify quality targets, setting agendas for action and reporting clearly on intentions and outcomes. It is in such a context that the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 10) emphasises “co-operation and partnerships in governance”, once again accentuating dialogism (a touchstone of a reflexive democratic praxis):

Successful policy must reconceptualise the relationship between higher education and the state, civil society, and stakeholders, and among institutions. It must also create an enabling institutional environment and culture that is sensitive to and affirms diversity, promotes reconciliation and respect for human life, protects the dignity of individuals from racial and sexual harassment, and rejects all other forms of violent behaviour.

3. Top-down auditing should operate at two levels: internal audit (institutional auditing according to the Education White Paper 3) conducted within an institution on a frequent, comprehensive basis and an external audit referred to by the Education White Paper 3 as external independent assessment) on a periodic or irregular basis conducted by a national or regional agency, in the

South African instance, by the HEQC. Harvey and Knight (1996: 115) proposes that internal auditors would probably:

- require clarification of claims made in the auditing report;
- require evidence of unsupported claims;
- undertake an audit trail of the way the quality assurance process operates;
- observe teaching;
- examine output from scholarship and research activities; and
- talk to students and other stakeholders.

External auditing aims to assess the quality of provision and the adequacy of quality procedures and relate them to the institution's self-critical appraisal. This involves:

- assessing whether institutions fulfil their missions;
- exploring this might be done better; and
- suggesting modifications to the mission in the light of changed national circumstances of local requirements (1996: 115).

The basis for enhancing transformation through quality in the form of external auditing is not unrelated to equal student access, improved teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service, increased student progression, and the greater responsiveness to social and economic needs. In this regard the Education White Paper 3 (1997: 55)

stresses that public funding will be conditional on institutions developing plans for their future development and providing evidence of the progress they are making to realise these goals.

4. Quality assurance has to be efficient, non-burdensome, rational and effective.

Producing a quality institutional report such as those submitted by higher education institutions for programme accreditation or three-year rolling institutional plans, should not “become over bureaucratised (which may) ... possibly fossilise an informal and dynamic process” (Harvey & Knight 199: 117). On the efficiency and effectiveness of programme accreditation and three year rolling plans submissions, the Education White Paper (1997: 20) stresses that each higher education institution needs to clarify

... its institutional mission based on appropriate programme choices and combinations, as the body of learners diversifies, as the teaching, research and management profiles become more representative of our people, as quality promotion and quality assurance processes take hold, as the institutional landscape changes, as centres of excellence are recognised and promoted across the system (which would cause) the distinction between historically advantaged and historically disadvantaged (to become) ... less and less relevant.

In essence, quality as efficiency and effectiveness in institutional planning and development seems to be aimed at complementing the predominance of equality with that of quality through transformation so that “the distinction

between historically advantaged and historically disadvantaged (students) becomes less and less relevant”.

In sum, quality as transformation, in particular improvement and development, seems to be an appropriate way to enhance higher education transformation at South African institutions. This is so primarily as a result of the function of quality as transformation to be tilted towards enhancing transformation rather than initiating transformation. In this way, equality through equal access and quality through transformation do not stand in opposition to each other, but rather constitute complementary processes in shaping higher education transformation. Also, quality as transformation is a process which relies heavily on dialogism, mentioned in my explanation of quality as invoking “new collegialism”, “team working”, “consultation”, “co-operation”, “commitment”, “partnerships”, and so on. These nuances of dialogism connect logically with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. Moreover, asserting dialogism in enhancing higher education transformation through quality is itself a commitment to collective action whereby people through “strength of will” show determination to chart out a reflexive democratic praxis.

Thus, first, initiating equality in the transformation process through **equal access** and development opportunities for disadvantaged students reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. Second, the idea of accountability seems to be logically connected to a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that for higher education policy to be publicly accountable, it needs to be answerable to institutional communities and the broader society, and it needs to be of **relevance** to “national policy goals and priorities”. Finally, enhancing the transformation of the higher

education sector through quality assurance measures invoking a spirit of **dialogism** is compatible with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. And for the reason that access, relevance and dialogism are considered “touchstones” of rationality (the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis), one can now justifiably refer to a reflexive democratic praxis as that “doing action” which can engender equality, development, accountability and quality in higher education transformation. It is with such an understanding of a reflexive democratic praxis in mind that I shall in the next chapter attempt to show how notions of equal access, relevance and dialogism can shape what I consider three interrelated practices, namely teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service. All this is situated within the move towards initiating equality and development and, enhancing accountability and quality in higher education transformation in South Africa.

4.4 HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

A reflexive democratic praxis as has been argued for is shaped by the general principle of rationality which, in turn, is constituted by “touchstones” – equal access, relevance and dialogism – that can contribute towards transforming higher education institutions. But rationality itself is guided by critical, reflexive, ethical and democratic forms of educational discourse, understood here as praxis to achieve some morally worthwhile good. Like any other concept, praxis occurs in particular contexts of meaning making or what has now become common to refer to as “modes of knowledge production”. Therefore to understand how a reflexive democratic praxis can shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community

service related to higher education, I first need to expound on current debates about knowledge production.

Muller (1999: 3) explains the increasing salience of knowledge as a form of symbolic capital increasingly being organised as *the* central form of productive capital as follows.

- In the economy: knowledge in the form of data, plans, blueprints, patents, programmes and theories become *immediately* productive in the sense that it decreasingly requires labour and machines as intermediaries before it produces value.
- In politics and civil society: knowledge of all sorts is increasingly sought by groups, communities, as well as individuals as they conduct themselves and pursue their interests in the bewildering complexity of modern civic life. Recent examples would include contests around desirability of mineral extraction, land rights claims, abortion, the environment, and so on.
- In private life: knowledge becomes the tool with which individuals negotiate the complexities of everyday life, from taxation (tax counselors) to unfair labour practices (shop stewards and human resource personnel); from relationships (marriage counselors) and diet (nutritional knowledge) to health and consumption (consumer information agencies).

By implication the work of knowledge producers and reconfigurers becomes central to the life of all citizens (1999: 4). I shall now examine two different ways in which knowledge production can be mapped out.

4.4.1 “Modes” of knowledge production and higher education

As a preliminary I shall briefly refer to the nature of knowledge itself, a concept central to the discussion of a reflexive democratic praxis at higher education level. Following Hirst’s (1998b: 255) explanation of the nature of knowledge, I deduce that to acquire knowledge is to become mindful of organised, rational (meaningful) human experience of the world in “a way otherwise unknown, and thereby come to have a mind in the fuller sense”. What does Hirst mean by structured and rational human experience? Hirst (1998b: 260) contends that structured and rational human experience “involves the use of symbols and the making of judgments in ways that cannot (always) be expressed in words and can only be learnt in a tradition”. These traditions or modes of knowledge include: (1) distinct subdivisible disciplines such as mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy and, (2) theoretical and practical fields of knowledge (such as geography and politics) which are not themselves disciplines or subdivisions of any discipline and are formed by building together around practical pursuits and rooted in more than one discipline. It is with such an understanding (that notion which can be explained in terms of a general principle) in mind that I shall examine these two traditions of knowledge production, that is, structured, organised and rational human experience.

Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott and Trow (1994) distinguish between two modes (traditions) of knowledge production, namely, "Mode 1" and "Mode 2". "Mode 1" knowledge production refers to

... a complex of ideas, methods, values, norms – that has grown up to control the diffusion of the Newtonian model to more and more fields of inquiry and ensure its compliance with what is considered sound scientific practice. Mode 1 is meant to summarise in a single phrase the cognitive and social norms, which must be followed in the production, legitimation and diffusion of knowledge of this kind. For many, Mode 1 is identical with what is meant by science. Its cognitive and social norms determine what shall count as significant problems, who shall be allowed to practise science and what constitutes good science. Forms of practice which adhere to these rules are by definition scientific while those that violate them are not (1994: 3).

"Mode 2" in contrast to "Mode 1" knowledge production is articulated by Gibbons *et al.* (1994: vii) as follows:

Our view is that while Mode 2 may not be replacing Mode 1, Mode 2 is different from Mode 1 – in nearly every respect. The new mode operates within a context of application in that problems are not set within a disciplinary framework. It is transdisciplinary rather than mono- or multi-disciplinary. It is carried out in non-hierarchical, heterogeneously organised forms which are essentially transient. It is not being institutionalised primarily within university structures. Mode 2 involves the close interaction of many actors throughout the process of knowledge

production and this means that knowledge production is becoming more and more socially accountable. One consequence of these changes is that Mode 2 makes use of a wider range of criteria in judging quality control. Overall, the process of knowledge production is becoming more reflexive and affects at the deepest levels what shall count as “good science”.

The constitutive features which distinguish “Mode 2” from “Mode 1” knowledge production as stated above can be considered in more detail in terms of five categories: knowledge in the context of application (socially distributed knowledge), transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity and organisational diversity, social accountability and reflexivity, and quality control.

4.4.1.1 Knowledge in the context of application

“Mode 1” problem solving is conducted within a disciplinary context, whereas “Mode 2” problem solving is performed in specific contexts of application. In these contexts of application, knowledge is negotiated whereby people (educators, students, parents, communities, academics and other groups) make sense of their own worlds, to determine their own interests, both individual and collective, and connect their experiences to **relevant** social issues.

4.4.1.2 Transdisciplinarity

“Mode 2” transdisciplinary knowledge arises in “a continuous linking and re-linking, in specific (disciplinary) clusterings and configurations of knowledge” and therefore it

is “generated in the context of application”. Gibbons *et al.* (1994: 29) argue that

(a) transdisciplinary mode consists in a continuous linking and re-linking, in specific clusterings and configurations of knowledge which is brought together on a temporary basis in specific contexts of application. Thus it is strongly oriented towards and driven by problem solving. Its theoretical methodological core, while cross-cutting through well-established disciplinary cores, is often locally driven and locally constituted, thus, any such core is highly sensitive to further local mutations depending on the context of application.

Emerging clusters of transdisciplinary knowledge according to Gibbons *et al.* (1994: 29) include cultural studies, urban studies, women’s studies, and so on, which are not developed first and applied later (Kraak 1999: 4). It is in this regard that I think McLaren (1991: 10) makes sense when he claims that “all knowledge is relational and can only be understood within the context of production, its distributions, and the way it is taken up by different individuals and groups”. Put differently, knowledge does not comprise a universal, value-free body of facts, independent of the understandings of people. Rather, it is produced, located and understood within existing social and cultural formations (Giroux 1999: 17). Hence, Gibbons *et al.* (1994: 11) explains transdisciplinarity as “problem solving capability on the move”.

4.4.1.3 Heterogeneity and organisational diversity

“Mode 2” knowledge is organisationally diverse and heterogenous unlike “Mode 1”

which is homogenous, that is, disciplinary knowledge is rigidly institutionalised. Organisational diversity arises because “Mode 2” is the outcome of “sites of knowledge production”. Located at these sites are temporary teams of knowledge producers with diverse backgrounds such as academics, production engineers, skilled craftspersons and social scientists, researchers and so on (Kraak 1999: 14). In other words, in addition to the traditional university, other diverse sites of knowledge production may include government and industrial laboratories and research centres, think-tanks, consultancies and civil society organisations. Gibbons *et al.* (1994: 6) refer to such transient clusters of temporary teams and networks as new organisational forms of “Mode 2” knowledge production:

(Teams of knowledge producers) dissolve when a problem is solved or redefined. Members may then reassemble in different groups involving different people, often in different loci, around different problems ... Though problems may be transient and groups short-lived, the organisation and communication patterns persists as a matrix from which further groups and networks, dedicated to different problems, will be formed.

4.4.1.4 Social accountability and reflexivity

“Mode 2” knowledge is produced through engaging people critically and reflexively in action for the reason that “the issue on which research is based cannot be answered in scientific and technical terms alone” (Gibbons *et al.* 1994: 7). Teams of diverse workers constitute a collaborative group of critical inquiry that links the need for greater social accountability to the acknowledgement of other viewpoints. They are

different, yet they intersubjectively share and negotiate patterns of meaning in order to broaden the conditions for the production of socially relevant knowledge. They become more reflexive and sensitive to the broad social implications of their work in varying contexts. In this way, people are self-critical, yet remain socially engaged, that is, in “constant dialogue” with others (educators, researchers, planners, community groups, and so on) and other viewpoints to address the most pressing social (educational) and political problems of their time (Giroux 1992: 20).

4.4.1.5 Quality control

In “Mode 1” the main criterion for judging the quality of knowledge produced is “peer review”. In “Mode 2” additional role players, whether from the university, research councils, government departments or industry, bring “external criteria” to the review process. This combination between “peer review” and external merit judgements in “Mode 2” knowledge production raise questions about social acceptability, cost-effectiveness, widening of knowledge applicability in a market-oriented society and about what constitutes “good science”. In assessing the quality of knowledge produced Gibbons *et al.* (1994: 8) claim the following:

So, the peer review process is one in which quality and control mutually reinforce one another. It has both cognitive and social dimensions, in that there is professional control over what problems and techniques are deemed important to work on as well as who is qualified to pursue their solution. In disciplinary science, peer review operates to channel individuals to work on problems judged to be central to the advance of the discipline. These problems are defined largely

in terms of criteria which reflect the intellectual interests and preoccupations of the discipline and its gatekeepers ... (In "Mode 2") since it is no longer limited strictly to the judgement of disciplinary peers, the fear is that control will be weaker and result in lower quality work. Although the quality control process in Mode 2 is more broadly based, it does not follow that because a wider range of expertise is brought to bear on a problem it will necessarily be of lower quality. It is of a more composite, multidimensional kind.

Hence, in "Mode 1" knowledge production is sanctioned by a community of specialists, whereas in transdisciplinary "Mode 2" different criteria are applied in quality control allowing for experimental planning to deal with uncertainties, continuous evaluation, and sensitivity to changes in social, economic and technical environments.

In sum, Gibbons *et al.* (1994: 6) see the shift to "Mode 2" knowledge production coherently in terms of knowledge in the context of application (socially distributed knowledge), transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity and organisational diversity, social accountability and reflexivity, and quality control. The two modes of knowledge production are related in two ways: Firstly, "Mode 2" is viewed as an outgrowth of "Mode 1", existing parallel to it without replacing it. Secondly, each mode represents distinct ways of knowledge production but also interacts in complementary ways. Drawing on Muller's (1999: 9) critique of the replacement of "Mode 1" by "Mode 2", I infer that "Mode 1" is orthodox, disciplinary knowledge production which is not going to disappear but rather which is affected by the "degree and emergence of Mode 2". Instead "Mode 2" knowledge production depends upon a sound "Mode 1"

disciplinary base (Muller 1999: 9). In this regard he claims that

... (t)he most effective examples of Mode 2 (supplementing Mode 1) are research projects which configure disciplinary specialists within an organisational format that produces a knowledge outcome that could not be produced by one disciplinary input ... (which) should not mean that all higher education courses (including community service activities) should now become interdisciplinary, or practical, or skills-based ... (Muller 1999: 10)

In the light of the above explanation of the shift towards “Mode 2” knowledge production, I shall now examine some of the implications of knowledge in the context of application (socially distributed knowledge), transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity and organisational diversity, social accountability and reflexivity, and quality control for a reflexive democratic praxis.

4.4.2 Implications of the shift towards “Mode 2” for a reflexive democratic praxis

Earlier, I argued that a reflexive democratic praxis can be considered “doing action” which can engender equality, development, accountability and quality related to higher education transformation. Before I move on to a discussion as to how a reflexive democratic praxis can shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service in higher education, I shall briefly look at how the emerging shift towards “Mode 2” knowledge production strengthens the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that “Mode 2” knowledge production is

a form of knowledge which in my view does not happen independently of emergent trends in teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service. My contention is that the notions of access, relevance and dialogism ("touchstones" of rationality) unfold in the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production, which in turn reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.

First, the shift from "Mode 1" to "Mode 2" knowledge production, that is, knowledge produced in the context of application characterised by transdisciplinarity, heterogeneity, organisational diversity and increased social accountability and reflexivity accompanied by new forms of quality control, has the effect whereby universities in particular will have to adjust from being adept producers of mainly disciplinary knowledge to being creative reconfigurers of knowledge in solving increasingly complex problems (Subotzky 1999: 17). Gibbons (1998: 1) claims that the pursuit of knowledge **only** for its own sake seems to have been supplanted by the view that universities "are meant to serve society, primarily by supporting the economy and promoting the quality of life of its citizens".

Before I examine the notion of "promoting the quality of life of its citizens", I first need to elucidate the idea of knowledge for its own sake in relation to the role of universities. Röhrs (1995: 15) articulates the view that the university's chief aim is to unleash forms of speculative inquiry which "lay bare the *meaning of the idea* and in so doing to stimulate thinking about its appropriateness and usefulness for the present day" (my emphasis). In other words, the attitude and way of life in the university should first be determined by "an emphasis on philosophising as a basic attitude of the academic mind", that is, emphasising the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. In

turn, the attainment of “profound specialised knowledge” can be extended to the domain of practical knowledge necessary in real or public life (1995: 21). In this way, the idea of pursuing knowledge for its own sake through “philosophical reflexion” can be used for the benefit of society. It is in this regard that I agree with Young (1999: 11) when he claims that “some sense of ‘learning for its own sake’ is essential; always having to search for the uses of knowledge can be a constraint on learning as it can be on research”. Hence, without rejecting the idea of a university as an institution striving for intellectual concentration and profundity, university intellectuals can combine their pursuit of knowledge for its own sake with their civic responsibilities. In this regard Röhrs (1995: 21) posits the following:

The attitude and way of life in the university should be determined by “a spirit of scholarship as a principle”; this should bring about, through the medium of philosophical thinking, that lucidity which can exert a real influence on life. In spite of all its independence the university cannot remain a “closed world”; it must rather, as a kind of national academic institution, renew the whole of public life by recalling the practical knowledge necessary in public life to the idea of knowledge and scholarship and to the ethical foundations of both.

In this way, universities and their academics and / or intellectuals can serve society through supporting the economy and “promoting the quality of life of its citizens”.

My emphasis is on the idea of “promoting the quality of life of its citizens”. To my mind “citizens” include those who attend, do not attend, might / can attend or want to attend higher education institutions. In other words promoting quality of “citizens”

brings into play the notion of access of students, particularly from the disadvantaged sector, to universities. As I have argued previously, students first need to gain equal access to higher education institutions before one can talk of enhancing their quality and that of the institutions they attend. Bearing in mind that the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis is inextricably linked to initiating equal access and enhancing quality in a complementary way, the notion of “promoting quality of citizens” within the shift towards “Mode 2” knowledge production reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. In fact, “Mode 2” knowledge production allows space for a more diverse student population at higher education institutions due to increased access to students from the historically disadvantaged sector in terms of class, race and / or gender factors. Hence, promoting quality *through* access makes the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis unavoidable.

Second, the shift towards “Mode 2” offers challenges to higher education institutions summarised by Scott (1995) as follows.

- Higher education institutions will no longer remain the supreme provider of both new knowledge and skills for the reason they must compete with other public and private institutions.
- Socially distributed knowledge emerges as an important source of knowledge in accredited learning programmes and research as academics and the public come to disregard the distinction between disciplinary academic knowledge and relevant knowledge.

- Programmes of learning will increasingly become modularised to ensure greater flexibility to society's diverse needs.

My interest is in "Mode 2" shaping learning programmes to be more flexible, transdisciplinary and relevant to competitive market forces. And, considering that a reflexive democratic praxis invokes the notion of relevance, the shift to "Mode 2" knowledge production further reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.

Third, "Mode 2" knowledge production not only makes it possible for different kinds of knowledge (scientific, technological and industrial) to co-exist, but also increases the level of co-operation between people located in different institutions. For example, research scientists, business people, patent lawyers, production engineers, and so on, develop dialogical partnerships through which they become jointly responsible for effectiveness of student learning, curriculum development, research and community development. In this way, the shift towards "Mode 2" knowledge production lends itself to what constitutes a reflexive democratic praxis, for the reason that the latter constantly asserts its bias towards dialogism as a commitment to collective action, referred to by Gibbons (1998: 54) as the notion of partnership.

In essence, the shift to "Mode 2" knowledge production and its implications for higher education reinforces the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. This is so primarily because "touchstones" of rationality are harnessed in the context of the emergent mode of knowledge production ("Mode 2"). I am not suggesting that a reflexive democratic praxis can operate better if "Mode 2" replaces "Mode 1" knowledge production. In other words, my argument was not for elitist, disciplinary

knowledge to be replaced by more democratic and diverse forms of knowledge. Instead, my contention is that a reflexive democratic praxis could operate better if practised in a context of meaning making whereby “Mode 2” complements “Mode 1” knowledge production. This is so for the reason that “Mode 2” competence depends on a prior disciplinary “Mode 1” competence. Gibbons (1998: 54) explains below the complementary link between “Mode 1” and “Mode 2” knowledge production.

To meet both national and community needs a different organisation of knowledge production than Mode 1 is required. The elements of that organisation lie not necessarily in the wholesale abandonment of Mode 1, but rather in the developing of linkages between Mode 1 and Mode 2.

4.5 SUMMARY

I used some of the “touchstones” of rationality to show how the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards achieving higher education transformation in South Africa. I argued that the South African higher education policy framework concerns itself with issues of equality, development, accountability and quality. The achievement of these transformative goals can be linked to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.

In the next chapter I shall attempt to show how a reflexive democratic praxis can shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service in the context of the shift towards “Mode 2” knowledge production related to higher education transformation.

CHAPTER 5

TEACHING AND LEARNING THROUGH DISTANCE EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I shall attempt to address the question as to how a reflexive democratic praxis in terms of the shift towards “Mode 2” knowledge production can shape teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher education transformation. Thus far, I have argued that the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis is constituted by rationality. Rationality comprises “touchstones” of which equal access, relevance and dialogism can be considered as appropriate to guide notions of teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service related to higher education transformation and the concomitant shift towards a new mode of knowledge production. In this section I shall attempt to show that a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards organising higher education focussing on teaching and learning through distance education, research (incorporating research-based teaching) and community service. It is my contention that a more nuanced understanding of these aspects of higher education has the potential to **initiate** equal access and development on the one hand, and to **enhance** accountability and quality on the other hand.

I shall attempt to show how a reflexive democratic praxis can facilitate access, relevance and dialogism in teaching and learning through distance education at higher

education institutions. To my mind, by far the most significant challenge that higher education institutions face in providing equal access to masses of disadvantaged students, is the design, development, production and delivery of learner-centred, quality and cost-effective distance education course materials. El-Khawas (1999: 9) notes three challenging trends which higher education institutions face in deciding how they must serve adult learners in a changing environment: (1) the decisions by many countries to rely on *distance education* to accommodate growing higher education provision; (2) unprecedented expansion taking place in the feasible uses of information and communication technology; and (3) a stronger degree of market competition with respect to the adult learner. These trends, likely to have an overlapping effect, indicate that the future holds a new competitive market for serving adult learners (1999: 9).

It is my contention that a reflexive democratic praxis offers us space not only to provide distance education (overlapping of course with information and communication technology) to **initiate** equal access but also to **enhance** the quality (in terms of the relevance of distance education course materials) and dialogical relationships between educators and learners in the context of teaching and learning at a distance.

The question however remains: Why is distance education such a significant challenge which higher education institutions face? A discussion of distance education invariably brings into focus the notion of lifelong learning. Higher education and lifelong learning permeate almost all models of the university for the future (Duke 1999: 25). The term "lifelong learning" grew out of OECD

(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), UNESCO (United Nations Educational and Scientific Cultural Organisation) and similar European-based intergovernmental agencies at the end of the 1960s in a time of social and economic optimism (1999: 21). Lifelong learning challenges notions that learning should be confined to the classroom and “that learning is essentially a pre-experience formative process controlled purposefully by society if not the State (199: 22). It signals the shift from elite (or simply academic) higher education to the massification of higher education concerned with the role of universities to provide equal access to students (where the rite of passage of the privileged remains recognisable, but of less significance in comparison with the disadvantaged) and to *engage* with society in the construction and application of new knowledge and skills (1999: 25). Teichler (1999: 38) claims that higher education is fairly well-prepared to meet the demands of “lifelong self-learners” since it fosters questioning, critical and reflective thinking (reflexivity) and provides primarily the foundations of knowledge for future professional tasks. Foundations of knowledge usually assume the form of programmes, for example, degree programme, non-degree programmes, individual lectures, short courses, or certified advanced programmes at various stages of higher education (preparatory, advanced, refresher or continuing programmes) (1999: 39).

Through lifelong learning people of all ages who are past the normal age of initial full-time education can expect to have their broad learning needs met. According to Davies (1995: 287) these “adult learners” can be categorised as follows: (1) “Deferrers” or students qualifying for higher education when they were young but not transferring to higher education shortly after completion of secondary education; (2) “Second chancers” or students initially not qualifying for entry to higher education

but turning after some period to higher education (possibly after making use of second-chance provisions for the acquisition of entry qualification or through special admission arrangements for adults); and (3) “Returners” or persons having graduated from higher education and enrolling again after some period (i.e. for professional refresher courses, advanced academic or professional programmes). Moreover, lifelong learning is broader than recurrent adult and non-formal education, because it embraces all learning from that of young people in pre-primary schooling through to adults (Wagner 1999: 56). However the focus of this thesis is on lifelong learning for “adult learners”.

There is nothing new about lifelong learning taking place in the home. Distance education universities have multiplied worldwide in recent decades. According to Duke (1999: 30) “lifelong learning implies approaching universal participation in post-school education with recurrency throughout life ... (offering) a strong set of *alternative* learning opportunities to meet more of the *diverse* needs of different client groups to learn at their own time, place and pace” (my italics). In a different way, the challenge of lifelong learning offers higher education institutions a space for alternative, flexible learning through distance education (Davies 1995: 287). I shall now look at distance education as a “mode of delivery” for lifelong learning provision (Teichler 1999: 39) in more detail, in particular how it links up with concepts embedded in lifelong learning, that is, teaching and learning.

5.2 TEACHING AND LEARNING THROUGH DISTANCE EDUCATION

I first need to make a few preliminary remarks about the concepts teaching and learning. To teach, in the standard sense, is to submit one's reasons to the learner who, in turn, submits them to evaluation and criticism (Scheffler 1998: 259). To send one's daughter to driving school is not, in itself, to teach her how to drive. So to have taught someone how to drive is more than to have sent someone to driving school; it is also to have succeeded in getting someone to *do* something and to have succeeded in making someone exercise criticism and judgment. Scheffler (1998: 261) makes the point that "teaching is engaged in, it is directed toward a goal, the attainment of which normally involves attention and effort, and provides a relevant definition of success". Here "a relevant definition of success" can be explained as trying to get someone to drive, which should be tied to a goal striven for that may or may not be attained. The desire to drive has been activated according to someone's "reasoned persuasion and freely given consent" (1998: 260). In other words, teaching is an activity involving an attempt to get someone to learn something, and it does not preclude the learner from asking questions such as "How?" and "Why?". If I relate such an explanation of teaching and learning to higher education, then one cannot simply argue that offering disadvantaged students equal access to universities is in itself to teach them. Teaching requires educators to reveal their reasons to students, for example, through distance education course materials, and by doing so, to submit them to students' critical reflection and reasoned judgments. In this way the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can be invoked in both students and educators.

More specifically, Kember (1998: 8-9) categorises several conceptions of teaching: conceptual change / intellectual development, facilitating understanding, student interaction, transmitting structured knowledge and imparting information. These categories hold much promise for teaching and learning through distance education couched under the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis.

- *Conceptual change / intellectual development* involves establishing an interpersonal relationship conducive to learning (Dunkin 1990), facilitating understanding through engagement with content and process (Ramsden 1992) and supporting student learning (Samuelowicz & Bain 1992).
- *Facilitating understanding* offers learners opportunities to explore ways of understanding (Dall'Alba 1991) and to develop independence in learning (Dunkin 1990).
- *Student interaction* is aimed at motivating and encouraging active student learning (Martin & Balla 1991).
- *Transmitting structured knowledge* helps students to acquire teachers' knowledge (Prosser, Trigwell & Taylor 1994) and to organise content and / or procedures (Ramsden 1992).
- *Imparting information* involves transmitting and presenting information (Dall'Alba 1991).

Regarding learning, Entwistle (1998: 74) distinguishes two approaches to learning: deep approach and surface approach. On the one hand, a surface approach to learning expects learners to cope with the course requirements. Learners study without reflecting on either the purpose or strategy of the course, treating the course as unrelated "bits of knowledge" which have to be memorised routinely. Students (learners) find it difficult to make sense of new ideas presented. On the other hand, in a deep approach to learning, students relate ideas to previous knowledge and experience, looking for patterns and underlying principles. They examine logic and argument critically, checking evidence and relating it to conclusions. They are actively interested in the course content.

To my mind, the above categories of teaching seem to be compatible with a deep approach to learning. A deep approach to learning seems reconcilable with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that the main aim of praxis is to encourage learners in "bringing an understanding to mind" (Entwistle 1998: 74). In this regard, learning is concerned with insight into the subject, as well as new ways of thinking about the world. In a different way, teaching should facilitate learners in actively developing and constructing meaning and their own understandings of what is being learned (Tang 1998: 103). This idea of teaching is averse to *all* learning that smacks of rote learning **only**. It rejects the technicist view of higher education that has been dominant in South Africa for some time that epistemological issues are value-free and not socially constructed. Such a technicist view of teaching focussed on the transmission of knowledge from one person to another, thus emphasising the passive acquisition and regurgitation of knowledge (Usher, Bryant & Johnstone 1997: 10).

In addition, teaching and learning at higher education institutions is driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Ward 1995: 31). To improve teaching and learning for its own sake is the guiding principle, which may represent intrinsic motivation. Most active and voluntary participants in the process of improving their teaching at universities and colleges in the developed countries such as the United States, Britain, Australia and European countries were doing so in order "to get better" (1995: 31). Rewards of promotion, tenure and salary increases are considered extrinsic reward structures, which may encourage educators to improve "teaching" (O'Connell 1983: 668). What I want to illustrate with this explanation is that any process of development (in this case improving teaching and learning) is driven by internal or external motivations. In other words, what we do is driven by our reason for acting in a particular way. In this case, our reason for acting depends on what we consider as quality teaching and learning.

Ramsden (1992: 9) posits that the "key to improving teaching is changing the way in which the process of education is conceived by its practitioners". The question arises: How should distance education be conceived in order to improve teaching? Research has shown that in order to improve teaching we need to focus on learning (Angelo 1994: 4; Knapper 1995: 70). Ramsden (1992: 6) accentuates this link between teaching and learning as follows: "To teach is to make an assumption about what and how the student learns; therefore to teach well implies learning about students' learning". I shall now dip into a brief historical interlude of what distance education means and how it can be shaped by "touchstones" of a reflexive democratic praxis.

5.2.1 Evolutionary trends in distance education

Like all concepts distance education has a history. And to understand why the concept is used the way it is used, one has to make reference to its historical context. Moore and Kearsley (1996: 19-20) classify the development of distance education according to three generations:

- *First generation* correspondence study / single media characterised by printed materials and study guides sent by mail from lecturers / tutors at correspondence colleges to students. Students were given assignments, essays, letters or a reading list with a set of sample questions which correspondence tutors marked.
- *Second generation* multimedia distance education characterised by the use of “one-way” media (predominantly print, television and radio broadcasting, teleconferencing and cassettes) with the “two-way” communication still being provided by correspondence tutors, or face to face tutorials. During this generation the first open universities appeared (The University of South Africa – Unisa, 1946, the British Open University, 1969, Korea National Open University, 1972, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia – Spain, 1972, Universitas Terbuka – Indonesia, 1984, Indira Ghandi National Open University, 1985).
- *Third generation* distance education and tele-education emerged in the 1990s based on the use of electronic information technologies such as telecommunications, computer conferencing networks and audio and video conferencing.

This description of distance education emphasises its outward delivery modes and does not give us the distinctive meaning of distance education, that is, that which makes distance education what it is. To explain what is meant by the distinctive meaning of distance education, considering the different terms used to denote it – such as “correspondence study”, “independent study”, “external study” and “home study” (Keegan 1990: 29), I draw on Steward’s (1981: 1) description of distance education:

It denotes the forms of study not led by teachers in the classrooms but supported by tutors and an organisation at a distance from the student.

From the above, I deduce that the meaning which distinguishes distance education from other forms of education is that the former occurs at a *distance between teacher and student*. Literatures on distance education reveal many “definitions” on what may constitute distance education:

- Distance education may be defined as the family of instructional methods in which the *teaching behaviours are executed apart from the learning behaviours*, including those that in a contiguous situation would be performed in the learner’s presence, so that communication between the teacher and learner must be facilitated by print, electronic, mechanical or other devices (Moore 1973: 664).
- The term “distance education” covers the various forms of study at all levels which are *not under the continuous, immediate supervision of tutors present with*

their students in lecture rooms or on the same premises, but which, nevertheless, benefit from the planning, guidance and tuition of a tutorial organisation (Holmberg 1977: 9).

- Distance education (*Fernunterricht*) is a method of imparting knowledge, skills and attitudes which is rationalised by the application of division of labour and organisational principles as well as by the extensive use of technical media, especially for the purpose of reproducing high quality teaching material which makes it possible to *instruct great numbers of students at the same time wherever they live*. It is an industrialised form of teaching and learning (Peters 1993: 206).

Distance education theorists like Moore (1973), Holmberg (1977) and Peters (1993) concur that the separation of teaching and learning activities is central to what distance education is (Keegan 1990: 37). The idea of separation between teacher and student (educator and learner) is inherent in the work of Holmberg (1989) and Moore (1991). For Holmberg (1989: 43) the separation between learner and educator is grounded in a “two-way” communication process and a *guided personal didactic conversation* between both participants.

Moreover, Moore (1990: 12) views distance education as “a family of transactions between teachers and learners”. For him, these “transactions” include two dimensions: First, dialogue and structure, and second, learner autonomy (Moore, 1990: 10-11). The idea of “dialogue and structure” (what I consider as dialogism) as one dimension grows out of the works of Wedemeyer (1971). Dialogue refers to the extent to which the learner and educator respond to each other in relation to the content of subject-

matter studied, educational philosophy of educator, personalities of educator and learner, environmental factors and medium of communication. Structure expresses the responsiveness or relevance of educational objectives, teaching methodologies, and evaluation measures of the distance education programme to the needs of the learner (Wedemeyer in Moore, 1990: 10). For purposes of this thesis, I focus on the notion of dialogue for the reason that in a dialogical relationship between educator and learner at a distance, the educator needs to adapt the distance education programme to the individual needs of the learner.

Second, learner autonomy describes the extent to which in a distance education programme the learner determines objectives, implementation procedures, and resources and evaluation (Moore 1990: 13). In other words, autonomy depicts the extent to which learners exercise responsibility over the learning process. The upshot of this “transaction” between educator and learner is that teaching and learning cannot be improved if the self-understanding of both educator and learner is not invoked in the teaching / learning process.

Dialogue and learner autonomy are central to the quality, that is, relevance of teaching and learning at a distance. I shall describe some of the notions of dialogue and learner autonomy to make sense of the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis leading to improved teaching and learning. In chapter two I have already expounded on the notion of dialogism as a logically necessary condition for rationality, the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis. I now need to say more about dialogism for the reason that, in getting distance education course materials to focus on access and relevance, the idea of dialogism becomes unavoidable.

5.2.2 Dialogue

To say that dialogue is “determined” by content of subject-matter, educational philosophy, personalities, environmental factors, medium of communication and learners’ individual needs, does not clarify the meaning of dialogue. Dialogue is often mistakenly equated with discussion. Following Schein (1993), discussion often leads to dialectics, which results in a debate and resolution that is usually accomplished by beating down the opposition (1993: 42). Instead, dialogue is a

creative process in which entirely new ways of thinking and acting will emerge. Dialogue is a space of deep thinking, where there is nothing to prove, where well-worn ways of thinking and being can be let go of. In a dialogue there is nothing to be solved and nothing to be defended (Isaacs in Qualters 1995: 50).

Two important philosophical aspects constitute the notion of dialogue. Firstly, if nothing in a dialogue needs to be “solved” and “defended”, then the potential of confrontation is ruled out. In this way, the possibility for politeness and mutual trust is enhanced in order to arrive at new ways of thinking and acting. Secondly, dialogue as a “creative process” implies that the procedure lends itself to an ever-evolving process of deep thinking and the free flow of meaning, “where there is nothing to prove”. A notion of dialogue between educator and learner as espoused above can bring about an improvement of the teaching / learning process at a distance in the following ways:

- Mutual trust and politeness in the dialogue between educator and learner at a distance implies that educators have to expand their self-awareness in order to engender new ways of thinking and acting such as developing greater empathy and sensitivity to the concerns of learner needs.

- The dialogical process of a free flow of meaning between educator and learner underscores both agents' commitment to co-operative learning. The educator and learner at a distance establish a level of intimacy and comfort in order to acquire a sense of each other's perspectives and interests.

Hence, improving the relevance and quality of teaching and learning at a distance lies in the implementation of a dialogical process. This dialogism is underscored by an acquisition of educators' self-awareness to engender empathy and sensitivity to the concerns of learners, as well as a sense of each other's perspectives regarding learning styles, teaching methods, academic preparation and student resources.

5.2.3 Learner Autonomy

I want to explain the idea of learner responsibility towards the learning process, that is, a matter of exercising learner autonomy. Moore (1993: 20) makes a claim for learner autonomy whereby learners engage intellectually with the content, interact with the course developer in the forms of the conversational writing styles in the study guides, give feedback on in-text activities or assignments, and include a variety of media. When learners interact responsibly and intellectually in the learning process,

they exercise a great deal of “self-direction” (Moore 1990: 11), what Dearden (1998: 272) refers to as “finding out as opposed to (just) being told”.

Moreover, I want to extend Moore’s view of learner autonomy being associated with “self-direction”. I contend that “self-direction” should also include an element of critical reflection whereby learners become aware of the assumptions which underlie the learning process, reflect on them, and then question whether or not they are valid (Qualters 1995: 49). In this way, learners’ assumptions can be transformed to “new ways of thinking and acting” (1995: 49).

Moreover, critical reflection demands that both educators and learners at a distance “take the risk to challenge ideas and explore new conceptions and perspectives” (Anderson & Garrison 1995: 197). Therefore, the process of improving the quality of teaching and learning at a distance should be subjected to the integration of “information acquisition, critical reflection and critical discourse” (1995: 198). In this way, the idea is challenged that distance education programmes should only stress the importance of pre-packaged self-instructional materials without encouraging learners to reflect critically about their learning and to pursue an interactive social distance education discourse (1995: 138-139).

It is with this in mind that Anderson and Garrison (1995: 197) state the following:

Distance education models which are based upon one-way media such as educational television, computer managed instruction, or text books, cannot be expected to facilitate a community of inquiry and, thus, will

be less likely to provide opportunities to think critically. While some introductory and well-defined courses will emphasise the presentation of basic information ... some opportunity should be provided to support critical discourse and the development of a community of inquiry.

In essence, a teaching / learning environment which creates space for learner autonomy to prevail where the critical self-awareness of both educator and learner is invoked has the potential to promote and attain quality. In this way, a reflexive democratic praxis can be associated with the idea of learner autonomy for the reason that both practices consider achieving quality and relevance as paramount to the teaching and learning process.

This leads to a discussion as to how a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards producing distance education course materials, which allow space for access, relevance and dialogism at higher education institutions.

The prevailing milieu of many higher education institutions fosters isolation and independence and not interaction and team-orientation (Kinsella 1995: 110). This means that higher education practitioners (academics, educators, researchers, scientists, course material developers, etc.) too often work alone in their offices and struggle independently with course design decisions and dilemmas. Novice and veteran higher education practitioners may even feel that to actively seek advice on course design and development is admitting a lack of competence and a potential threat to their professional status. The unfortunate result of this highly personal and subjective notion of distance education is that critical decisions about teaching and

learning stem from “solitary reflection rather than mutually enriching dialogue with informed, trusted, and respected ... (distance education) practitioners” (Kinsella 1995: 110). For this reason it is imperative for higher education institutions to create structures for continuous collegial support as to facilitate pedagogical improvement. It is here that a reflexive democratic praxis may be considered helpful to engender a spirit of dialogism in distance education course materials design, development, production and delivery.

Dialogism as has been explained in this chapter and chapter two refers to a “non-judgemental” process of dialogue and collaborative interaction between colleagues (in this instance, distance education practitioners). This dialogue can occur in dyadic, tryadic or team partnerships in “an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidentiality and support, where colleagues feel it safe to experiment, fail, reflect, solicit help, revise, and return to the classroom (or course design process) to try again” (Kinsella 1995: 112-113).

Central to a dialogical partnership related to improving teaching and learning at a distance, and hence, reinforcing a reflexive democratic praxis, are three stages: pre-design planning period with the establishment of design criteria; designing of course materials; and post-design evaluating period. Before I examine these stages of course design, I shall briefly explain what I understand by course design, which has become known as instructional design or instructional systems design.

5.2.4 Instructional systems design

According to Johnson (1989: 3) instructional design (ID) involves organising and “using tools of the mind and tools of learning, to improve the conduct of education and training ... (it) involves thinking creatively about teaching and learning”. Moreover, Johnson (1989: 4) claims that ID “provides a set of tools that allow us to maximise individual learning potential ... (and) to meet learner needs”. Kember and Murphy (1995: 4) hold that ID not only transmits knowledge and knowledge structures, but also is aimed at accomplishing conceptual change in learners.

ID is “a creative, flexible, dynamic process; it is not rule-dependent, but fluid and responsive (relevant) ... an evolving (adaptable) discipline” (Johnson 1989: 14). That ID is a creative, flexible, dynamic process suggests that its foundations are not derived from any single discipline, but rather “call on a wide range of perspectives on learning and human behaviour as well as how that information can be creatively combined within a broader social and organisational context” (Johnson 1989: 6). Other common “definitions” of ID include

- a process by means of which the best instructional methods are selected to teach given outcomes under set conditions (Reigeluth 1983: 23);
- the process of specifying conditions for learning with the purpose to create strategies and products at the macro level, such as programmes and curricula, and at the micro level, such as lessons and modules (Seels 1995: xi); and

- a set of procedures to guide authors in the evaluation, analysis, design, production, and implementation of learning environments (Tennyson 1995: 113).

What is common to all these explanations is the understanding that ID is a strategy or procedure which uses certain tools to improve teaching and learning.

Historically, the fields of behavioural, developmental, social and cognitive psychology contributed to a set of learning theories for ID. For behavioural psychologists in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, controlling the learning environment through reinforcement, contingency management and behaviour modification became central to many learning theories. Behavioural psychology has influenced ID by contending that learning is a change of behaviour (Johnson 1989: 6). Although behaviourism has provided some guidance for complex mental tasks such as synthesis, analysis and evaluation, it considered the learner and learning as passive (Johnson 1989: 6). Developmental psychologists like Piaget regarded learning as active and thus posed a direct challenge to the behaviourists. In the words of Kember and Murphy (1995: 100), “learners are not empty vessels waiting to be filled with knowledge. Rather, they approach each learning task with a set of personal beliefs, motivations, and conceptions about the subject area and about knowledge itself”.

In addition, Gardner (in Johnson 1989: 8) holds the view that multiple intelligences that call on different skills need to be considered in ID. Also Sternberg (in Johnson 1989) proposes that a “triarchic theory of human intelligence” be considered in ID practices. For Sternberg, the contextual subtheory specifies how intelligent behaviour adapts to and guides an existing environment; experiential subtheory proposes that

learning is influenced by the degree to which prior experiences can be applied to new situations; and componential subtheory suggests that underlying cognitive structures determine learning and intelligence.

During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the domain of ID became underscored by instructional systems design (ISD), that is, a systematic process of practising ID. Tennyson (1995: 113) identifies four generations of ISD which have evolved over the past few decades. Firstly, phase one uses the non-adaptive linear method of design to offer generic solutions to all situations. Four distinct, consecutive steps were used, such as preparing behavioural objectives, designing a pretest, producing the instructional programme and designing a post-test. First generation ISD uses a formative evaluation loop between the four components. During first generation ISD, the design of instruction was in the hands of the educator or subject content expert.

Secondly, in second generation ISD, the use of systems theory is expanded to that of employing a flowchart to control and manage instructional design. And, although ISD-2 is focused on the development of the product, it remains difficult to adapt to specific problem situations. Second generation ISD uses the sequential flowchart procedure of:

- establishing goals, objectives and preparing pre- and post-tests;
- analysing the target audience;
- reviewing and selecting existing materials;
- preparing the instructional product;
- selecting instructional delivery; and

- implementing instruction.

Moreover, in second generation ISD, summative evaluation (final report on the quality and effectiveness of the product) supplements formative evaluation (the evaluation of the course design and development process while it is being carried out) after the process with behavioural theory as its learning foundation.

Thirdly, the proponents of third generation ISD use an iterative procedure within four linear phases to take into account specific application needs and constraints. The four phases associated with third generation ISD are as follows:

- assessment, which involves analysing the needs/problems of situation, student profiles, constraints, resources, and risks and to develop a project plan;
- design means preparing and evaluating goals / objectives, learners, a delivery strategy and prototype;
- producing materials for instruction and management; and
- implementing a quality instructional and management system.

In third generation ISD, a feasibility evaluation (determining the scope of a possible ISD effort) is done in the initial assessment phase to help determine the level of resource need and allocation as well as being employed in deciding how to proceed: that is, to adopt or adapt existing products, or to develop new products. In addition to formative and summative evaluation done during the design and production phases respectively, a maintenance evaluation (an on-going assessment of a product to evaluate continued employment) is done during the implementation phase. In

addition, the extension of ISD into a complex process of multiple steps and layers has shifted the design to “highly trained technicians” who, unlike most subject content experts, can do more than just following a static set of procedures. In third generation ISD both the subject content expert and technician participate in authoring. By the 1980s cognitive psychology became the preferred learning theory for third generation ISD.

In fourth generation ISD (which in my view embraces nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis), a dynamic and flexible system relevant to the demands of a given situation. The implementation of a given system design implies the use of processes for a specific designing situation (Gagné, Briggs & Wager 1988: 12). As ISD had developed over decades, the relatively simple linear method of design evolved into the flowchart method, followed by a linear set of phases and eventually the more complex, recursive and dynamic process of instructional systems design.

Fourth generation ISD employs technologies from the field of system dynamics. It uses what is referred to as a problem solving approach. Instead of using a rigid set of abstract or expert controlled procedures, ISD-4 proposes “systems of explicit rules dynamically controlled by contextual or situational problem solving evaluations” (Tennyson 1995: 121). Unlike the first three generations of ISD where the problem is assumed to be understood at the start and where instructional design can then proceed along a defined plan, ISD-4 allows for adjustments to the process as variables and conditions change over time. It would not be necessary with ISD-4 to start with written objectives, for example. This ISD model uses two main components: a situational evaluation and a knowledge base component containing several ISD tools.

I shall now discuss various tools (ISD strategies) which have been used in these four generations of ISD under the following headings: (1) analysing your learners, (2) proposing your distance education package, (3) establishing your ISD team, (4) designing / structuring your course, (5) using access devices, (6) delivering your package, and (7) evaluating your programme. In this way, I hope to clarify how ISD can engender access, relevance and dialogism (“touchstones” which constitute a reflexive democratic praxis) in course materials design, development, production and delivery.

1. *Analysing your learners*: The development of distance education materials is underscored by educators’ sensitivity to the concerns of learners, that is, ensuring relevance and access. Parer (1994: 243) claims “we need to approach open and distance learning with a clear philosophy and pedagogy that places the learner in the centre of the process”. When analysing the learner population, educators (course developers) gain information about the following:

- learner characteristics such as educational background, age, ability, need for motivation, present skill levels, number of learners, geographic location, accessibility to resources and culture; and
- learner differences in cognitive style, aptitude, learning style, perception, language ability, and so on (Tennyson 1995:124).

Profiling the perceived learner population can be done through reflecting on previous experiences of learners, consulting colleagues or student services

bureaux, meeting prospective learners and negotiating with them as to what they would want from the course, and sending a questionnaire to prospective or past learners in order to elicit information from them (Rowntree 1994: 43). Analysing one's learners is premised on the recognition that interaction between teacher and learner is important and that the teacher, through analysing the learners would be in a position to envisage the knowledge and content to be learnt (Pratt 1992).

2. *Proposing your distance education package:* After the learner analysis has been completed, educators need to propose a solution plan such as whether to buy and use existing distance education materials, modify existing materials, or develop new materials. They also need to estimate the costs and resource requirements of each option (Tennyson 1995: 124). Whether one intends using any of the options mentioned, one still needs to decide on the nature of the distance education course materials, that is, the distance education package. Distance education packages can generally be categorised into three types:

- *Wrap-around packages:* Distance education course materials are developed around existing educational resources, for example, textbooks. The “wrap-around” course materials support and provide a medium for communicating the envisaged subject content to learners. Such a distance education package can be developed in less time than stand-alone packages, but not always at a lower cost for learners, particularly if international textbooks are prescribed. Also, texts may not always be contextually relevant.
- *Stand-alone packages:* All course materials are provided to learners which include only study guides which may be supported by video cassettes, audio

cassettes, interactive satellite communication or face-to-face tutorial sessions, as well as textbooks. These packages are very time-consuming and expensive to develop. However, course developers have more control to adapt the specified learning content to the needs of learners.

- *Hybrid packages:* These distance education packages integrate both elements of “wrap-around” and “stand-alone” packages. For example, a course may comprise a study guide wrapped around a prescribed textbook, supported by a reader and interactive satellite tutorial sessions (Rowntree 1994: 44).

3. *Establishing your ISD team:* Course development for distance education requires team orientation and not isolation and independence (Kinsella 1995: 110). Establishing a team to develop distance education course materials involves a non-judgmental process of dialogism (open communication and collaborative interaction) between distance education practitioners. As has already been mentioned, this dialogue can occur in dyadic, triadic or team partnerships in an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidentiality and support, where distance education practitioners feel it safe to experiment, fail, reflect, solicit help, revise, and return to the course development process to try again (Kinsella 1995: 112-113). Moreover, teamwork also encourages the habit of self-initiated reflection on the part of colleagues about their professional practices (Costa & Garmston 1994: 25). Self-initiated reflection implies that course developers accept that their practices, and the motives for those practices, should be critically reviewed and analysed, and then pursue ways to actively improve or change their practices (Killen 1995: 125). In this way, teamwork allows for the challenging of ideas and improving

shared practices between course developers of the same and different institutions; a matter of practising a reflexive democratic praxis.

The emphasis team orientation places on “internal” values such as “trust”, “confidentiality”, “support” and “reflection”, suggests that it may be considered a source of intrinsic motivation for participating in course development. Hence, course developers bonded through teamwork are inner motivated persons whose professional values move them to seek the rewards intrinsic to materials development regardless of the institutional policies that support that effort (O’Connell 1983: 662). Moreover, team-orientation does not merely mean interaction. One may find that a team comprises the most talented academics, writers, editors, academic development specialists and multimedia experts. These course developers co-operate and participate in the course design process. This brings us to a brief discussion of the various role players that may constitute a course development team, discussed below.

- *Course co-ordinator:* Possesses expertise in the field of distance education. The co-ordinator is often mandated by the faculty / department to organise and manage the course or programme to be developed. The co-ordinator facilitates negotiation between course developers regarding content, didactical approach, mode of media, learner evaluation procedure, intended purpose and goal articulation of the course, time schedules and estimated costs for design, development, production and delivery of materials.

- *Academic author(s)*: These role players possess specialist knowledge of the course to be developed. They generate the academic learning material in accordance with the negotiated course development plan.

- *Critical reader(s)*: These role players may or may not have specialist knowledge of the course to be developed. They are not involved in the development of the course materials. They specifically scrutinise the developed materials for coherence, learnability and learner accessibility. Critical readers may also unbiasedly evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of a course on completion, that is, performing a summative product evaluation.

- *Editor(s)*: Editors are integral members of the team. Their roles are not only confined to language editing, but includes looking at issues such as cultural sensitivity, sexism, racism, bias, readability and learner accessibility, especially in relation to second language users.

- *Instructional designer(s)*: Conceptualise learning opportunities for a specific course and in collaboration with mainstream academic authors embark on a continuous, recursive and ever-evolving process of course design within the parameters of a negotiated “mind-map” which incorporates educational framework of thinking, student intake, resources, curriculum structure and aims. The instructional designers do this in addition to an agreed-upon course outline, that is, units of content, time allocation to content, sequencing, continuity, pacing and methodology for each unit, assessment methods and feedback procedures (Lockett 1996: 40). Their roles are crucial in leading all role players to establish

collegial trust and open communication to facilitate the improvement of the quality of course materials.

- *Graphic designers:* They are primarily responsible for the formatting, style sheet, page layout and display characteristics, for example, graphics, text, colour, icons, marginal notes, etc. of the DE course materials.

Ideally an ISD team comprises members who are multi-skilled. For example, an instructional designer can also be a person with specialist subject knowledge of the developed course.

In essence, establishing an ISD team seems to be reconcilable with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis for the reason that teamwork or dialogism is considered a “touchstone” of its general principle.

4. *Structuring your course:* Structuring your course involves a design phase whereby course developers:

- define the organisation or sequence of the knowledge through course, module (section), theme (topic) and units (sub-topics or lessons);
- establish authoring activities, for example, using initial outlines and concluding summaries, headings and subheadings, expounding on concepts, defining key vocabulary, addressing the target group, using proper syntax, structuring paragraphs, generating visual interest through good page layout, using access devices (table of contents, course map, glossary and index, including self-

assessment activities, promoting independent learning through guidance and feedback, using graphic aids such as pictures, maps, graphs and charts);

- specify goals and objectives of what learners should be able to do after completing a course or module or theme or unit in terms of verbal information, intellectual skills, contextual skills, cognitive strategies and creative strategies;
- identify and determine learner entry knowledge, that is, background knowledge, prerequisite knowledge and prior knowledge; and
- define the learning environment in terms of available resources, learner workload and possible constraints.

Gagné, Briggs and Wager (1988) developed a set of instructional procedures that could be used to structure, for example, a unit of a distance education course:

- *gaining learners' attention* through the use of good layout, accessible writing style, graphics and stimulating questions;
- *specifying the objectives* of the course materials;
- *integrating learners' prior learning experiences* with newly developed activities;
- *stimulating learner interest* by introducing problem-oriented activities in the text;
- *providing advice and coaching* to learners through the use of self-evaluation exercises and progress checks; and
- *assessing learner performance* through pretests, post-tests and retention tests.

Hence, there exists a logical relationship between the significance and utility of instructional procedures (strategies) adopted by academics / educators and the fact that learning should be student-focussed (Trigwell *et al.* 1994; Gow & Kember

1993). This notion of using instructional procedures to make distance education course materials relevant to and accessible for learners is compatible with a reflexive democratic praxis.

5. *Using instructional devices*: Instructional devices are invariably used in distance education texts to make the course materials accessible and learnable for learners, referred to as “good” teaching in distance education. Using access or instructional devices adequately in distance education texts is what distinguishes distance education from contact forms of teaching. Some of the main instructional devices used in distance education texts include objectives, advance organisers, graphics, pretests, overviews and self-directed activities in the text.

- *Objectives* are interspersed throughout the text and provide a means to orientate learners towards the intended goals of the course, direct learners to what should be learned, and provide criteria for learner assessment (Gagné, Briggs & Wager 1988).
- *Advance organisers* are concepts, ideas and learning experiences used to initiate learners in “advance” into *higher* cognitive learning tasks than the information to be learned (Ausubel 1960). Introducing in “advance” *higher* cognitive learning tasks in distance education texts provides learners with a frame of reference as to what they do not know and what learning and skills need to be acquired.
- *Graphics* such as diagrams, charts and visuals can be used by learners to establish links between relevant concepts to be learned in the text.
- *Pretests* are administered before learning tasks are introduced in the text to increase learners’ awareness of what is expected of them, and to orientate them

towards studying the distance education course material (Hartley & Davies 1976: 248).

- *Overviews (summaries)* guide learners through the distance education text. They are at the same cognitive level of the material to be learned and facilitate learners' access to the course material (Marland & Store 1982).
- *Self-directed activities in the text* can be included with the aim to contribute to learners' understanding and development, as well as assisting them to complete assignments (Lockwood 1995: 202).

6. *Delivering your package:* During the situational analysis and design phases consideration needs to be given to selecting appropriate media to make distance education course materials available to learners. Print, audio / video, radio / television, teleconferencing, video conferencing, computers, face-to-face tutorials and interactive satellite communications or combinations of these different types of media can be used to make distance education available to learners. Careful consideration should be given to factors such as learner accessibility, costs, time of delivery and organisational efficiency in selecting the type of media to be used. Often, learning materials have been well-designed, but failure in the delivery system to deliver them on time to the students prevented the latter from obtaining them when needed (Robinson 1994: 185). This failure of quality can be attributed to

a combination of poor records system, lack of specified time for dispatching materials after receipt of registration information, lack of a monitoring system and unclear designation of responsibility for checking performance ... the late production of the materials, created by late hand over by writers ... infrequent

communication and lack of co-ordination between the staff teaching the course (1994: 186).

7. *Evaluating the distance education programme:* Participants need to conduct their own course evaluations on the basis of a two-fold collaborative approach, discussed earlier.
 - Through a process of *formative evaluation* course teams should solicit statements from colleagues or conduct focus group interviews with students regarding course outlines, teaching methods, and other steps taken to improve course materials. Student piloting in particular is necessary to improve the quality and contextual relevance of distance education course materials. This needs to be an ongoing, collaborative process of interaction and monitoring based on trust between course developers in relation to producing quality course materials.
 - An unbiased *summative evaluation* procedure of course materials (evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of a course on completion, that is, product evaluation) also needs to be pursued by administration and management involved in improving learning at a distance as to ensure quality distance education. Researchers who have not been directly engaged with the design and development of the distance education materials can complete the evaluation of the final product (Holmberg 1989: 173).

What the above explanation of ISD indicates is that if distance education course materials are developed according to dynamic and flexible procedures, such materials

can provide greater access, relevance and dialogical space for students engaged in learning through distance education at higher education institutions. In this way, ISD can be considered as reconcilable with the notion of a reflexive democratic praxis. To further show how a reflexive democratic praxis can shape distance education course material design, development, production and delivery, I refer briefly to three stages of development.

1. *Pre-design planning*: In a reflexive democratic praxis during the pre-planning period, relationships between course developers are shaped in relation to an educational vision in terms of which course design, development, production and delivery processes are negotiated. Now bearing in mind that the improvement of teaching and learning at a distance is underscored by teachers' sensitivity to the concerns of their students such a vision can be made explicit as follows.
 - Course developers, as has been mentioned earlier, profile the perceived target (learner) population. This can be done through reflecting on previous experience of learners, consulting colleagues or student services bureaux, meeting prospective learners and negotiating with them as to what they would want from the course, and sending a questionnaire to prospective or past learners in order to elicit information from them (Rowntree 1994: 43).
 - Dialogical research of content, didactical approach, mode of media and learner evaluation procedure on the part of course developers and

prospective learners. Course developers reflect together on the intended purpose and goal articulation of the course.

- Negotiation between course developers regarding time schedules and estimated costs for design, development, production and delivery of materials.

2. *Designing the course:* A reflexive democratic praxis demands that all participants (mainstream academic staff, instructional designers and other consultants / advisors) design “bits of courses” collaboratively in groups. In doing so, they have to consider the different steps which are involved in the design, sequencing of these steps, and the evaluation of each other’s course design (Luckett 1996: 39) following the agreed-upon criteria of “quality” course materials which encourage the development of critical reflection on the part of learners. As colleagues, the course developers embark on a continuous, recursive and ever-evolving process of course design within the parameters of a negotiated “mind-map” which incorporates educational framework of thinking, student intake, resources, curriculum structure and aims. This is done in addition to an agreed-upon course outline, that is, units of content, time allocation to content, sequencing, continuity, pacing and methodology for each unit, assessment methods and feedback procedures (1996: 40). Dialogical course designing, as exemplified above, leads participants to establish collegial trust and open communication to facilitate the development of course materials – a practice which is attuned to a reflexive democratic praxis.

3. *Post-design evaluating period:* According to a reflexive democratic praxis participants need to conduct their own course evaluations on the basis of a dialogical approach. Through a process of formative evaluation (the evaluation of the course design and development process while it is being carried out) course teams, through a process of soliciting statements from colleagues regarding course outlines, teaching methods, and other steps taken to improve teaching and learning, can modify and improve their course materials. This needs to be an ongoing, collaborative process of interaction and monitoring based on trust between course developers in relation to producing quality course materials. Moreover, an unbiased summative evaluation procedure of course materials (evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of a course on completion, that is, product evaluation) also needs to be pursued by administration and management involved in improving teaching and learning at a distance as to enhance quality.

In essence, a reflexive democratic praxis can shape teaching and learning with reference to distance education in such a way that results in distance education course materials becoming more learner-centred, relevant and of better quality. Also, distance education seems to be an appropriate form of teaching and learning which can address issues of equal access, development, accountability and quality in the sense that ISD offers a procedure to develop course materials which are accessible, relevant, accountable and of quality.

It is my contention that a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards initiating equal access and development, as well as enhancing accountability and quality *through* the use of ISD procedures that can effect learner-centred, flexible distance

education materials. In this regard the National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE 1996: 23) report states the following regarding distance education:

The use of well-designed learning resources, with which students can interact at an appropriate pace, enables academic staff to shift their emphasis away from lecturing towards curriculum and course design, tutor training, assessment, quality assurance and promotion If implemented successfully, this approach should enable academic staff to lead and direct well-designed learning environments for larger and more heterogenous groups of students.

In the Glossary of the NCHE (1996: 273) report, the following definition of distance education course materials, more specifically resource-based learning, is given:

The increasing use of a variety of media, methods and mechanisms to meet the different needs of learners in a rapidly changing educational situation, with diminishing dependence on face-to-face communication, and growing reliance on well-designed interactive study material, the implementation of computer-based and audio-visual instruments and programmes, and diversification in the manner and location of educational guidance and support offered to learners by teachers (a notion signaling the increasing collapse of the traditional sharp distinction between contact and distance education).

Implicit in the above definitions of resource-based learning is the general principle which opens up possibilities such as the use of "well-designed interactive study materials" and other educational resources "to meet the different and divergent needs

of learners in a rapidly changing educational situation". My claim is that "diversification" and "variety" in the provision of educational resources and support offered to learners by educators, as well as academic staff "shifting their emphasis away from lecturing towards curriculum and course design, tutor training, assessment, quality assurance and promotion" to cater for "heterogenous groups", fall in line with the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis. These significant shifts in higher education policy towards providing "good" teaching and learning not only offer the key to what is meant by resource-based learning, but also focus the concern of higher education towards meeting the imperatives of equal access, development, accountability and quality. In other words, egalitarian and quality-based practices such as having a diverse approach to higher education, providing learner support for heterogenous groups, enhancing quality, using a variety of educational resources, meeting diverse educational needs, preparing for the widest possible range of learners, can initiate access and development, as well as enhancing accountability and quality in relation to teaching and learning in the higher education sphere.

Examples of a reflexive democratic praxis are designing flexible courses to meet the requirements of different and divergent needs, removing barriers that prevent access to courses, and using a learner-centred approach to increase the dialogue between educator and learner at a distance. The NCHE (1996: 272) report defines such an approach to teaching and learning as follows:

A flexible, learner-centred approach to (higher) education, seeking to increase access to educational opportunities by removing all unnecessary barriers to learning ... involves using the full spectrum of available resources to ensure

quality and cost-effectiveness in meeting diverse educational needs, including preparation of the widest possible range of learners for lifelong learning.

Unfortunately, not all practices at higher institutions in South Africa meet the criteria. The NCHE (1996: 120-121) report points out that although the extent of the distance education infrastructure in South Africa is impressive, efficacy, relevance and cost-effectiveness leave much to be desired. The NCHE enumerates (1) low throughput and completion rates in science and technology programmes, (2) ineffective single mode correspondence-type distance education, (3) inadequate tutorial and learner support structures at regional and national centres and, (4) subsidy arrangements which do not encourage learner-centred education. Consequently, the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis that can organise teaching and learning in ways which provide access, development, accountability and quality seems to be plausible in a context of higher education transformation in South Africa.

Finally, it is not in the interest of this thesis to investigate problems such as ineffective distance education which hampers student access to quality course materials, the lack of a learner-centred philosophy in courses, a lack of embedded student support within study guides, etc. which occur at higher education institutions. I shall refer briefly to the provision of distance education in South Africa in order (drawing on 1996 statistics originally compiled by the South African Institute for Distance Education, SAIDE) to give some idea as to the number of institutions faced with the enormous challenge of bringing distance education in line with the imperatives of a reflexive democratic praxis. I acknowledge that many institutions might already be in the process of transforming their teaching and learning, more specifically distance

education programmes. Also, many distance education colleges offering teacher education have since been incorporated into technikons or other institutions. Notwithstanding these developments, I shall briefly summarise distance education under the following categories:

- *The University of South Africa (Unisa)*: It became a fully-fledged correspondence university in 1946. Unisa is currently the largest university in South Africa with 128 454 students registered in 1996 - 49,1% African, 38% White, 3,9% Coloured and 9% Asian - with 3040 employees (1393 teaching and research staff and 2066 non-teaching). In 1996 most of Unisa's students followed study programmes in Arts, with 29 862 in language; 13 090 in humanities; 48 505 in social science; 40 797 in economic and management sciences; and 5 969 in science and technology. Courses are mostly print-orientated and offered through study guides (mostly stand alone and wrap-around guides which accompany textbooks) and tutorial letters, while audio cassettes are distributed for many subjects. Student support structures in the form of learning – with the exception of the Eastern Cape - and satellite centres are established in the Western Cape, Northern Province, Kwazulu/Natal, Northern Province and the Eastern Cape. Unisa also has 475 examination centres worldwide.
- *Technikon South Africa (TSA)*: Established in 1980 as a facility of Technikon Witwatersrand it became an autonomous institution in 1993. In 1996 it had 85 039 students, 360 academic and 917 non-academic staff members. Of its 1996 student enrolment, 48.9% were enrolled in Law, 31.4% in Business, 11.6% in Social

Sciences, 4.4% in Science and Technology, 2.4% in Language, and 1.3% in Education.

- *Technical College of South Africa (Technisa)*: Technisa is a technical college for distance education and offers courses in engineering, business and social fields of learning. In 1996 it had 8 650 students, 42 academic and 40 administrative staff. Its main campus is in Randburg with satellites in Pretoria and Cape Town.
- *Vista University*: Initially enacted in 1981 under the Department of Education and Training to investigate the university needs of urban Africans, it began its first academic year in 1983 to provide education for people in urban areas. In 1996 the university operated through seven contact tuition campuses at Mamelodi, Bloemfontein, Sebokeng, Soweto, Port Elizabeth, the East Rand, and Welkom. It had 19 341 registered students in 1996 for degree, diploma and certificate programmes in Education, Arts, Economic and Management Sciences, Law and Science. In addition the university has the Vista University Distance Education Campus (VUDEC) in Pretoria that focuses solely on upgrading underqualified teachers through distance education. In 1996 the university had a total of 1 689 staff members.
- *Private Distance Education Colleges*: The Private Distance Education Colleges are financed privately. They offer secondary school courses, vocational / professional courses and non-vocational / hobby courses. There are four main colleges: Damelin Correspondence College, INTEC College, Rapid Results College and South African National Private Colleges with an enrolment of well in

excess of 100 000 students and which own Lyceum, Success and Mentor Colleges.

- *Residential Universities and Technikons:* Several residential universities and technikons are increasingly offering distance education in addition to their traditional “contact” study programmes. Some of these institutions include the University of the Western Cape, University of Natal, the Medical University of South Africa (MEDUNSA), Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, Rand Afrikaans University, University of Cape Town, University of the Free State, University of the Witwatersrand, University of Pretoria, University of Stellenbosch, Peninsula Technikon, Mangosuthu Technikon, Technikon Northern Gauteng, Eastern Cape Technikon and ML Sultan Technikon.

In essence, teaching and learning through distance education creates possibilities for higher education institutions to engage students in personal and collective interaction with learning tasks embedded in particular learning contexts. These possibilities of teaching and learning not only drive the distance education course materials, how students learn, and how educators teach through materials design and development, they also have a great impact on initiating equal access and development and, enhancing accountability and quality. Initiating access and development through teaching at a distance may contribute to increasing the level of students’ learning, that is, ways of experiencing and understanding the world around them. Enhancing accountability and quality has necessarily to do with students experiencing something in a new way, becoming aware of other ways of experiencing and arriving at “a fuller, richer” understanding of these ways of experiencing (Marton 1998: 198). In this way,

teaching and learning through distance education seems compatible with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.

5.3 RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

A reflexive democratic praxis within the context of the emergent “Mode 2” form of knowledge production and higher education transformation places an increasing demand on the roles universities need to chart out to meet the imperatives of equality, development, accountability and quality. Before I move on to a discussion of the roles of academics at universities in relation to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis, I shall first offer a few remarks about a “Mode 1” research university. Research in this instance refers to developing or producing knowledge which contributes to our individual and collective understanding of the world and new ways of seeing things in the world (including seeing our own experiences) (Marton 1998: 184-185). In a different way, research is seen as ways of experiencing and understanding the world around us “oriented towards the knowledge to be gained or the object about which knowledge is to be gained” (1998: 196). The research university is anchored in the traditional arts and science disciplines and has a programme of instruction that “moves from the basic principles of these disciplines to the most specialised levels” (Cummings 1998:1). Knowledge production at the research university is formal and coded according to canonical rules and procedures of academic disciplines often isolated from real-world problems (Gibbons 1998: 56). Some more typical characteristics of the “Mode 1” research university can be summarised as follows.

- Instruction is conveyed in year long traditional disciplinary courses taught by

personnel with life-long appointments.

- Research organisation is layered on top of the academic teaching programme.
- Decentralised choice of research agenda whereby individual personnel determine their research objectives and then seek grants from public sources to fund their work (Cummings 1998: 1-2).
- Conventional norms of academic freedom, critical reflection, peer-review evaluation, rewards and curiosity-driven research exist (Subotzky 1999: 6).

The research university with its life-long appointment of most of its personnel relies on public and state-supported funding. However, the decline in economic growth led to the reduction of subsidies to public research universities. This impetus together with wastes in university budgets, deceptive practices in overhead accounting, inadequate instruction provided by graduate assistants while full-time professors spend their time on personal projects, brings into question the legitimacy of the traditional research university (Cummings 1998:1). This brings me to a discussion of the roles of academics at higher education institutions, in particular universities.

5.3.1 The role of academics

The roles of academics are numerous. Gordon (1997: 67) enumerates a range of roles which can be assumed by academics: teacher, scholar, practitioner, demonstrator, writer, model, discoverer, inventor, investigator, designer, architect, explorer, expert, learner, developer, collaborator, transformer, facilitator, enabler, evaluator, critic, assessor, setter, guide, colleague, supervisor, mentor, listener, adviser, coach, counsellor, negotiator, mediator, juggler, manager, leader and entrepreneur. These

diverse functions of academics can be unified into those of research, teaching, integration and application (Boyer 1990) or collegial, managerial, negotiating and developmental (Gordon 1997: 67). Combining the views of Boyer (1990) and Gordon (1997), with a reasonable degree of generality these roles of academics can be narrowed down into four core functions: research, teaching, management and service (Gordon 1997):

- Usually academics as researchers have acquired higher degrees and / or developed research interests (1997: 74). These academics “systematically trained in research in their own higher degrees studies” (Kogan, Moses & El Khawas 1994) cultivate their research through various developmental initiatives, university teaching qualifications and teaching journals.
- Generally academics are expected to perform several managerial roles individually, in teams, and in collaboration with those responsible for education provision for cohorts of students. In all probability most academics acquire additional managerial roles such as supervisors of research students, managers of research projects, curriculum developers, members of committees, chairs of committees, consultants, etc. (Gordon 1997: 73).
- Literature on effective teaching and learning abounds. Colling (1994:2) suggests that an effective teacher in higher education demonstrates subject expertise, awareness of developments in the teaching of their subject, understanding of how students learn, the systematic use of a wide variety of teaching methods, a capacity to reflect upon his / her practice, a willingness to develop himself /

herself, effective planning of teaching sessions and courses / materials, skills in course review and evaluation of student learning, expertise in a variety of assessment methods, awareness of diversity of student population, understanding of equitable practice and ability in providing examples of learning for students. Additional perspectives on the effective teacher in higher education are that they act as “creators and facilitators of high technology learning materials” (Williams & Fry 1994: 48), “reflective practitioners” (Martin & Ramsden 1994), and educational developers within departments / programmes (Gibbs 1996).

- Service roles can include activities within the institution and for the institution, as well as those for the discipline or profession and for the external community, usually learners from formal, non-formal and informal education settings, policy analysts, teacher educators and trainers in business and industry (Gordon 1997: 74). These service activities can take the form of “rudimentary research projects” in the community. Several such projects in the South African context are described below.

1. A project to empower communities to address the current problem surrounding the perpetual plight of street children.
2. A project where support is provided to disadvantaged schools focussing on teachers of mathematics and science and their language abilities in these fields (as well as the general quality of teaching through the development of managerial and government capacity in schools).

3. A programme that aims to establish alternative ways of dealing with strife and friction within and between communities and to teach children how to resolve conflict.
4. A problem-centred approach to mathematics teaching and learning aimed to assist and support educators in their professional development so that conceptual growth can take place in learners and key mathematical abilities are developed.
5. A project which makes available a number of tried and tested educational activities designed to supplement school curricula in especially the natural sciences, and to help teachers to use features of the immediate environment to teach the principles of environmental education.
6. Literacy for life skills project which aims to improve the quality of life of a community (CENEDUS 1998: 2-6).

The above project roles, which could be occupied by academics, accentuate the view that community service can co-exist with teaching and research. In all the six projects mentioned above, project participants at the Centre for Education Development of the University of Stellenbosch (CENEDUS) cultivate their research through various education development initiatives as in the roles of managers, consultants, facilitators, reflective practitioners and developers. In this way, service does not necessarily have to rank below teaching and research, but can be integrated equally with the latter two roles. This view is evinced by Kogan *et al.* (1994: 70) for whom the “core functions

of academic staff are teaching and research, complemented by service to the institution, to the professions, and to society". The literature in the field of academic workloads consistently suggests that the main tasks of academics include teaching, undertaking research and serving the community (Berrell 1998: 78).

In essence, community service cannot merely be conceived as "part of good citizenship" for the reason that many of the academic personnel (like the CENEDUS staff) are in fact providing service integrated with reasonable research and teaching. In fact, this integration of service with teaching and research on the part of higher education practitioners complies with the idea of a lifelong learning perspective whereby university academics can perform the following functions:

- (1) bridge the divide between secondary and higher education. All those secondary learners who might aspire to study at university level can be encouraged by academics to do so. Academics could provide them substantial and highly accessible information about study opportunities, career options and to think about (on the part of higher education practitioners) adapting programmes, teaching and learning to student needs and interests; and
- (2) foster closer co-operation with the business sector in programmes, teaching and learning via student projects, part-time educators from business and industry and learning organised at work sites (Wagner 1999: 61).

5.3.2 Challenges to higher education institutions

As has been alluded to earlier, the increased pressures on the funding of higher education together with major challenges could impact upon the preparation and development of academics at universities not merely to be effective managers, teachers and researchers, but also providers of efficient community service. Gordon (1997: 76) posits that the major challenges to higher education systems are likely to include:

- providing greater flexibility in educational provision;
- changing modes and methods of teaching;
- equipping students to handle an uncertain employment market;
- resolving the tension between research and teaching;
- efficiently using new technologies for effective learning;
- reconciling the tension between institutional competition and collaboration;
- re-articulating and assuring standards in more diverse mass systems of higher education;
- meeting the challenges of providing for life-long learning;
- recruiting, motivating, rewarding and developing all employees;
- reconciling globalisation and localisation (the international world of knowledge and/or servant of local communities);
- addressing equity and ethical issues; and
- acting strategically whilst responding tactically to short term fluctuations.

The above-mentioned demands of the future also require that higher education

programmes in South Africa should become diverse and educationally transformative.

These programmes should:

- build contextually on learners' existing frames of reference;
- be learner-centred and experiential;
- be value adding;
- develop attitudes of critical inquiry and power of analysis; and
- prepare students for continued learning in a world of technological and cultural change (CHET 1998: 4).

To ensure the above, a changing South African higher education system should be constituted by a broad range of functions: "the realm of higher knowledge by sustaining scholarly and scientific practices, the generation of higher knowledge through research activities across a spectrum from discipline-driven research through strategic research, applied or applications-driven research to product-related research, and the dissemination of higher knowledge through systematic programmes of teaching and training, including continuing education and other forms of community service" (CHET 1998: 4). Central to such a changing higher education system is the notion that research, teaching and community service should be integrated in all of its programmes. The upshot of this is that service at higher education levels should be integrated with research and teaching. In this way, the university may shift away from breeding only academics whose teaching and research are far removed from the education-related developments in their communities. Berrell (1998: 78) argues that universities' core resource will remain their academics and their teaching and research expertise, but there needs to be a shift "to a dispersed community of life-long

learners". In a different way, academics should possess a specialist knowledge base, autonomy (both teaching and research) and a service orientation (Eraut 1994). Hence academics should be committed teachers, researchers and service providers.

I want to flesh out the concepts of research and community service more clearly using "Mode 1" and "Mode 2" forms of knowledge production in order to make the argument for their integration more plausible. Thereafter a conceptual model of community service will be developed.

5.3.3 The supplementary relationship between "Mode 1" and "Mode 2"

Service is a relatively ambiguous concept in the higher education lexicon (Cummings 1998: 1). On the one hand, various parts of universities' administration have come to describe their work as service, for example, health and social services, student services, international student services, library services, information technology services, maintenance services, nursery services and academic development services. On the other hand, academic personnel in faculties provide services to external communities which may include running hospitals that help people, legal services, services to local schools, conducting programmes of continuing education to meet the needs of working adults, and other community activities such as those which address the plight of the homeless and street children.

The view of community service articulated in this thesis focuses on the integration of research at universities and its application in the community. In other words, community service means that universities should not be disengaged from the real

problems in society, but rather, should open up possibilities, through research, for greater social relevance - a matter of "Mode 2" supplementing "Mode 1".

The question arises: What view of community service can be engendered by the supplementary relationship between "Mode 1" and "Mode 2" forms of knowledge production? Drawing once again on Muller's (1999: 9) critique of the replacement of "Mode 1" by "Mode 2", I infer that "Mode 1" is orthodox, disciplinary knowledge production which is not going to disappear, but it will rather be affected by the "degree and emergence of Mode 2". Instead "Mode 2 knowledge production depends upon a sound Mode 1 disciplinary base" (Muller 1999: 10). In this regard he claims that

... (t)he most effective examples of Mode 2 (supplementing Mode 1) are research projects which configure disciplinary specialists within an organisational format that produces a knowledge outcome that could not be produced by one disciplinary input ... (which) should not mean that all higher education courses (including community service activities) should now become interdisciplinary, or practical, or skills-based ... (1999: 10).

In the light of this, community service initiatives must integrate theoretical, disciplinary based knowledge with practical, problem-oriented and transdisciplinary knowledge to become more responsive and relevant to current social, economic, political and environmental problems. For community service, transdisciplinarity involves problem-oriented research programmes which develop the necessary basic (theoretical) skills to apply knowledge in a socially distributed, applications-driven

“Mode 2” way (Gibbons 1998: 56).

The supplementary relationship between “Mode 1” and “Mode 2” knowledge production clearly points to the value of linking research and community service. The literature in the field of such a definition of community service suggests that the concept should be coupled with academics’ roles as teachers and researchers (Berrell 1998: 78; Ladd & Lipsett 1976). Generally teaching (which I consider as a form of research) includes time spent on lecturing, conducting tutorials or workshops, developing course material, marking assignments, consulting with students, writing and marking exams, and attending meetings (Berrell 1998: 78). Research *per se* includes time expended in identifying a problem, designing a procedure or instrument to address the problem, collecting and analysing data, and presenting or publishing the findings (Berrell 1998: 80). Community service usually takes the form of project work that draws on the considerable experience of academics in research (CENEDUS 1998). In this regard Gibbons (1998:55) argues that the challenge for research universities is to

... use their Mode 1 resources to extend their capabilities by means of programmes of collaboration in which the sharing of resources is central. This effort at extension will draw these universities into the distributed knowledge production system, focus their attention on the needs of their communities, direct their efforts to understanding of local and national complex systems, and, in the end, create a new culture of teaching and research – with relevance built in!

For example, a rudimentary mathematics service project for learners in the foundation phase relies overwhelmingly on the research findings as well as teaching experience of its core team. In this way, a link exists between academics as community service providers and their roles as researchers with a teaching function using both “Mode 1” and “Mode 2” knowledge production (CENEDUS 1998: 8). In fact, time devoted to community service in the mathematics programme co-ordinated and implemented by CENEDUS, includes conducting workshops for the training of educators, developing flexible course material, problem resolution and data analyses - all pragmatic activities which constitute the notions of teaching and research under discussion. In essence, to pursue community service may invariably integrate key dimensions of research grounded in problem-oriented and theoretical knowledge, that is, “Mode 2” and “Mode 1”. The value of integrating teaching, research and community service at universities has the potential “to improve the lives of the underprivileged communities through provision of practical services, and infusing the curriculum with greater relevance through a focus on current social, economic, political and environmental problems” (Subotzky 1999: 19).

However, I am by no means suggesting that “Mode 2” should be predominant over “Mode 1” knowledge production. My argument is for “Mode 2” supplementing “Mode 1”. The claim that universities should carefully move towards becoming “service” institutions does not imply that they should abandon their status, what Morrow (1998: 393) refers to as “constitutive institutions”. In other words, the business of universities should not be to serve primarily as “all-purpose welfare agencies for society” such as industrial training schools, prisons, hospitals, mental asylums, armies, art galleries, and so on (Morrow 1998: 393-394). Rather, universities

should constitute the public space in which the shared interest for higher knowledge or “Mode 1” academic practice can be pursued in the light of “standards of excellence” in order to fulfill their function as service institutions *through* the use of higher knowledge “deeply embedded in the traditions of disciplined thinking” (1998: 394) supplemented by “Mode 2” socially distributed knowledge which would enhance their service purpose to the common interest of society.

The question arises: What does the above explanation of the roles of academics and / or educators at higher education institutions have to do with a reflexive democratic praxis? A reflexive democratic praxis shapes the practices of higher education practitioners in such a way whereby they can “adjust from being adept producers of (mainly disciplinary) knowledge to being creative reconfigurers of knowledge in solving increasingly complex (social) problems” (Subotzky 1999: 19). In other words, the roles of academics as researchers and teachers should also shift to that of serving society, primarily by “supporting the economy and promoting the quality of life of its citizens” (Gibbons 1998: 1). In this sense the disciplinary-based research roles of academics have been challenged by a more pragmatic role of community service provision which calls for the production of socially relevant “Mode 2” based knowledge. The above-mentioned research based projects also draw upon the collaborative actions of private donors, local communities, diverse disciplinary based academics, education department officials, teachers, learners and members of the corporate sector. This is a central feature of “Mode 2” knowledge production whereby universities which “intend to practice research at the forefront of many areas, are going to have to organise themselves ... to become more open, porous institutions, more aggressive in seeking partnerships and alliances that they are currently”

(Gibbons 1998: 10). In this way the roles of academics in a climate of “Mode 2” knowledge production seems to be compatible with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis.

5.3.4 A conceptual model of community service

What should a conceptual model of community service guided by the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis look like? In the context of the afore-mentioned discussion regarding the inextricable link between research, teaching and service, I want to propose a conceptual model whereby it is possible to combine a university’s responsibility to protect the free search for knowledge and its implementation (through teaching), with an active involvement to put research results into practical use (through service). By transforming research results into practical use through service initiatives, universities would remain higher education institutions which acknowledge curiosity and wondering as legitimate reasons for conducting research. At the same time, it gives teachers and researchers the possibility to try out new ideas or challenge commonly accepted truths through service functions, that is, giving the research results a practical and socially relevant implementation.

Implementing the service function of universities would also increase the chances to receive funding from external sources. The financial constraints faced by South African higher education institutions necessitate the taking of initiatives to create new revenue. In this regard, the service function of universities, without interfering in what teachers and researchers choose to research, can also facilitate finding new sources of funding. Moreover, “going service” without threatening research and research-based

teaching, would make universities even more sensitive to the rest of our societal system whereby academics and researchers would be encouraged to do research on topics of great interest for the South African nation. In the words of Perold (1998: 2) "community service in higher education has the potential to contribute to the reconstruction and development goals of the new government".

A strong community service ethos emerged in South Africa during the 1980s (Subotzky 1999: 19). Several community service programmes at universities such as Pretoria, Free State, University of the Western Cape, Natal and Stellenbosch provide evidence of the integration of teaching and research within a community service setting (Subotzky 1999: 17). Some faculties at many universities have developed apparatuses to manage service. However, in line with international trends, the general lack of an administrative instrument at central level is the main hindrance to enabling faculties to take up profitable service activities (Tjeldvoll & Holtet 1998: 27). Universities need apparatuses in their own structures to take care of service functions. Such a central administrative apparatus would also enable a university to be capable of taking responsibility for its own financing. To be sensitive to the service needs of the various sectors of communities, including industry and business, may give new impulses to stimulate creative thinking in research and teaching within many universities.

A conceptual model of community service for South African universities should articulate the role of service as an integral function that cross-cuts the traditional activities of teaching and research but they should also shift their focus outward to external communities. Such a conceptual model of service may be constituted by the

following key elements which link up with nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis:

- *Vision:* Any university needs to formulate a rationale for service that not only outlines the increased need for service, but also the potential value for all concerned and how this activity relates to the mission of the institution. For example, the service movement at the University of Stellenbosch is in its infancy, being nurtured at a number of faculties. The Centre for Education Development at the University of Stellenbosch (CENEDUS) is located in the education faculty. The Centre's vision statement, adopted in 1998, clearly states that its fundamental aspiration is to become a centre of excellence for education development: "CENEDUS provides support for education development through the implementation and development of leading edge, relevant projects. These include teaching, research and service to the education community. Its mission is that of enhancing service by integrating it with teaching and research; responding to and contributing to educational change; developing contextually sensitive and relevant material resources and providing training; identifying and creating opportunities towards optimising the potential of learners and educators; making available academic expertise; conducting and applying research; fostering collaboration with other parallel service providers within and outside the university". A rationale that fits with the particular university setting is the most crucial constituent element of a conceptual model for service (Cummings 1998: 2).
- *Context:* Faculties of education, engineering, business, law, medicine, dentistry and agriculture seem to have the greatest potential for service in South Africa. But, there may be untapped possibilities through 'outreach' in other faculties that

can enrich the teaching and research functions.

- *Leadership:* Critical in the promotion of service is the commitment of the highest levels of leadership of an institution in consistently and persistently emphasising the role of service (Cummings 1998: 4). Public speeches can be bolstered by incentives such as a Rector's award and competitive grants to induce faculties and other units to place greater emphasis on service.
- *Consensus:* Service initiatives designed by administrators external to service departments within faculties and other units at a university may promote service. However, these initiatives may lead to ad hoc activities unless they gain the support of faculties and, even better, encourage service units to design their own plans. In either instance, the advancement of service at universities depends on an effective response to those who question the value of this emphasis. Possible responses are (1) that service tends to enrich the traditional roles of teaching and research, and (2) that service need not be for everyone nor need it be a daily preoccupation but rather can be phased in and out as individual agendas change (Cummings 1998: 4).
- *Structural support:* Inducing faculties and staff to participate in service activities are difficult if the prevailing personnel rules do not reward such activities. Thus supporting change, it is crucial that faculties redefine work loads and tasks so that involvement in service can be traded off with involvement in teaching and research. For such trade-offs to be fair, it is necessary to develop a metric by which service efforts can be measured (Cummings 1998: 2).

- *Finance:* Service offices within and independent of faculties at the University of Stellenbosch generate and retain control over considerable external revenue. Yet service providers such as CENEDUS still require funding for co-ordinating and administering service activities partially due to low-level external funding of projects. It is the challenge of university leaders to decide how much is an investment in service units and thus can be charged from other sources and how much needs to be generated as revenues in the short run. Over the long run, it can be hoped that service will pay for itself as research and teaching does. But to get from today to the long run there inevitably has to be a certain level of start-up investment funding (Cummings 1998: 6).

- *Partnerships:* To achieve the ideal of integrating teaching, research and community service, universities should engage in partnerships with the greater community. Braskamp and Wergin (1998: 87) claim, “through partnerships, the research and instructional (teaching) agenda can be intricately connected to the communities outside the academy”. In this way, through community service integrated with teaching and research, academic epistemology (“Mode 1” knowledge) is linked with social responsibility and accountability. Universities through partnerships shape their social relationship with society, being responsive while retaining their “core purposes and standards” (1997: 89).

How universities deal with the above conceptual underpinnings of service will determine the outcome of the service agendas of South African research universities. Community service in the context of this thesis calls for the co-existence of “Mode 1”

and “Mode 2” forms of knowledge production by which universities can directly serve social development. Most institutions in South Africa identify community service “as part of the universally recognised function of the modern university, namely, teaching, research and outreach” (Subotzky 1999:15).

Of course, strong academic environments tend to attract the best researchers and the best students, and hence have the best results. Also, they have the best chances to receive funding from external sources. Any academic teaching and research university wants to be in this desirable position. However, the desire to find better solutions to practical problems concerning economic and social development in the country may be an important motivating factor for research, and that research can give substantial contributions to material wealth accumulation as well as to improve the quality of life. The National Commission on Higher Education (1996) identified that research and teaching at higher education institutions are out of balance with national requirements. Fisher (1998: 58) highlights three such imbalances:

- an over-subscription of humanities and social sciences programmes coupled with insufficient enrolments in science and technology;
- a dearth of applied and developmental research geared to meeting South African needs and solving South African problems; and
- the highly variable quality of teaching and research, with scarce resources invested in programmes of dubious relevance and worth.

Finally, in tune with the notion of a reflexive democratic praxis, higher education institutions, in particular universities, should not in any serious meaning move away

from traditional roles of research and teaching. Rather, they should move towards integrating aspects of their research and teaching agendas more relevantly with community service functions. This understanding of community service links strongly with Byrne's (1999: 75) notion of "The Engaged Institution". For him engagement on the part of universities is more than outreach or uni-directional extension of the universities' services to the people or organisations they serve. Engagement includes the mutual development of goals and the two-way sharing of expertise with elements of society. South African society with its deep-rooted social, cultural and economic problems can benefit from universities that can provide research-based community services. These universities can take careful steps in the direction of service without harming their status of research institutions of quality.

5.4 SUMMARY

I have attempted to show that a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards organising teaching and learning at a distance, research (incorporating research-based teaching) and community service. A reflexive democratic praxis creates spaces for higher education practitioners to design flexible courses to be **responsive** to different and divergent needs, removing barriers that prevent **access** to courses, and using a learner-centred approach to increase the **dialogism** between educator and learner at a distance. Similarly a reflexive democratic praxis can have the effect whereby universities in particular move towards integrating aspects of their research and teaching agendas more relevantly with community service functions. South African society with its deep-rooted social, cultural and economic problems can benefit from universities that can provide research-based community services. In this way, higher

education can take careful steps in the direction of service without harming their status of research institutions of quality and through which they can **initiate** equal access and development on the one hand, and **enhance** accountability and quality on the other hand. In the next chapter I shall examine some of the practices related to community service and distance education in the Faculty of Education at the University of Stellenbosch in order to illustrate how nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis already seem to have manifested in the higher education sector in South Africa.

CHAPTER 6

INSTANCES OF HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMATION: SOME RESPONSES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The idea of a reflexive democratic praxis involves making teaching and learning through distance education accessible, relevant and dialogical in order to meet some of the demands posed by equality, development, accountability and quality in higher education transformation. What is the University of Stellenbosch's (US) response to community service and distance education in relation to the emergent shifts in higher education? I shall identify instances related to community service and distance education with particular emphasis on the University's Faculty of Education. In this way, I hope to give further clarity to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis which holds much promise for initiating equal access and development and enhancing accountability and quality as far as university community service and distance education initiatives are concerned.

6.2 COMMUNITY SERVICE

During the Vice-Chancellor's (Prof A H van Wyk) speech at the graduation ceremony of 8 December 1998, he accentuated the University's responsibility to provide community service to the broader South African society. He also acknowledged the necessity of an active investment in the University's service function, in particular,

integrating community service with its teaching and research functions. Moreover, although the service function has become important for the University as a whole in contributing to the social, economic and cultural development of South African communities, he underlined the contentious (“omstrede”) and not easily definable (“moeilik definieerbare”) role of community service. There are some indications that service is an important criterion for hiring academic and administrative personnel. This is a crucial observation. Whatever the positive phrasings about the service function found in the University’s Institutional Plan for the period 1999 to 2001, it is left to see whether this attitude materialises in job descriptions or when hiring new personnel.

The US took the position whereby all its faculties initiated mechanisms to implement research-based projects aimed at addressing the service needs of the South African community, a matter of being responsive. Some examples follow.

- Personnel in the Faculty of Medicine embarked upon research in ailments and problems encountered by disadvantaged communities such as malnutrition and AIDS.
- Several research projects in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences are directly associated with alleviating the social problems of South African society.
- Through the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences research projects are implemented in the community aimed at improving the welfare of disadvantaged communities

such as the marketing of fresh agricultural products in lower income communities in the environs of Cape Town.

- In the Faculty of the Natural Sciences, the Institute for Mathematics and Science Teaching (IMSTUS) delivers meaningful in-service training for educators of mathematics, physical science, biology and computer science.
- CENEDUS, based in the Faculty of Education, is currently focusing the University's resources at the levels of formal, non-formal and informal education to assist in changing the lives of community participants (particularly through services provided to local schools) who have agreed and often have requested to participate in education-related projects.
- In the Faculty of Engineering, through SUNSTEP (Stellenbosch University Schools Technology Project), engineers work with schools throughout the country to promote their technical innovativeness and productivity and to foster awareness in learners about engineering by encouraging them to build small electronic devices.
- In the Faculty of Law, legal services are provided to the community in the forms of promoting "Street Law" and co-ordinating a law clinic (US Institutional Plan 1999 – 2001).

Thus, at the US, through their community service initiatives, the climate has been set to make accessible the University's potential for even greater social relevance,

especially against the decline in the quality of life in South African society. In the absence of clear definitions of what constitutes community service (a point recognised by the Vice-Chancellor of the US), much has transpired at the University that has service elements in it. For example, community service ("dienslewing na buite") is recognised formally as part of the expected and reward role of academics or key administrative personnel. This suggests that the introduction of community service into the deliberations on faculty promotion and tenure has already been taken up as a crucial issue by key leaders of the University's administration. However, for the reason that decisions regarding the percentage "weighting" which may be allocated to academic personnel for their community service functions reside solely with faculties, and not with a central authority, the possibility exists that unequal "weightings" may be allocated to research, teaching and community service. Often, a lower "weighting" has been allocated to community service functions in the faculties in comparison to that of teaching and research (US "Handleiding"). While the evaluation of University personnel recognises acceptable accomplishments in the more traditional teaching and research roles, as well as recognised community service, the unequal "weightings" allocated to the three components is an issue which key leaders of the University's administration may open up in deliberations surrounding personnel promotion, tenure and evaluation. In essence, suggestions for modifying personnel evaluation procedures would signal a significant step towards the seriousness of the University in articulating its community service position.

Finally, many centres or units within and outside faculties already have developed apparatuses to handle community services. However, to make the community service function more visible to its clients and external funders, the University needs an

apparatus in its own structure to take care of this function. In this way profitable community service activities within and outside faculties at the University would be co-ordinated at central level by an administrative and market-orientated instrument. This initiative would further open up opportunities for the University to give proper attention to market needs and to generate enormous revenue for its community service programmes. And, to be more sensitive to market needs may give new impulses and further stimulate creative thinking within the University. Taking for granted the qualities of a centralised institutional authority such as an over-arching community service co-ordinating body, it seems, however, that the University could be even more sensitive to the societal problems in our country.

Summing up, many leaders at the US seem generally aware of a future where community services integrated with research and teaching will be increasingly important for success in the institution's activities. They also have a clear expectation that centres or units could provide services relevant to the needs of South African communities. In this sense, community service harnessed at the University embraces nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis, that is, allowing spaces for access to, relevance for and partnerships with education communities through the institution's research-based projects.

6.3 DISTANCE EDUCATION

In this section I shall relate some of the distance education initiatives taken by staff members in the Faculty of Education to the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. This dissertation focuses on distance education for the reason that the massification of

higher education in South Africa during the next few years would be significantly tilted towards this mode of education. Since 14 July 1997 three of the Faculty of Education's four departments, namely Didactics (together with the Institute for Mathematics and Science Teaching (IMSTUS), Educational Psychology and Specialised Education, and Education Policy Studies collaborated with South African National Private Colleges (NPC) to develop distance education programmes. These programmes include Further Diplomas in Education (FDEs) in the areas of Curriculum Studies, Mathematics and Numeracy, Natural Science, Communication, Literacy and Language Learning, Social and Human Sciences, Life Orientation, Environmental Education and, Learner-centred Education Strategies, as well as in 1999, Bachelor of Education (BEd) courses in the fields of Educational Management, Philosophy of Education, Didactics, Educational Psychology, Environmental Education, Specialised Education (Adult Basic Education), Comparative Education and, Historical and Sociological Perspectives in Education. In addition a BEd Access course is offered in the areas of Didactics, Educational Management, Educational Psychology and Philosophy of Education. Currently almost 4000 students mostly from the disadvantaged Black sector of the population are registered for these courses. It is expected that the first group of FDE students will be awarded the qualification at the end of the year 2000 and the first BEd group will hopefully graduate in March 2001. Between 30 and 40 academics including contract staff are responsible for the authoring of the study guides.

I shall now discuss the design, development, production and delivery of the Faculty's distance education programmes in order to establish whether distance education in the Faculty embraces nuances of a reflexive democratic praxis. For each of the courses

mentioned, an author and co-authors have been assigned. After the academic authors have completed their first drafts of the distance education course materials, one or two critical readers made suggestions to improve the materials' quality. These drafts are sent to NPC for instructional design, language editing and graphic design. After NPC completed the ID process they returned the study guides to the authors who in turn, validated the course materials. At this stage, frequent collaboration occurred between the instructional designers from NPC and the academic authors from the Faculty. The instructional designers and academic authors were particularly interested in the learner-centredness (accessibility), relevance and dialogical (conversational) style of the texts. These distance education texts were aimed at producing critical students involved in seeking reasons, attempting to be well-informed, using and acknowledging credible sources, considering alternatives and other points of view, withholding judgment until they have sufficient evidence and seeking to be as precise as possible (Norris 1989) – a matter of ensuring that a reflexive democratic praxis guides their (students) learning.

However, the course development process did not occur without certain limitations. Some of the course materials developed under NPC / Faculty initiatives, used flexible and dynamic ISD-4 principles (as articulated earlier in the chapter), many of the course materials seemingly used procedures trapped in the domains of first generation ISD, second generation ISD and third generation ISD. Of course, instructional design “tools” associated with first generation ISD, second generation ISD and third generation ISD (refer to section 5.2.4) can be used (and has been used by the NPC / Faculty course development team). However, in the main, the instructional design “tools” which can bring about quality distance education course materials ought to be

located in fourth generation ISD. This makes sense if one considers that a complex, dynamic and flexible approach to instructional system design has been argued for in this thesis and which links conceptually with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. My contention is that the NPC / Faculty of Education materials development process did not always effectively implement fourth generation ISD “tools”. Some of the weaknesses highlighted in discussions and interviews with academics include issues such as unclear course maps which do not match objectives, too lengthy summaries, lack of critical outcomes learners have to acquire, an emphasis on low-level activities and a surface approach to learning.

The above weaknesses in the distance education texts suggest that all “tools” identified in fourth generation ISD were not effectively used to develop a prototype for designing course materials. This is necessary, since the quality of the prototype depends on the efficient and effective use of these instructional design “tools”. A crucial aspect, which emerges from the above weaknesses of the materials, is the materials development team’s lack of continuous involvement with the situational analysis phase. In other words, these texts were written without consistently referring to the impact the ever changing situational analysis has or would have on the design and development of the course materials. The process of materials development could therefore not always have been consistent with recursiveness and dynamism.

Moreover, during the initial design and development phases, student piloting has not been incorporated into the materials development phases. This suggests that the materials development team would not have been in a position to ascertain whether the materials would in fact be “well-designed and interactive”, that is, dialogical. By

implication, the course design and development could not have been recursive, whereby course developers update the materials in the light of student feedback. This is a necessary step to ensure that “well-designed, interactive study material” can be achieved. In other words, the course development team has to embark on a dynamic and flexible approach to instructional design, that is, recursively improving the materials after student piloting. This was seemingly not always the case. Consequently, the following areas need to be addressed as to ensure that the quality of materials are improved:

- situational analysis, whereby the course development team (academic authors, moderators, instructional designers, language editors, graphic designers and critical readers) develop learning experiences and environments in the course texts with the realisation that learners have a distinctive style, learning style, orientation, value system and expectation. The information acquired during this phase can be used to make informed decisions about the planning, development (for example, the levels and types of self-assessment activities used to help students access the materials) and implementation of the course;
- analysis-design phase, during which good page layout and access devices such as course map linked to clear objectives are used, as well as clear goals and objectives specified of what learners should be able to do after completing a course unit;

- design-production phase, whereby attention should be given to the choice and use of appropriate graphics, icons, diagrams, activities and typesetting (especially in relation to mathematical notations); and
- Production-implementation-maintenance phase, during which the materials are amended and refined to meet the criteria of the design specifications as indicated during the peer evaluation periods.

The fact that at least four main fourth generation ISD "tools", that is, doing a situational analysis, analysis-design, design-production and production-implementation and maintenance, have not been used effectively, suggests that a reflexive democratic praxis has not consistently been pursued. However, it is my contention that some ISD "tools" have been used which at least exonerates the course team from operating mostly in the quagmire of the linear and flowchart phases of instructional systems design. Moreover, the face-to-face group contact sessions which academics in the Faculty had with several students at five venues in the country, namely Stellenbosch, Umtata, East London, Durban and Pietersburg, vindicates the claim that dialogical interaction between students and academics has always been a priority for the course development team. Useful student feedback received at these sessions, in my view, could be incorporated into the texts in the next development phase, which will occur in 2002.

Since the end of 1999 by far the most relevant distance education programme which has been developed in the Faculty thus far, has been (and continues to be) the Masters in Philosophy (MPhil): Leadership in Education programme. This programme can be

considered relevant to the changing higher education context in South Africa primarily for its reliance on information technology – allowing course delivery via satellite transmission, a virtual mode of delivery. Students, more specifically adult learners, can use this form of electronic learning to communicate with university lecturers from multiple locations in order to renew their learning and skills. In fact, what makes the MPhil programme even more relevant is that employed adults seek to pursue formal degree study compatible with their initial educational training. In other words, adult learners have a demand for work-relevant education (El-Khawas 1999: 8).

It is my contention that during the development phase participants used what has been explained in chapter two and three as logically necessary conditions of rationality (the general principle of a reflexive democratic praxis). These conditions include: critical educational discourse whereby participants (mostly academics) engaged in a clear articulation of issues and attuned themselves to the needs of prospective students who subsequently registered for the course; reflexive action whereby academics willingly subjected authored texts to critical scrutiny in order to progress “toward the better”; respect for each other and diversity of views; and dialogism as a commitment towards collective action.

1. *Critical educational discourse:* The curriculum content of the MPhil distance education programme prioritises the improvement of leadership and management in schools considered as one of Education Minister Kader Asmal’s strategic initiatives according to his “five-year plan for an education shake-up” (Mothibeli 2000: 23). In this way, the distance education

programme aims to address the needs of the current education system, what Minister Asmal refers to as “to make everybody accountable for the performance of our education system” (2000: 23). What makes the programme even more critical is its focus on four primary themes which address relevant issues concerning educational transformation in the country. The four major themes include: Leadership in Educational Transformation, Leadership in Educational Research, Leadership in Curriculum Transformation and, Leadership in Education Management. Moreover, the programme aims to develop competent educational leaders who should:

- possess the leadership competencies necessary to contribute towards institutional *transformation*;
- serve his / her education institution and community in a more professional manner;
- be empowered to bring about conceptual and pragmatic *change* in accordance with a broad understanding of curriculum development, education efficiency and research;
- create an environment conducive to the development and *enhancement of critical, logical, creative and reflective thinking*;
- facilitate appropriate adaptations to learning and teaching strategies for *diverse learning contexts*, and simultaneously optimise the *quality of learning experiences*;
- create a democratic climate for learning characterised by functional discipline and an appreciation for and sensitivity to cultural, racial and gender diversity;

- develop an informed understanding of current legislation with regard to management of human resources, and acquire a thorough knowledge of professional organisations and their constitutional commitment to *respect human rights*;
- realise the consequences for education of political issues and *social problems* such as poverty, poor health and the environment.
- apply principles of educational research in practice; and
- cultivate a school research ethic (Schreuder 2000: x).

Hence, the envisaged outcomes of the MPhil (Leadership in Education) distance education programme reinforce the notion of a critical educational discourse and consequently, a reflexive democratic praxis. This is so for the reason that issues dealing with “transformation”, “change”, “critical, logical, creative and reflective thinking”, “diverse learning contexts”, “quality of learning experiences”, “to respect human rights” and, to address “social problems” relate to initiating equal access and relevance, as well as enhancing accountability and quality – outcomes of a reflexive democratic praxis. What further strengthens the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis is the fact that the programme currently provides **access** to most students from the historically disadvantaged sector of the South African society, as well as tutorial support via interactive satellite communication to these students at fourteen different learning centres throughout the country.

2. *Reflexive dialogical action*: Academic authors in collaboration with critical readers, language editors, instructional designers and graphic artists developed

the course materials. Authors willingly subjected their written drafts for rigorous critical scrutiny in order to improve the quality and learner-centredness of the texts. Deliberations and negotiations regarding the coherence, style and appropriateness of the materials were characterised by an atmosphere of respect for each other and diversity of views. In this way course team members remained dialogically committed to produce quality distance education course materials. The idea of dialogism was “imported” into the study guides in the sense whereby students are required to engage with the “voices” of the academic authors. Several portfolio activities occur throughout the study guides in order for students to develop their own rational understandings of often difficult, yet challenging concepts. In this way the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis *through* engaging with the study guides seems unavoidable.

In essence, through the virtual mode of satellite transmission the lifelong educational needs of adults are beginning to play an important role in higher education. It is in this regard that the University of Stellenbosch responded in a creative manner.

6.4 A MOMENT IN MY OWN PRAXIS: REFLEXIVE, DEMOCRATIC OR BOTH?

At the University of Stellenbosch, during the second semester of the academic year of 1999, I taught a post-graduate course (honours level) in Comparative Education for students who were mostly in-service teachers, social and / or community workers and adult basic education practitioners. The course named “Theories, Methodologies and

Approaches of Comparative Education” comprised a curriculum that included a diversity of interdisciplinary topics such as frameworks (theories and methods) of understanding education; educational policy planning, development, analysis and implementation related to developing countries; globalisation, democracy and transformation in relation to educational development and its related problems in South Africa; and contemporary debates surrounding the production of socially relevant knowledge. All these topics were constituted by possibilities of the processes of higher education transformation and liberation within the broader South African society, that is, they were always connected to wider political, economic, social, historical and power relations that promoted context-specific values and interests.

The course was organised in such a way that it offered students a core body of knowledge complemented by relevant and critical readings. It also included activities (classroom presentation / discussions, assignment, seminar and workshop) that would demand their use of critical reflection and rethinking of knowledge and the production of their own and shared meanings. Students were not only encouraged to make analytical summaries of the selected readings to ensure a basic understanding of the texts, but also to interpret these same texts relevant to their own social and every day life experiences. They were then challenged to critically appropriate and reconstruct their understandings and interpretations of these readings with respect to change and transformation in their society. In a different way, students were engaged critically and reflexively in classroom activities. The understanding of knowledge which underlined such an approach to learning in the Comparative Education classroom, is that knowledge is not complete, predetermined and *entirely* discipline related, but rather, continuous and constructed in specific social and historical settings. Boulton-

Lewis (1998: 202-203) argues that critical learning (as I assume students experienced in the Comparative Education classroom) is shaped by knowledge in the forms of declarative and procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge consists of factual knowledge of a discipline and the way it is structured for retrieval such as the knowledge regarding theories and methods of understanding education. Procedural knowledge is that which allows the purposeful manipulation of declarative knowledge to undertake a task, solve problems, make decisions, understand, know "How" and "Why", and so on. According to Clark and Neave (1992: 1521) the most effective means of teaching "are those emphasising active student involvement, problem solving, and application of skills".

Moreover if curricula are to respond to the challenges higher education currently faces, educators need to begin to take responsibility for enabling their students to deal reflexively in shaping education as a dynamic activity. By this is meant that education should see the learner as engaging in experience, reflection, restructuring and planning, referred to by Schön (1983: 50) as "reflexivity" or "reflection-in-action". Schön (1983: 50) postulates when reflecting-in-action, "there is some puzzling phenomenon with which the individual is trying to deal. As he (she) tries to make sense of it, he (she) also reflects on the understandings which have been implicit in his (her) action, understandings which he (she) surfaces, criticises, restructures and embodies in further action". Fostering reflexivity in and on education, the educator "ideally engages the learner in constant inner dialogue, aiding in the development of life long learning skills" (Mitchell, Jolly & Mcleod 1998: 296). In this sense, reflexivity in education means that learners need to direct reflective thinking to themselves (how are we performing), fact (where to find information), reason (why

are we doing this?), theory (do the interpretations really help?) and creativity (how could this be used in other settings?).

I started teaching the course by presenting and expounding on the conceptual underpinnings of issues about knowledge in the curriculum, in particular the diversity of ways in which knowledge within the field of education and educational research is produced. I then focussed on those conceptual thinking patterns that would engender a critical, reflexive understanding and approach to educational studies. I continuously related what appeared to be abstract theoretical and methodological perspectives in education with situational examples where these perspectives were at play and embodied in every day life situations. This type of teaching strategy was aimed at fostering the following understandings in students:

- A reduction of the teaching of facts and unnecessary analysis to ensure students concentrate on transferable skills and the understanding of fundamental concepts so that they do not need to spend so much time simply absorbing knowledge.
- Lecture is not a very effective method of ensuring that students fully grasp the kind of concepts that underpin understanding.
- To get students to think, or go beyond the information given with integrative skill of bringing knowledge, skills, understanding and experience together in problem solving activities and environment, which in turn, provides students with the appropriate kind of preparation for lifelong independent learning.

After the presentation and exposition stages, students as individuals and in collaborative groups engaged critically in the reading of knowledge and knowledge formation as constructed and applied in the world. They practised dialogism. Mildren, Whelan and Chappell-Lawrence (1998: 30) reflect on the advantages of implementing group work in educational studies, below.

- Talking to students about the ways in which they interact in a team gives them an insight into their own learning style as well as that of others. This gives them an appreciation of the value of diversity in a working environment.
- Students, when working in teams from early in their university experience, are more quickly affiliated with fellow students and the environment of the institution from the sense of collegiality developed in working in teams.

Introducing group work during university study can facilitate an easier transition to the workplace. Given the emphasis placed on teamwork in many workplaces, this better prepares graduates to enter the workplace environment.

I want to come back to my teaching strategy as mentioned earlier, in particular in getting students to think, or go beyond the information given. The question remains: What was the general principle that underscored my teaching strategy in the classroom? The point of this question is that in order to get students to think and then for them to go beyond the information given, they have to engage, in the first place, in dialogism. Dialogism in the university classroom requires the establishment of a set of social relationships different from many traditional classroom relationships and

corresponding significantly with those associated with the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. According to Bridges (1998: 285) dialogism requires of those students and educators engaged to be prepared to examine and to be responsive to the different opinions they put forward, that is, a readiness to understand and appreciate each other's different points of view. In other words, dialogism "is an activity of which the success depends essentially on the reciprocal efforts of those taking part. It requires social involvement, co-operation, mutual attentiveness and responsiveness, respect and appreciation of individual divergence, reasonableness, etc." (1998: 305). These qualities and relations, in my view, lie at the heart of a reflexive democratic praxis. Again it is worth noting that the lecture could not generate the same kind of relationships or values between educator and students. There does seem to be some kind of justification for considering a preference for dialogism in the university classroom as being attuned to a reflexive democratic praxis. Like Bridges (1998), I am not alone in seeing some connection between a preference for teaching and learning by dialogism and the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis. Dewey (1940: 10) makes the point that there exists a relationship between the democratic method of forming opinions and "dialogism and persuasion in politics ... (and) in schools (or universities), the places where the essentials of character are supposed to be formed". Hallworth (1957: 10) indicated the significance of group dialogism is "to establish a democratic situation for the teacher in training". Fielding (1973: 2) has seen a concern to equip students for participating in dialogism as a means to democratise changes in traditional "authoritarian, teacher-dominated classroom methods".

Finally, students reflected through debate and questioning on these issues about knowledge in selected readings and how such issues relate to their own common

understandings and ways of seeing the world. My teaching strategy was based on the understanding that we have to know content (what knowledge is), how we reflect on how we come to know, and why we have to know – all practices which link conceptually with a reflexive democratic praxis. This idea of teaching is aimed at allowing the student to evaluate, challenge and perhaps extend knowledge to a new area, that is, fostering deep learning (Marton *et. al* 1997; Samuelowicz & Bain 1992). My contention is that students will mature intellectually when they are exposed to an environment that allows and fosters deep learning for the reason that in deep approaches “students seek personal understanding of the (learning) material” (Clark & Neave 1992: 1522). According to Rossouw (1994: 29) such an approach to learning and knowledge at higher education level can be seen as “an open process” of meaning making whereby knowledge cannot be regarded as “a completed product”.

The assessment of the course (content, approach and methodology used) was done at the end of the course. I conducted a focus group interview with the students on the lectures, readings, assignment and topics covered in the course with the aim of improving the content, presentation and the relevance of the topics included in the curriculum. The general response of the group to the curriculum was, in students’ words, that it was “actual and relevant to political changes and developments nationally and abroad”, “insightful”, “stimulating”, “contextual and relevant to own practices”, “diverse”, “interesting”, “engaging”, “thought provoking” and “challenging”. They valued the reflexive approach to classroom teaching and learning because it not only challenged their own assumptions about knowledge and knowing, but also engaged them critically with the diverse constructions of knowledge through different readings. They seldom wanted to know my analytical summaries of the texts,

and instead, mediated their diverse critical perspectives through imaginative constructions and reconstructions of meanings even unknown to me.

Students liked the facilitating role I performed for the reason that it created conditions for collaborative inquiry and exchange of ideas, critical and reflexive thinking. This transformative role opened up possibilities for students to question, reflect on, challenge and reconstruct knowledge constructs. And, when students challenge and reconstruct they are interested to understand knowledge, to integrate it with existing knowledge and to apply it to real world situations (Briggs & Moore 1993). Regarding the assignment students had individually to produce at the end of the course, they stated that, although it was “difficult to analyse their readings” rationally and systematically, the opportunities to reflect, rethink, construct and reconstruct their own meanings contributed to their ability to “understand educational developments in a period of change in South Africa in a critical manner”. Boulton-Lewis (1998: 204) would attribute such rational practices to “students who have (developed) deeper knowledge and more sophisticated levels of reasoning than those with which they began university study”.

Finally I appreciated the students’ evaluation of the course content and methodology since they provided me with more possibilities to interpret, construct and rethink knowledge and knowing in an ongoing manner. Their positive yet critical feedback offered me more possibilities to chart out my own future pedagogical practice not only in relation to the theory and practice of education in the university classroom, but also to be open to the many educative voices in my own society. In this way my praxis embraced nuances of reflexivity and democratic education, thus supporting the

claim that a reflexive democratic praxis is not only possible but also desirable as we as academics at higher education institutions attempt to attune our practices to the dictates of transformation – equal access, development, accountability and quality. This means that our practices have to be consistent with establishing an environment where students gain access to learning, and where they develop the willingness to want to learn. In such a transformative environment students are accountable to think for themselves and try to interpret before being told, that is by becoming aware of their own understandings, each other's understanding and their educators' understandings – a matter of students and educators learning from each other. This is to enhance the quality of higher education. It is worth quoting Marton (1998: 198) in this regard:

By becoming aware of other ways of experiencing and understanding phenomena, the collective consciousness of the knowledge organisation, the university, will grow as knowledge is then framed by our becoming conscious of *how* it is formed. I believe this is one way in which quality in higher education can be raised (my italics).

6.5 CONCLUSION: POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The University of Stellenbosch through their community service, distance education and teaching initiatives can engender reflexivity and democratic educational discourse. In this way, the University can be considered to make reasonable strides in meeting some of the demands posed by equality, development, accountability and quality in higher education transformation. Its responsiveness to the needs of, in

particular the disadvantaged sector of the South African population illustrates its commitment to provide equal access through the distance education programmes. The University's community service initiatives mostly address abject educational conditions in disadvantaged communities, as well as establishing dialogical partnerships with educators, learners, schools, community workers, and so on, to improve the level of educatedness of people. Hence, the University can be considered a social context in making the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis work from "inside" (Gutman 1998: 34).

A reflexive democratic praxis, as has been argued for in this thesis, provides higher education practitioners with a conceptual frame to organise their discourses in a reflexive and democratic way which can contribute towards transforming what they do or intend doing. It offers possibilities for those involved with higher education not only to democratise their practices, that is, making their representative actions functional according to participatory processes of teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service, but also making their actions reflexive. This means that higher education practitioners can rationally organise their activities, which would enable them to achieve some worthwhile end; to contribute towards addressing the demands of equality, development, accountability and quality in South African higher education.

My argument for a reflexive democratic praxis as the general principle for transforming higher education in South Africa is by no means comprehensive and absolutely monolithic in relation to rethinking teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service. However, it does provide a conceptual

and enabling space for those serious about higher education transformation in South Africa to critically examine higher education policy changes in relation to their own pedagogical practices. Moreover, there will be more nuanced ways in which the idea of praxis can be linked to notions such as reflexivity and democracy. But it is here where the challenge for serious higher education practitioners lies: to gain more clarity about the concepts which can effect educational transformation. Only when one understands what constitutive meanings underlie concepts such as reflexivity, democracy and praxis, can one be better positioned to make rational choices about the different ways in which higher education transformation can be enhanced.

Finally my conceptual analysis of the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis from the perspective of a university academic is itself an attempt to make sense of the claim that universities should remain institutions intent on producing higher knowledge embedded in the tradition of deep disciplinary thinking, in my instance, philosophy of education, in quest of serving the higher intellectual and common interests of the South African society. It is my contention that the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis contains constitutive meanings that may encourage university scholars and researchers to further pursue matters that can have wider implications for higher education transformation. But perhaps of equal or more importance is the possibility that my use of conceptual analysis within a critical educational discourse can benefit engaging analyses, interpretations and expositions of various ideas related to higher education transformation on the part of higher education role players.

In summary, I have shown that the idea of a reflexive democratic praxis can contribute towards transforming higher education practices. It is not sufficient to

assume that higher education policy frameworks can engender transformation within higher education. We first need to have clarity about particular concepts that guide transformation in higher education before we can develop possible ways to actuate change. This chapter involving the response of the University of Stellenbosch is an attempt to show that a reflexive democratic praxis can work and that it provides space to clarify and use concepts in the transformation of higher education with specific reference to transforming teaching and learning through distance education, research and community service.

REFERENCES

Anderson, T. & Garrison, D. (1995) Critical thinking in distance education: developing critical communities in an audio teleconference context. *Higher Education*, 29(2): 183-199.

Angelo, T. (1994) From faculty development to academic development. *AAHE Bulletin*, 1: 3-7.

Apple, M. (1979) *Ideology and Curriculum*. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.

Aristotle (1955) *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Thomson, J. (trans.). London: Penguin.

Aronowitz, S. & Giroux, H. (1992) *Postmodern Education*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ausubel, D. (1960) The use of advance organisers in the learning and retention of meaningful verbal material. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 51(5): 267-272.

Ayer, A. (1933) Atomic propositions. *Analysis*, 1(1): 2-6.

Ball, C. (ed.) (1985) *Fitness for Purpose: Essays in Higher Education*. Guildford: SRHE and NFER / Nelson.

Barber, B. (1994) Theory and practice: democracy and the philosophers. *History Today*, 44(8): 44-50.

Barrow, R. (1991) The generic fallacy. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 23(1): 7-17.

Bennett de Marrais, K. (ed.) (1998). *Inside Stories: Qualitative Research Reflections*. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Berdahl, R., Moodie, C. & Spitzberg, I. (1991) *Quality and Access in Higher Education: Comparing Britain and The United States*. Suffolk: St Edmunds Press Ltd.

Berlin, I. (1969) *Four Essays on Liberty*. London: Oxford University Press.

Bernstein, R. (1983) *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Berrell, M, (1998) The place of research, scholarship and teaching in newly established universities. *Higher Education Management*, 10(2): 77-93.

Biesta, G. (1994) Education as practical intersubjectivity: towards a critical-pragmatic understanding of education. *Educational Theory*, 44(3): 299-317.

Birch, A. (1993) *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*. London: Routledge.

Bitzer, E. (1998) Hoër onderwys as 'n studieveld: uitdagings in 'n tyd van omvorming. Inaugural Address, April 1998, University of Stellenbosch. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch Publishers.

Boyer, E. (1990) *Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professorate*. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation.

Bobbio, N. *The Future of Democracy*. Griffin, R (trans.), Cambridge: Polity Press.

Boulton-Lewis, G. (1998) Applying the SOLO taxonomy to learning in higher education. *Teaching and Learning in Higher Education*. Dart, B. & Boulton-Lewis, G. (eds.) Melbourne: Acer Press, 201-221.

Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1987) *Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought*. New York: Basic Books.

Braskamp, L. & Wergin, J. (1998) Forming new social partnerships. Tierney, W. (ed.), *The Responsive University: Restructuring for Higher Performance*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 62-91.

Briggs, J. & Moore, P. (1993) *The Process of Learning*. 3rd Edition. New York: Prentice Hall.

Bridges, D. (1998) Teaching by discussion. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume IV Problems of Educational Content and Practices. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 284-307.

Broad, C. (1958) Two lectures on the nature of philosophy. *Inquiry*, 1(2) – 42-75. Reprinted (1963) in *Clarity is Not Enough*. Lewis, H (ed.). London: Allen & Unwin.

Brubacher, J. (1955) *Modern Philosophies and Education*. Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education.

Bryman, A. (1988) Quantity and quality in social research. Blumer, M. (ed.), *Contemporary Social Research Series*, No. 18. London: Unwin Hyman.

Buckland, P. & Hofmeyer, J. (1993) *Education Governance in South Africa*. EDUPOL Resource Document Series, Vol 1 (1). Johannesburg: Urban Foundation.

Bullock, A. & Thomas, H. (1997) *Schools at the Centre? A Study of Decentralisation*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bunting, I. (1994) *The Legacy of Inequality in Higher Education in South Africa: Contemporary Policy Issues*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.

Burnheim, J. (1985) *Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Byrne, J. (1999) Taking charge of change: a leadership challenge for public higher education. *Higher Education Management*, 11(1): 69-79.

Callan, E. (1998) Pluralism and civic education. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume III Society and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 56-78.

Capper, C. (1993) *Educational Administration in a Pluralistic Society*. Albany, New York: State University of New York.

Carr, W. (1983) Can educational research be scientific? *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 17(1): 35-43.

Carr, W. & Kemmis, S. (1986) *Becoming Critical*. Lewes: Falmer Press.

Carr, W. & Hartnett, A. (1996) *Education and the Struggle for Democracy: The Politics of Educational Ideas*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Carr, W. (1998) What is an educational practice? *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 167-183.

Carrim, N. (1998) Anti-racism and the "new" South African educational order. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 28(3): 301-321.

Centre For Education Development University of Stellenbosch (CENEDUS) (1998) Unpublished Strategic Plan. Faculty of Education, University of Stellenbosch, 1-18.

Centre For Higher Education Transformation (CHET) (1998) The New Qualifications Framework in Higher Education: A First Reader. Pretoria: HSRC.

Clark, B. & Neave, G. (eds.) (1992) *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education, Volume 3, Analytical Perspectives*. Oxford, New York, Seoul and Tokyo: Pergamon Press.

Clark, B. (1997) The modern integration of research activities with teaching and learning. *Journal of Higher Education*, 68(3): 241-255.

Colling, C. (1994) Staff development for teaching and learning. *Higher Education*, 35(1): 9-13.

Cooper, D. (1998) Quality and equality in education. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume III Society and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 179-191.

Costa, A. & Garmston, R. (1994) *Cognitive Coaching: A Foundation for Renaissance Schools*. Norwood, MA: Christopher Gordon.

Crosby, P. (1984) *Quality Without Tears: The Art of Hassle-Free Management*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Cummings, W. (1998) The service university movement in the US: searching for momentum. *Higher Education*, 35(1): 1-8.

Dall'Alba, G. (1991) Foreshadowing conceptions of teaching. *Research and Development in Higher Education, Vol 13, Teaching for Effective Learning*. Wright, B. (ed.). Campbelltown: Higher Education Research and Development Society of Australasia, 293-297.

Danner, H. (1995) Hermeneutics in educational discourse: foundations. *Metatheories in Philosophy of Education*. Higgs, P. (ed.). Johannesburg: Heinemann, 221- 244.

Davies, P. (ed.) (1995) *Adults in Higher Education: International Perspectives on Access and Participation*. London: Jessica Kingsley.

Dearden, R. (1998) Instruction and learning by discovery. Analytic and post-analytic philosophy of education: methodological reflections. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume IV Problems of Educational Content and Practices. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 268-283.

Department of Education (DoE), (1996a) Lifelong learning through a national qualifications framework. Report of the ministerial committee for development work on the NQF. Discussion document, February 1996. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Department of Education (DoE), (1996b). Curriculum framework for general and further education and training. Draft document, July 1996. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Department of Education (DoE) (1997a) *Draft White Paper on Higher Education*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Department of Education (DoE), (1997b). Curriculum 2005. Specific outcomes, assessment criteria, range statements. Grades 1 – 9. Discussion document, April 1997. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Derrida, J. (1994) *Specters of Marx*. New York: Routledge.

Dewey, J. (1940) *Freedom and Culture*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Dewey, J. (1957) *Human Nature and Conduct*. New York: The Modern Library.

Dewey, J. (1984) Qualitative thought. *John Dewey: The Later Works*, Vol 5. Boydston, J. (ed.). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 243-262.

Dewey, J. & Bentley, J.F. (1989) Knowing and the unknown. *John Dewey: The Later Works*, Vol 16. Boydston, J. (ed.). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1-279.

Donaldson, A. (1994) Up against the fiscal. *Reconstructing Education: DSA in Depth*.

Sonn, F. (ed.). Cape Town: IDASA Publication, 5-6.

Duke, C. (1999) Lifelong learning: implication for the university of the 21st century.

Higher Education Management, 11(1): 1-35.

Dunkin, M. (1990) The induction of academic staff to a university: processes and products. *Higher Education*, 20: 47-66.

Egèa-Kuehne, D. (1995) Deconstruction revisited and Derrida's call for academic responsibility. *Educational Theory*, 45(3): 293-309.

Eggins, H. (ed.) (1988) *Restructuring Higher Education: Proceedings of the Annual Conference 1987 of the Society for Research into Higher Education*. Suffolk: St Edmundsbury Press Ltd.

Elliot, R. (1998) Objectivity and education. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume II Education and Human Being. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 224-233.

El-Khawas, E. (1999) The "new" competition: serving the learning society in an electronic age. *Higher Education Management*, 11(2): 7- 17.

Entwistle, N. (1998) Approaches to learning and forms of understanding. *Teaching and Learning in Higher Education*. Dart, B. & Boulton-Lewis, G. (eds.). Melbourne: Acer Press, 72-101.

Eraut, M. (1994) *Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence*. London: Falmer Press.

Esterhuyse, W. (1996) Universiteit en transformasie. *Filosoof op die Markplein: Opstelle vir en deur Willie Esterhuyse*. Van Niekerk, A. (ed.) Goodwood: Tafelberg Publishers.

Evers, C. (1979) Analytic philosophy of education, from a logical point of view. *Education Philosophy and Theory*, 11(2): 1-15.

Evers, C. (1991) Towards a coherent theory of validity. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 15(6): 521-535.

Evers, C. (1998) Analytic and post-analytic philosophy of education: methodological reflections. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 120-132.

Fay, B. (1975) *Social Science and Political Practice*. London: Keegan Paul.

Fay, B. (1987) *Critical Social Science*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Feinberg, W. (1996) Affirmative action and beyond: a case for backward-looking gender- and raced-based policy. *Teachers College Record*, 97(3): 363-397.

Fielding, M. (1973) Democracy in secondary schools: school councils and shared responsibility. *Journal of Moral Education*, 2: 3-10.

Fine, M. (1994) Distance and other stances: Negotiations of power inside feminist research. *Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational Research*. Gitlin, A. (ed.). New York: Routledge, 13-35.

Firestone, W. (1987) Meaning in method: the rhetoric of quantitative and qualitative research. *Educational Researcher*, 16(7): 16-21.

Fisher, G. (1998) Policy, governance and the reconstruction of higher education in South Africa. *Higher Education Policy*, 11(1): 121-140.

Fisher, W. (1989) Clarifying the narrative paradigm. *Communication Monographs*, 56, 55-58.

Fletcher, R. (1999) Modern and postmodern racism in Europe: dialogic approach and anti-racist pedagogies. *Harvard Educational Review*, 69(2): 150-162.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (Bouchard, D.F. trans.). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Foucault, M. (1980) *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction*. Hurley, R. (trans.). New York: Vintage Books.

Frankel, C. (1971) Equality of opportunity. *Ethics*, 81(3): 191-211.

Fraser, N. (1990) Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critiques of actually existing democracy. *Social Text*, 25(6): 56-79.

Gadamer, H. (1992) Interview: The 1920s, 1930s, and the present: National socialism, German history and German culture. *On Education, Poetry and History: Applied Hermeneutics*. Misgeld, D. & Nicholson, G. (eds.), Schimdt, L. & Reuss, M. (trans.). Albany: State University of New York Press, 136-152.

Gaden, G. (1990) Rehabilitating responsibility. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 24(1): 27-38.

Gagné, R., Briggs, L. & Wager, W. (1988) *Principles of Instructional Design (Third Edition)*. Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Gallagher, S. (1992) *Hermeneutics and Education*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Gay, L. (1987) *Educational Research: Competencies for Analysis and Application*. Melbourne: Merrill Publishing Company.

Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P. & Trow, M. (1994) *The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in*

Contemporary Societies. London: Sage.

Gibbons, M. (1998) Higher education and relevance in the 21st century. Paper Presented at UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education. Paris, October, 1-65.

Gibbs, G. (1996) Supporting educational development within departments. *International Journal for Academic Development*, 1(1): 21-38.

Giroux, H. (1983) *Critical Theory and Educational Practice*. Geelong: Deakin University Press.

Giroux, H. (1988) *Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning*. Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey.

Giroux, H. (1992) *Border Crossing: Cultural Workers and the Politics of Education*. New York: Routledge.

Giroux, H. (1999) Rethinking cultural politics and radical pedagogy in the work of Antonio Gramsci. *Educational Theory*, 49(1): 1-19.

Golding, W. (1981) *Rites of Passage*. London: Faber & Faber.

Gordon, G. (1997) Preparing and developing academics for the needs of effective provision in mass tertiary education. *Higher Education Management*, 9(3): 67-77.

Gould, C. (1988) *Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gow, L & Kember, D. (1993) Conceptions of teaching and their relationship to student learning. *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 63: 20-33.

Gramsci, A. (1971) *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*. Hoare, Q. & Smith, G. (eds. and trans.). New York: International Publishers.

Greene, M. (1987) A response to: Interpretive, normative theory of education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 19(1): 12-14.

Gutman, A. (1998) Undemocratic education. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume III Society and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 28-43.

Haack, R. (1976) Philosophies of education. *Philosophy*, 51: 159-176.

Habermas, J. (1972) *Knowledge and Human Interests*. London: Heinemann.

Habermas, J. (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1987a) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two: Lifeworld and System*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1987b) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. F. Lawrence (trans.). Boston: MIT Press.

Hacker, P. (1972) *Insight and Illusion*. Oxford: Claredon Press.

Hallworth, H. (1957) Group discussion in its relevance to teacher training. *Educational Review*, 10: 10-15.

Hamlyn, D. (1998) The concept of development. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume II Education and Human Being. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 144-153.

Hardie, C. (1942) *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory*. New York: Columbia.

Hare, R. (1952) *The Language of Morals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harrington, H (1988) *Excellence – The IBM Way*. Milwaukee: American Society for Quality Control.

Hartley, J. & Davies, I. (1976) Preinstructional strategies: the role pretests, behavioural objectives, overviews and advance organisers. *Review of Educational Research*, 46(2): 239-265.

Harvey, L. & Green, D. (1993) Defining quality. *Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education: An International Journal*, 18(1): 9-34.

Harvey, L. & Knight, P. (1996) *Transforming Higher Education*. Suffolk: St Edmundsbury Press.

Hassard, J. (1993) Postmodernism and organisational analysis: An overview. *Postmodernism and Organisations*. Hassard, J. & Parker, M. (eds.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1-24.

Held, B. (1990) What's in a name? Some confusions and concerns about constructivism. *Journal of Marital and Family Therapy*, 16(2): 179-186.

Henning, E. (1995) Qualitative educational research: soft or solid option? *South African Journal of Education*, 15(1): 29-34.

Henning, E. (1998) Service learning in the university curriculum: partnerships in community education. *South African Journal of Higher Education*, 12(1): 44-53.

Hermes, M. (1998) Research methods as a situated response: towards a First Nations' methodology. *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 11(1): 155-168.

Hernandez, A. (1997) *Pedagogy, Democracy and Feminism: Rethinking the Public Sphere*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Herriman, M. (1995) Democratic values, individual rights and personal freedom in education. *Creating and Managing the Democratic School*. Chapman, J., Froumin, I. & Aspin, D. (eds.). Washington: The Farmer Press, 176-193.

Hirst, P. & Khilnani, S. (eds.) (1996) *Reinventing Democracy*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Hirst, P. & Peters, R. (1998) Education and philosophy. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 27-38.

Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.) (1998) The analytic tradition and philosophy of education: an historical perspective. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. London and New York: Routledge, i-xii.

Hirst, P. (1998a) Education, knowledge and practices. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 385-395.

Hirst, P. (1998b) Liberal education and the nature of knowledge. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 246-266.

Holmberg, B. (1977) *Distance Education: A Survey and Bibliography*. London: Kogan Page.

Holmberg, B. (1989) *Theory and Practice of Distance Education*. London: Routledge.

Howe, K. (1998) In defense of outcomes-based conceptions of equal educational opportunity. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume III Society and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 192-218.

Jarvis, D. (1998) Postmodernism: a critical typology. *Politics and Society*, 26(1): 95-143.

Jackson, R. (1994) The struggle for funds. *Reconstructing Education: DSA in Depth*. Sonn, F. (ed.), Cape Town: IDASA Publication, 7-8.

Jayaratne, T. & Stewart, A. (1995) Quantitative and qualitative methods in the social sciences: feminist issues and practical strategies. *Debates and Issues in Feminist Research and Pedagogy*. Holland, J., Blair, M. & Sheldon, S. (eds.). Clevedon, Philadelphia and Adelaide: Multilingual Matters Ltd and The Open University.

Jegedi, O. (1991) Constructivism and research in distance education. *Open Forum*, 1(1): 5-10.

Johnson, K. (1989) The foundations of instructional design. *Instructional Design: New Alternatives for Effective Education and Training*. Johnson, K. & Foa, L. (eds.). New York: Collier Macmillan, 4-15.

Jonassen, D., Davidson, M., Collins, M., Campbell, J. & Haag, B. (1995) Constructivism and computer-mediated communication in distance education. *The American Journal of Distance Education*, 9(2): 7-26.

Jones, M. (1998) Education and racism. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume III Society and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 138-153.

Kaul, R. (1996) Civil service reforms: learning from commonwealth experiences. *Public Administration and Development*. Washington: American Publications.

Keegan, K. (1990) *Foundations of Distance Education*. London: Routledge.

Kelchtermans, G. & Schratz, M. (1994) The development of qualitative research: efforts and experiences from continental Europe. *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 7(3): 239-255.

Kember, D. & Murphy, D. (1995) The impact of student learning research and the nature of design on ID fundamentals. *Instructional Design Fundamentals: A Reconsideration*. Seels, B. (ed). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 99-11.

Kember, D. (1998) Teaching beliefs and their impact on students' approach to learning. *Teaching and Learning in Higher Education*. Dart, B. & Boulton-Lewis, G. (eds.) Melbourne: Acer Press, 1-25.

Kerdeman, D. (1998) Hermeneutics and education: understanding, control and agency. *Educational Theory*, 48(2): 241-266.

Killen, R. (1995) Improving teaching through reflective partnerships. *To Improve the Academy: Resources for Faculty, Instructional, and Organisational Development: The Professional and Organisational Development Network in Higher Education Journal*, 14: 125-141.

Killen, R. (1996) Outcomes-based education: Rethinking teaching. Paper presented at the University of South Africa, Pretoria, on 15 October 1996, 1-22.

Kinsella, K. (1995) Peers coaching and teaching: colleagues supporting professional growth across the disciplines. *To Improve the Academy: Resources for Faculty, Instructional, and Organisational Development: The Professional and Organizational Development Network in Higher Education Journal*, 14: 101-123.

Knapper, C. (1995) Understanding student learning: implications for practice. *Teaching Improvement Practices*. Wright, W. & Associates (eds.). Bolton: Anker Publishers.

Kogan, M., Moses, I. & El Khawas, E. (1994) *Staffing Higher Education*. London:

Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

Kraak, A. (1999) Investigating new knowledge production: a South African higher education case study. Unpublished paper presented at the University of the Western Cape 27 July workshop (New Knowledge Production – Interrogating the Gibbons Thesis from the South African Perspective), 1-21.

Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London, New York: Verso.

Ladd, E. & Lipsett, S. (1976) How professors spend their time. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2(2): 115-123.

Lakomski, G. (ed.) Beyond paradigms: coherentism and holism in educational research. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 15(6): 499-507.

Lanham, R. (1974) *Style: An Anti-textbook*. New York: Garland.

Lategan, L. (1998) Quality assurance and the South African university system: defining the impact of external and internal trends on the South African university system and its quality. *South African Journal of Higher Education*, 12(1): 61-69.

Lather, P. (1991) *Getting Smart: Feminist Research and Pedagogy with/in the Postmodern*. New York: Routledge.

Lather, P. (1998) Critical pedagogy and its complicities: a praxis of stuck places. *Educational Theory*, 48(4): 487-497.

Lockwood, F. (1995) Students' perception of, and response to, formative and summative assessment material. *Open and Distance Learning Today*. Lockwood, F. (ed.). London: Routledge, 197-207.

Luckett, K. (ed.) (1996) *Curriculum Development: Reflecting on Our Practice*. SAAAD Curriculum Development Workshops, Tertiary Education Studies Unit, University of Natal.

MacIntyre, A. (1981) *After Virtue*. London: Duckworth.

MacIntyre, A. (1998) Who is taking risks? Moving toward collaborative research. *Inside Stories: Qualitative Research Reflections*. Bennett de Marrais, K. (ed.). London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 172-181.

MacKintosh, W. (1996) *Production Process Commission Report*, 1996. Bureau for University Teaching, University of South Africa.

MacMillan, J. & Schumacher, S. (1989) *Research in Education: A Conceptual Introduction* (2nd ed.). Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Macpherson, C. (1966) *The Real World of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Makgoba, W. (1996) South African universities in transformation: an opportunity to Africanise education. *Perspectives in Education*, 17(1): 175-186.

Marland, P. & Store, R. (1993) Some instructional strategies for improved learning from distance teaching materials. *Distance Education: New Perspectives*. Harry, K., John, M. & Keegan, D. (eds.). London: Routledge, 137-156.

Marcinkowski, T. (1993) A contextual review of the 'quantitative paradigm' in EE research. *Alternative Paradigms in Environmental Education Research*. Mrazek, R. (ed.). Ohio: North American Association for Environmental Education, 29-79.

Martin, E. & Balla, M. (1991) Conceptions of teaching and implications for learning. *Research and Development in Higher Education* 13: 298-304.

Martin, E. & Ramsden, P. (1994) *Effectiveness and Efficiency of Courses in Teaching Methods for Recently Appointed Academic Staff*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Marton, F. (1998) Towards a theory of quality in higher education. *Teaching and Learning in Higher Education*. Dart, B. & Boulton-Lewis, G. (eds.). Melbourne: Acer Press, 177- 200.

Marton, F., Watkins, D. & Tang, C. (1997) Discontinuities and continuities in the experience of learning: an interview study of high-school students in Hong Kong. *Learning and Instruction*, 7(1): 21-24.

McLaren, P. (1991) Critical pedagogy: constructing an arch of social dreaming and a doorway to hope. *Journal of Education*, 173(1): 9-34.

McLaren, P. & Giarelli, J. (eds.) (1995) *Critical Theory and Educational Research*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

McLaughlin, T. (1990) Peter Gardner on religious upbringing and the liberal ideal of religious autonomy. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 25(1): 107-125.

Middlehurst, R. & Woodhouse, D. (1995) Coherent systems for external quality assurance. *Quality in Higher Education*, 1(3): 257-268.

Middlehurst, R. & Gordon, G. (1995) Leadership, quality and institutional effectiveness. *Higher Education Quarterly*, 49: 265-285.

Mildren, S., Whelan, K. & Chappell-Lawrence, A. (1998) Introducing teamwork as a teaching and learning paradigm in engineering education. Proceedings of the 10th Australian Conference on Engineering Education, Gladstone, Queensland, 26-30 September 1998, 27-31.

Millard, R. (1991) Governance, quality and equity in the United States. *Quality and Access in Higher Education: Comparing Britain and the United States*. Berdahl, R., Moodie, G. & Spitzberg, I. (eds.) Suffolk: St Edmundsbury Press, 58-74.

Mitchell, C., Jolly, L. & McLeod, A. (1998) On the way to reflexivity. Proceedings of the 10th Australian Conference on Engineering Education, Gladstone, Queensland, 26-30 September 1998, 295-299.

Moore, G. (1903) *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, M. (1972) Learner autonomy: the second dimension of independent learning. *Convergence*, 5(2): 76-87.

Moore, M. (1973) Toward a theory of independent learning and teaching. *Journal of Higher Education*, 44: 666-679.

Moore, M. (1990) Recent contributions to the theory of distance education. *Open Learning*, 5(3): 10-15.

Moore, M. (1993) Three types of interaction. *Distance Education: New Perspectives*. Harry, K., John, M. & Keegan, D. (eds.). London: Routledge, 19-24.

Moore, M. & Kearsley, G. (1996) *Distance Education: A Systems View*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Mouton, J. (1996) Theory, metatheory and methodology in development studies: a heuristic framework. *Reconstruction, Development and People*. Coetzee, J. & Graaff, J. (eds.). Johannesburg: International Thomson Publishing, 16-38.

Morrow, W. (1995) *Metatheory Course Book*. University of the Western Cape: Department of Philosophy of Education.

Morrow, W. (1989) *Chains of Thought*. Johannesburg: Southern Books.

Morrow, W. (1998) Stakeholders and senates: the governance of higher education institutions in South Africa. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 28(3): 385-406.

Mothibeli, T. (2000) Kader Asmal reveals five-year plan for an education system shake-up. *Saturday Argus*, 15 / 16 January 2000, Cape Town.

Muller, J. (1999) What knowledge is of most work for the millennial citizen. Unpublished paper presented at the University of the Western Cape 27 July workshop (New Knowledge Production – Interrogating the Gibbons Thesis from the South African Perspective), 1-19.

Norris, S. (1989) Can we test validly for critical thinking? *Educational Researcher*, 18(9): 21-26.

Nuyen, A. (1996) Postmodern education as sublimation. *Educational Theory*, 46(1): 93-103.

Oakeshott, M. (1998) Education: the engagement and its frustration. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 284-310.

O'Connell, C. (1983) College policies off-target in fostering faculty development. *Journal of Higher Education*, 54: 662-675.

O'Connor, D. (1957) *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

Olivier, G. (1990) Philosophy and socio-political conversation: a postmodern proposal. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 9(2): 97-106.

Orner, M., Miller, J. & Ellsworth, E. (1996) Excessive moments and educational discourses that try to contain them. *Educational Theory*, 46(1): 71-91.

Ozmon, H. & Craver, S. (1995) *Philosophical Foundations of Education*. 5th Edition. Englewood Cliffs: Merrill Publishing Company.

Parer, M. (ed.) (1994) *Unlocking Open Learning*. Victoria: Monash University.

Pascarella, E. (1996) On student development in college: evidence from the national study of student learning. *To Improve the Academy: Resources for Faculty*,

Instructional, and Organisational Development: The Professional and Organizational Development Network in Higher Education Journal, 15: 17-29.

Pateman, C. (1979) *Participation and Democratic Theory; and The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Perold, H. (1998) Community service in higher education: a concept paper. Joint Education Trust Publication, 1-20.

Peters, O. (1993) Understanding distance education. *Distance Education: New Perspectives*. Harry, K., John, M. & Keegan, D. (eds.). London: Routledge.

Peters, R. (1966) *Ethics and Education*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Peters, R. (1973) Values in education (2): Reply to Glenn Langford. *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*. Langford, G. & O'Connor, D. (eds.). London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 135-146.

Peters, R. (1998a) The justification of education. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 207-230.

Peters, R. (1998b) Freedom and the development of the free man. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume II Education and Human Being. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 11-31.

Pfeffer, N. & Coote, A. (1991) *Is Quality for You? A Critical Review of Quality Assurance in Welfare Services*. London: Institute of Policy Research.

Pinar, W. & Reynolds, W. (eds.) (1992) *Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Popper, K. (1945) *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Vol I, Fifth Edition. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.

Popper, K. (1963) On the sources of knowledge and ignorance. *Conjectures and Refutations*. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul.

Pratt, D. (1992) Conceptions of teaching. *Adult Education Quarterly*, 42(4): 203-220.

Prezeworski, A. (1995) *Sustainable Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prosser, M., Trigwell, K. & Taylor, P. (1994) A phenomenographic study of academics' conceptions of science learning and teaching. *Learning and Instruction*, 4: 217-231.

Qualters, D. (1995) A quantum leap in faculty development: beyond reflective practice. *To Improve the Academy: Resources for Faculty, Instructional, and Organisational Development: The Professional and Organizational Development Network in Higher Education Journal*, 14: 43-55.

Quine, W. (1996) *From a Logical Point of View*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ramsden, P. (1992) *Learning to Teach in Higher Education*. London: Routledge.

Rawls, J. (1971) *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (1972) *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reigeluth, C. (1983) *Instructional-design Theories and Models: An Overview of their Current Status*, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1996) *A Framework for Transformation: Report*. Pretoria: National Commission on Higher Education.

Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1997) *Higher Education Act No. 101 of 1997*. Government Gazette, Vol. 390 No. 18515. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1997) *White Paper No. 3 on Higher Education Transformation*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Richman, R. (1965) Concepts without criteria. *Theoria*, 31: 65-85.

Robinson, B. (1994) Assuring quality in open and distance learning. *Materials Production in Open and Distance Learning*. Lockwood, F. (ed.). London: Paul Chapman Publishing.

Röhrs, H. (1995) *The Classical German Concept of the University and Its Influence on Higher Education in the United States*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publishers.

Rorty, R. (1980) *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rossouw, H. (1994) Die funksie van universiteitsonderwys. *Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe*, 35(1): 29-36.

Rowntree, D. (1994) *Preparing Materials for Open, Distance and Flexible Learning*. London: Kogan Page.

Rumble, G. (1989) Open learning, distance learning and the misuse of language. *Open Learning*, 4(2): 28-36.

Russell, B. (1918) The philosophy of logical atomism. *Logic and Knowledge*. Marsh, R. (ed.). London: Allen & Unwin, 177-281.

Ryle, G. (1949) *The Concept of Mind*. London: Hutchinson.

SAIDE (South African Institute for Distance Education) (1996) *Open Learning and Distance Education in South Africa. Report of an International Commission*. Johannesburg: Macmillan.

Salusinsky, I. (1987) *Jaques Derrida: Criticism in Society – Interviews*. I Salusinsky (ed.). New York: Methuen, 9-24.

Samuelowics, K. & Bain, J. (1992) Conceptions of teaching held by academic teachers. *Higher Education*, 24: 93-111.

Scheffler, I. (1960) *The Language of Education*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

Schein, E. (1993) On dialogue, culture and organisational learning. *Organisational Dynamics*, 22: 40-51.

Scheurich, J. (1996) The masks of validity: a deconstructive investigation. *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 9(1): 49-60.

Scholes, R. (1985) *Textual Power*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Schön, D. (1983) *The Reflective Practitioner*. New York: Basic Books.

Schreuder, D. (2000) *MPhil Leadership in Education: Programme Orientation*. Matieland: University of Stellenbosch Publishers.

Schuller, T. (ed.) (1991) *The Future of Higher Education*. Suffolk: St Edmundsbury Press Ltd.

Scott, J. (1989) Multiculturalism and the politics of identity. *Feminist Theory in Practice and Process*. Malson, M., O'Barr, J., Wesphal-Uhl, S. & Wyers, M. (eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scott, P. (1995) *The Meanings of Mass Education*. Suffolk: St Edmunds Press Ltd.

Scheffler, I. (1998) The concept of teaching. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume IV Problems of Educational Content and Practices. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 259-267.

Schumpeter, J. (1940) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Schwandt, T. (1997) *Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary of Terms*. London: Sage Publications.

Sedibe, K. (1998) Dismantling apartheid education: an overview of change. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 28(3): 269-283.

Seels, B. (ed). *Instructional Design Fundamentals: A Reconsideration*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.

Shalem, Y. (1999) Epistemological labor: the way to significant pedagogical authority. *Educational Theory*, 49(1): 53-70.

Sherman, R. & Webb, R. (eds.) (1990) *Qualitative Research in Education: Focus and Methods*. London, New York and Philadelphia: The Falmer Press.

Smith, A. (1998) *Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary*. London and New York: Routledge.

Small, R. (1987) Uses and abuses of phenomenology in education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 19(1): 12-15.

Smith, J. & Heshusius, L. (1986) Closing down the conversation: The end of the quantitative-qualitative debate among educational inquirers. *Educational Researcher*, 15(1): 4-211.

Soltis, J. (1998) Perspectives on philosophy of education. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 196-204.

Spady, W. (1994) Choosing outcomes of significance. *Educational Leadership*, 51:18-22.

Steffi, L. & Gale, J. (1995) *Constructivism in Education*. New Jersey, Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Steyn, J. (1998) Quality education and equality in education: a dilemma for democratic South Africa. *Building a Culture of Democratic Education in a Young South Africa*. Seminar Report, 21-24 July, University of Stellenbosch. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 103-109.

Steyn, J., De Klerk, J. & Du Plessis, W. (1999) *Education for Democracy*. 3rd Edition. Durbanville: Wachwa Publishers.

Steyn, P. & Wilkinson, A. (1998) Understanding the theoretical assumptions of outcomes-based education as a condition for meaningful implementation. *South African Journal of Education*, 18(4): 203-208.

Steward, D. (1981) *Distance Education: International Perspectives*. New York: Routledge.

Subotzky, G. (1999) Complementing the marketization of higher education: knowledge production for social development in community-higher education partnerships. Unpublished paper presented at the University of the Western Cape 27 July workshop (New Knowledge Production – Interrogating the Gibbons Thesis from the South African Perspective), 1-28.

Tang, C. (1998) Effects of collaborative learning on the quality of assignments. *Teaching and Learning in Higher Education*. Dart, B. & Boulton-Lewis, G. (eds.). Melbourne: Acer Press, 102- 123.

Taylor, C. (1985) *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1989) *Sources of the Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Teichler, U. (1999) Lifelong learning as a challenge to higher education: the state of knowledge and future research tasks. *Higher Education Management*, 11(1): 37-53.

Tennyson, R. 1995. The Impact of the Cognitive Science Movement on Instructional Design Fundamentals. In *Instructional Design Fundamentals: A Reconsideration* edited by B Seels. New Jersey: University of Pittsburgh.

Tennyson, R & Barron, A. (eds) 1995. *Automating Instructional Design: Computer-Based Development and Delivery Tools*, Minnesota: Springer and NATO Scientific Affairs Division.

Tierney, W. (1994) On method and hope. *Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational Research*. Gitlin, A. (ed.). New York: Routledge, 97-115.

Tjeldvoll, A. & Holtet, K. (1998) The service university in a service society. *Higher Education*, 35(1): 27-48.

Torres, C. (1998) Democracy, education and multiculturalism. *Comparative Education Review*, 42(4): 421-447.

Trigwell, K., Prosser, M. & Taylor, P. (1994) Qualitative differences in approaches to teaching first year university science. *Higher Education*, 27: 75-84.

University of Stellenbosch (1999) US Institutional Plan 1999-2001. Matieland: US Publishers, 1-30.

University of Stellenbosch (1998) US Handleiding vir prestasiebeoordeling van akademiese personeel. Matieland: US Publishers, 1-25.

Usher, R., Bryant, I. & Johnstone, R. (1997) *Adult Education and the Postmodern Challenge*. London: Routledge.

Vandenberg, D. (1995) Phenomenology in educational discourse. *Metatheories in Philosophy of Education*. Higgs, P. (ed.). Johannesburg: Heinemann, 175-196.

Van der Merwe, W. (1992) Wittgenstein on language and experience. *Acta Academica*, 24(4): 18-29.

Van Niekerk, A. (1998) Values, transformation and social work in South Africa. *Social Work*, 34(1): 60-70.

Velazquez, C. (1998) Personal reflections on the process; the role of the researcher and transformative research. *Inside Stories: Qualitative Research Reflections*. Bennett de Marrais, K. (ed.). London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 59-66.

Vroeijenstijn, T. (1995) Improvement and quality. *Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education, 23-25 May 1995*. Utrecht: VSNU / Inspectorate of Education, 25-35.

Waghid, Y. (1998) Improving teaching and learning at a distance through collegial partnerships. *The Journal of Open and Distance Learning*, 13(1): 45-51.

Waghid, Y. (1999) Instructional systems design tools and engineering materials development. *South African Journal of Education*, 19(2): 115-121.

Waghid, Y. (1999) Engaging universities and society through research, teaching and service. *South African Journal of Higher Education*, 13(2): 109-117.

Waghid, Y. (2000) Integrating university research, teaching and community service: a practice of greater social relevance. *International Journal of Special Education*, 15(2): In press.

Wagner, A. (1999) Tertiary education and lifelong learning: perspectives, findings and issues from OECD work. *Higher Education Management*, 11(1): 55 – 67.

Walker, J. & Evers, C. (1988) The epistemological unity of educational research. *Educational Research, Methodology and Measurement: An International Handbook*. Keeves, J. (ed.). Oxford: Pergamon Press, 28-36.

Walker, J. (1998) Education for democracy: the representation / participation dualism. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume III Society and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 11-27.

Walsh, K. (1991) Quality and public services. *Public Administration*, 69(4): 503-514.

Ward, B. (1995) Improving teaching across the academy: gleanings from research. *To Improve the Academy: Resources for Faculty, Instructional, and Organizational Development: The Professional and Organizational Development Network in Higher Education Journal*, 14: 27-42.

Wedemeyer, C. (1971) Independent study. *The Encyclopedia of Education*, 4: 548-557.

West, C., de Alba, K. & Sheris, E. (1996) Colloquy: our next race question: the uneasiness between Blacks and Latinos. *Harper's*, April, 55-63.

White, J. & White, P. (1998) Education, liberalism and human good. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, Volume I Philosophy and Education. Hirst, P. & White, P. (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 348-366.

Williams, G. & Fry, H. (1994) *Longer Term Prospects for British Higher Education*. London: Institute of Education.

Wilson, J. (1988) Seriousness and the foundations of education. *Educational Theory*, 48(2): 143-153.

Wittgenstein, L. (1922) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London: Routledge.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wolpe, H. (1993) Post-secondary education policy. Unpublished paper. Bellville: Education Policy Unit, University of the Western Cape, 1-7.

Wood, E. (1994) A tale of two democracies. *History Today*, 44(5): 50-56.

Yates, L. (1997) Research methodology, education, and theoretical fashions: constructing a methodology course in an era of deconstruction. *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 10(4): 487-498.

Young, M. (1999) Knowledge, learning and the curriculum of the future? Inaugural Lecture, University of London Institute of Education, London, 4 February 1999, 1-21.

Zeller, N. & Farmer, F. (1999) "Catchy clever titles are not acceptable", Style, APA, and qualitative reporting. *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 12(1): 3-19.

Zolo, D. (1992) *Democracy and Complexity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.